




National Security Systems Directorate

Counter Terrorism Playbook

DEPARTMENT
of the PRIME MINISTER
and CABINET



National Security Systems Directorate



11 July 2018



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INTRODUCTION

Background

1. The Government's response to national crises is outlined in the National Security System (NSS) Handbook. The NSS is New Zealand's all-hazard national strategic planning and crisis management system and involves three levels: a committee of key Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister; the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (ODESC); and Watch Groups. During crises the NSS provides strategic direction and ensures a coordinated government response. The NSS facilitates effective decision-making based upon situational awareness, a shared understanding of how events may unfold and procedures to ensure that decisions are taken in a structured way, at an appropriate level.
2. A counter terrorism response has the overall aim of securing a swift resolution that reduces the risk to the public and ensures as little disruption as possible. Under New Zealand law an act of terrorism is a crime, and as such is subject to criminal investigation and the judicial process. NZ Police therefore have primary responsibility for the operational response to a domestic terrorist incident. Nevertheless, the complexity of terrorism requires that the Government be directly involved to harness all national resources to respond to an incident, which may have wide-ranging implications. The response is guided by strategic objectives.
3. The strategic objectives for an initial central government response are to:
 - a. Ensure public safety, protect human life and alleviate suffering;
 - b. Preserve sovereignty, and minimise impacts on society, the economy, and the environment;
 - c. Support the continuity of everyday activity, and the early restoration of disrupted services; and
 - d. Uphold the rule of law, democratic institutions and national values.

Purpose

4. In addressing terrorism, New Zealand takes a risk management approach known as the '4-Rs'. The '4-Rs' approach encompasses end-to-end risk management around four elements: risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery. This Playbook is focused on the 'response' element of a terrorism event and is intended to act as an aide memoire that provides guidance for Ministers and officials when incidents occur.
5. The Playbook aims to:
 - a. Identify the most likely terrorist scenarios within New Zealand's domestic terrorism security environment;
 - b. Describe end-state objectives;
 - c. Identify possible response options;
 - d. Outline the actions taken by agencies in advance of the key Ministers and ODESC meeting;
 - e. Provide Ministers and senior officials with an indicative meeting run sheet including key considerations; and



- f. Provide background information concerning the enablers that contribute to an effective counter terrorism response.

Scenarios

6. While recognising the uniqueness of terrorist incidents and accordingly the need to maintain a flexible approach, observations from other countries' experience indicate that there are recurring themes and considerations that need to be addressed during a response. The Playbook is arranged with this in mind while also drawing on New Zealand's current domestic terrorist threat assessment, to identify five potential scenarios:
 - Scenario 1: a change in New Zealand's domestic terrorist threat level;
 - Scenario 2: a short one-off isolated attack;
 - Scenario 3: a hostage-taking/siege incident;
 - Scenario 4: simultaneous attacks or complex cascading attack; and
 - Scenario 5: a terrorist incident overseas that may impact New Zealanders or have consequences in New Zealand.
7. The Playbook does not contain an exhaustive list of all possible terrorist scenarios. Indeed, this Playbook is focused upon the most likely scenarios based on analysis of New Zealand's current security environment. Nevertheless, to ensure operational agility, Scenario 4, which is considered a 'maximum credible event', is included.

What Ministers can expect

8. The NSS is geared to assisting Ministers to make well-informed decisions and provide a degree of order and structure in challenging conditions. In this case a terrorist incident.
9. When an incident occurs, a committee of key Ministers would be convened in special session, as part of its role to "Coordinate and direct national responses to major crises or circumstances affecting national security either domestically or internationally". Ministers can expect to be briefed by the Chair of ODESC, the Commissioner of Police as well as supporting agencies' chief executives. In advance of the briefing and time permitting, Ministers will receive a summary of what has happened. At the initial meeting, Ministers will be:
 - a. informed of what decisions are required of them and asked to provide direction to officials;
 - b. updated on what has occurred;
 - c. informed of the impact;
 - d. briefed on what the response is; and
 - e. briefed on what the public is being told.



SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS

Scenario 1 – Change to the domestic threat level

This scenario is based upon credible intelligence that terrorists are discussing or undertaking activities that lead to an assessment that there is a potential threat to public safety in New Zealand. In this situation, the Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) will raise New Zealand's domestic threat level.

The threat level could range from MEDIUM to EXTREME depending upon a number of factors including the plausibility of the scenario, the intent and capability of the terrorists, and imminence of an attack. An elevation of New Zealand's terrorism threat level would result in an activation of the national security system to consider the implications, coordinate the government response and consider the advice to the public. An explanation of the threat levels is attached at Annex B.

Scenario 2 – Short one-off isolated attack

This scenario envisages a scenario where a lone actor conducts a low-level planned or spontaneous attack using readily available implements.

An example is the 2017 Westminster attack that occurred on 22 March. 52-year-old Khalid Masood drove a hire car onto London's Westminster Bridge, mounted the vehicle onto the pavement and accelerated into pedestrians. Masood then drove the vehicle around permanent bollards at the end of the bridge before remounting the pavement and crashing the car. Masood abandoned the vehicle and proceeded on foot into the Houses of Parliament complex via the Carriage Gates—temporarily open to allow a vehicle to exit—and used two kitchen knives to attack two unarmed police officers, killing one and injuring the other. An armed police close protection officer then shot and killed Masood.

The attack lasted 82 seconds and resulted in six deaths, including Masood's, and 49 people injured. It was an unsophisticated deliberate terrorist attack using a car and knives as weapons. In the follow-up investigation it was determined that Masood acted alone.

Scenario 3 – Hostage-taking/Siege Incident

This scenario envisages a situation where a lone actor takes one or more hostages and the incident evolves into a protracted siege.

The 2014 Sydney hostage crisis, also known as the Lindt Cafe siege occurred on 15–16 December 2014 when a lone gunman, Man Haron Monis, held hostage ten customers and eight employees of a Lindt chocolate café located at Martin Place in Sydney, Australia. Police treated the event as a terrorist attack at the time but Monis' motives have subsequently been debated. The Sydney siege led to a 16-hour standoff, after which a gunshot was heard from inside and police officers from the Tactical Operations Unit stormed the café. One hostage was killed by Monis and another was killed by a police bullet ricochet in the subsequent raid. Monis was also killed. Three other hostages and a police officer were injured by police gunfire during the raid.



Scenario 4 – Simultaneous attacks or complex cascading attack

This scenario envisages a more complex and coordinated attack where attacks are carried out simultaneously at two or more locations; or where an attack cascades from location to location, potentially involving different methodologies.

Examples of this include the Paris attacks in 2015 and the London Borough Market attacks in 2017. The Paris attacks involved three co-ordinated groups using firearms and explosives to target different locations, including a sports event, music concert and restaurants. One hundred and thirty people were killed and 413 injured over a three hour period. In London, three individuals drove a rental vehicle into pedestrians before abandoning the vehicle and moving into a shopping and tourist area by foot. Bladed weapons taped to the individuals' hands were used to stab and slash people as they went, before the attackers were shot by armed response Police. The attack lasted 18 minutes and killed eight people and injured 48.

Scenario 5 - Terrorist incident overseas that impacts New Zealand and/or New Zealanders

This scenario addresses the issue of international terrorist incidents and their potential impact to New Zealand and/or New Zealanders.

New Zealand has one of the biggest expatriate diasporas in the developed world, as many as a million people which is approximately 25% of our population. Furthermore, Statistics New Zealand report that 2.39 million New Zealanders went on overseas trips in 2015. Against this backdrop, when terrorist incidents occur overseas there is always the potential for New Zealanders to be affected. Alternatively, there are international terrorist incidents, which require New Zealand to review its current security settings to determine if a similar threat exists here or if vulnerabilities have been exposed. Examples are the IED attack outside of Ariana Grande's concert in Manchester in May 2017 or the thwarted plot to bring down an airplane in Sydney in July 2017. Incidents such as these may cause a limited activation of the National Security System to assess the implications for New Zealand.

[Pages 7 to 30 inclusive withheld in full under section 6(a)]



National Security System Response

Role

The purpose of the National Security System during a terrorist incident is to provide Government a framework that enables it to exercise leadership in crisis conditions.

How does the national security system respond?

When an incident occurs or is imminent, the Chief Executive of DPMC who is the lead official for national security will activate the national security system. The national security system consists of:

- Key Ministers, led by the Prime Minister;
- The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) consisting of Chief Executives led by the Chief Executive of DPMC ;
- A Watch Group consisting of senior officials led by the Deputy Chief Executive, Security and Intelligence, DPMC;
- A lead agency (Police) responsible for leading the operational response; and
- Supporting agencies.

The National Security System provides for a coordinated government response in which:

- risks are identified and managed;
- the response is timely and appropriate;
- national resources are applied effectively;
- adverse outcomes are minimised;
- multiple objectives are dealt with together; and
- agencies' activities are coordinated.

How does it work?

The ODESC will meet in advance of the key Ministers and focus on the strategic consequences arising from the incident and develop advice for Ministers to consider. In addition, a brief would be provided to Ministers covering: the intelligence picture (including a threat assessment), the operational response, communication messages and other key matters such as the international reaction and impact to communities. As well as providing advice, there will typically be issues or matters that require decisions by Government.

The Watch Group supports ODESC and accordingly will meet frequently to ensure that there is situational clarity, that the response is coordinated and strategic direction is being followed through by the response agencies.



The operational response will be managed by Police as the lead agency. Strategic direction derived out of the key Ministers’s deliberation, acts as the bridge that links the key Ministers, ODESC and the Watch Group with Police’s operational response.

Decision support

Decision support, accurate recordkeeping of meetings and dissemination of meeting decisions are extremely important. Cabinet Office supports the key Ministers and the National Security System Directorate (NSSD) of DPMC fulfils this function for the ODESC and Watch Group. NSSD is also responsible for coordinating the system in providing briefs, intelligence products and talking points. The products are circulated to the key Ministers, ODESC, Watch Group and responding agencies.

Membership of the NSS Committees

Committees	
Key Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister	Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC)
*TBC	Chief Executive of DPMC
	Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade
	Commissioner of Police
	Chief of Defence Force
	Secretary of Defence
	Director-General of GCSB
	Director-General of NZSIS
	Comptroller of Customs
	Secretary of Transport
	Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management
Other relevant portfolio Ministers as appropriate	Other chief executives as appropriate i.e the Secretary of Local Government (CE of DIA)

Watch Group Membership

Agencies represented in ODESC will also be reflected in the Watch Group membership.

Appendix:

1. Agenda for the Initial Meeting of the Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee.



APPENDIX 1

Agenda

**MEETING OF KEY MINISTERS
CONCERNING A TERRORIST INCIDENT**

Date Day/date/Month/Year
Time Time
Venue Location

Item	Subject	Responsible
1.	Scene setter: what decisions are required?	DPMC
2.	Situation Update and Intelligence: what has happened and what do we know?	Police, NZSIS
3.	Risks and implications: what is the impact and consequences?	DPMC
4.	Operational response: what are we doing about it?	NZSIS, NZDF, MCDEM, MFAT
5.	Public Communications: what are we telling the public?	Police, DPMC
6.	Confirmation of decisions	DPMC



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ANNEX C

TERRORISM THREAT LEVELS

Setting the Terrorism Threat Level

The threat level for New Zealand is set by the Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG). CTAG is a multi-agency fusion centre with an autonomous mandate to assess the threat to New Zealand and New Zealand interests from terrorism. CTAG monitors and revises the New Zealand domestic terrorism threat level as required. CTAG also sets and revises threat levels for countries and major events. In the event of a terrorist incident the process to change the domestic threat level is considered within the national security system resulting in advice from ODESC to the Prime Minister. A threat level may or may not be publicly announced.

Terrorism Threat Levels

The threat levels are:

Threat Level	Definition	Qualitative Statement
Negligible	Terrorist attack, or violent criminal behaviour, or violent protest activity is assessed as very unlikely	Remote / Highly Unlikely
Very Low	Terrorist attack, or violent criminal behaviour, or violent protest activity is assessed as unlikely.	Improbable / Unlikely
Low	Terrorist attack, or violent criminal behaviour, or violent protest activity is assessed as possible, but is not expected.	Realistic Possibility
Medium	Terrorist attack, or violent criminal behaviour, or violent protest activity is assessed as feasible and could well occur.	Probable / Likely
High	Terrorist attack, or violent criminal behaviour, or violent protest activity is assessed as very likely.	Highly/Very Probable/Likely
Extreme	Terrorist attack, or violent criminal behaviour, or violent protest activity is expected imminently.	Almost Certain

Figure 1: CTAG terrorism threat levels and associated probabilistic language

How are threat levels determined?

The New Zealand threat level is determined strictly in accordance with New Zealand conditions. It does not necessarily change when attacks occur overseas or when partners change their threat levels. It is intelligence-based and is an indication of likelihood of a terrorist event based on intent and capability of terrorist actors and their potential opportunity to enact that intent and capability in the form of an attack.

The terrorism threat level may be increased following a domestic attack but this is not an automatic reaction. An increase would denote that further attacks are considered feasible, likely or imminent; or that they cannot be conclusively discounted because of intelligence and operational information gaps.



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**PROTECTIVE SECURITY RESPONSE**

ANNEX D

Protective Security Response

In response to an attack or serious threat, the key Ministers will receive advice from the ODESC on the protective security measures it may wish to implement around the specific targets of the terrorist activity or in general. Protective security measures help mitigate the risks to the public and the public sector.

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The Public Sector

With respect to the public sector, the New Zealand Government's Protective Security Requirements (PSR) requires agencies to have plans and protocols in place so they can move to heightened security levels in case of an emergency or increased threat. To assist in the implementation of appropriate security arrangements, the PSR National Alert Levels provides generic guidance to agencies on what measures they need to initiate.

How are the security measures implemented?

Police would be responsible for notifying the public of an increase to security in response to a threat or incident. This would be done alongside coordinated communications to the public concerning the risk. With respect to the public sector, ODESC would initiate the protective security arrangements. Once direction is passed to agencies, it is the responsibility of agency Chief Security Officers (CSOs) to ensure implementation of security measures.

It should be noted, that the National Alert Levels and the detail of the security measures taken to protect people and the government are not publically discussed, to avoid unnecessary disclosure of security arrangements.



National Alert Levels

The four PSR national alert levels applicable to the public sector are as follows:

Level	Measures
<p>LOW: Applies when only general concerns exist or no known event, general threat, or physical activity likely to cause harm to the agency or any of its facilities exists.</p> <p>(A terrorist attack is assessed as unlikely.)</p>	<p>(All measures applied under this alert level are to be capable of being maintained indefinitely.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Staff are reminded about security and alert issues. ▶ Operational security and emergency plans and procedures are reviewed (at least once per year). ▶ Awareness training activities are initiated.
<p>MEDIUM: Applies when an event, general threat, or physical activity likely to cause harm might occur. There is no specific threat directed at the agency or to any of its facilities.</p> <p>(A terrorist attack is assessed as feasible and could well occur but no specific threat is known.)</p>	<p>(All measures applied under this alert level are to be capable of being maintained indefinitely.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Staff are alert to unusual activities and who to report them to. ▶ Normal operational plans and procedures are up to date. ▶ Regular security and emergency awareness messages are issued. ▶ Staff and emergency control personnel are trained and alert to local emergency events. ▶ Annual review of security, threat and disaster recovery plans.
<p>HIGH: Applies when an event, threat, or physical activity expected to cause harm is likely to occur to the agency or its facilities.</p> <p>(An assessment exists that a terrorist attack is feasible and could well occur to the agency; a suspicious mail item is received in the mail.)</p>	<p>(The measures used under this alert are to be capable of being maintained for lengthy periods without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with the local community.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ LOW/ MEDIUM measures are in place. <p>s6(a)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Staff are notified of the change in alert level. <p>s6(a)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Alternative business operation strategies are considered where an assessment of the situation finds the measures are to be maintained for lengthy periods of time.
<p>Extreme: Applies when an event, threat, or physical activity likely to cause significant harm is imminent or has occurred to the agency or its facilities.</p> <p>(An assessment exists that a terrorist attack is imminent and could well occur to the agency or has occurred.)</p>	<p>s6(a)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ LOW/ MEDIUM and HIGH measures are in place. <p>s6(a)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Frequent communication with staff. ▶ Plans under constant review to returning alert to HIGH or LOW/ MEDIUM level.

**POLICE OPERATIONAL RESPONSE**

ANNEX E

Legislative authority of New Zealand Police in Counter Terrorism

The fundamental power authorising New Zealand Police (NZP) to provide the response to any terrorist threat or incident in a domestic setting arises from the Crimes Act, and the Constabulary powers within the Policing Act. These powers are then implemented through the Police Counter Terrorism (CT) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Police procedures in response to a change in threat level or Counter Terrorist (CT) event

NZP are the designated lead agency, providing command and control of the multi-agency response to any CT event in New Zealand.

In response to a terrorist incident, or where there is intelligence of an imminent threat, there would be an increase in the number of visible policing resources.

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Command, control and coordination

Initial coordination of a terrorist incident will be managed by the National Communications (Comms) Centre. This role will transition to the relevant District Command Centre (12 DCCs nationally) in a protracted incident.

Oversight will be maintained by the National Command and Coordination Centre (NCCC) based at Police National Headquarters.

The Local Controller (District Commander) is responsible for command, co-ordination and control of the terrorist incident within their district, subject to any direction by the National Controller.

The National Controller (Assistant Commissioner) has the overall control and command of any domestic CT event, on behalf of the Commissioner. s6(a)

and dependent on the nature of the CT event, may instigate the activation of the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) and will then operate from there.

The Police structure, roles and responsibilities for a CT operation at the national level is detailed in the NZP Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for a Terrorist event.



NZDF ASSISTANCE

ANNEX F

Legislated employment of the NZDF in accordance with the Defence Act 1990

Within the parameters of a domestic counter terrorism (CT) response, the NZDF may be used to provide assistance to NZ Police, as the lead agency, through:

- The provision of personnel and capabilities where NZDF do not have the same powers as the Police. This may include, but is not limited to, helicopter support, logistics support, support to cordons, and use of armoured vehicles as protected mobility.
- The provision of personnel and capabilities where NZDF personnel shall:
 - For any purpose necessary to assist the Police in dealing with the emergency, exercise any power of a member of the Police; and
 - For the purposes of civil and criminal liability, have the protections of a member of the Police, in addition to all other protections that members of the Armed Forces may have.

Where NZDF personnel are given the same powers and immunities as a member of the NZ Police, NZDF assistance could include the deployment of Special Forces (SF) and the potential use of deadly force to assist in resolving the situation.

Approvals to employ NZDF in response to a domestic CT response.

Where NZDF personnel do not require any power of a member of the police, the Chief of the Defence Force can approve their deployment at the request of NZ Police.

Where NZ Police request that NZDF personnel be given the same powers and immunities as a member of the NZ Police, approval resides with the Prime Minister or the next most senior Minister.

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What factors should be considered in providing NZDF assistance?

- What support do the Police need and where?
- What will be the impact of deploying the military to the security situation?
- What impact will the deployments have on public confidence and community cohesion?
- What is the plan for ramping down the military deployment?
- How will we explain to the public what we are doing?

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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO A DOMESTIC TERRORIST INCIDENT

ANNEX G

MFAT provides the principal interface between the New Zealand Government, foreign governments and international organisations. Our international priorities in responding to a domestic terrorist threat will be to:

1. Coordinate offers of or requests for international support in response to the incident.
2. Retain the confidence of the international community that the New Zealand Government is effectively managing the incident.
3. Support foreign diplomatic and consular missions accredited to New Zealand to fulfil their consular responsibilities to nationals affected by the incident.
4. Minimise any negative impact on New Zealand's trade and international relations.
5. Enable effective investigation of international linkages, including cooperation with foreign governments on any residual or emerging threats.

In the event of a significant incident, MFAT leads the international function including the provision of advice on foreign policy, international security, international relations and trade implications in support of the lead domestic response agency, Police.

International responses

The attitudes and responses of foreign governments and other international stakeholders can add a complicated dimension to a domestic terrorist crisis. These include, but may not be limited to:

- Travel advisories issued by foreign governments;
- Requests for information on the situation from foreign governments;
- Views on the New Zealand response to the crisis;
- Potential impact on trade interests, such as negative reactions from the tourism or international education sectors;
- International media interest;
- Circumstances in other countries contributing directly or indirectly to the crisis (including such as would make ancillary terrorist targets of a diplomatic or foreign character located in New Zealand).

MFAT will seek to manage the reaction of the international community through engagement with accredited diplomatic missions and consular posts in New Zealand, as well as directly with foreign governments via its network of posts overseas. MFAT will coordinate messaging to foreign governments in accordance with the communications strategy, noting that in some instances it will be desirable to share information with trusted foreign partners over and above that available in the public domain.

MFAT will also seek to ensure the travel advice for New Zealand issued by foreign governments is proportionate, recognising that influence will be limited. Countries with mechanistic systems could advise against travel to New Zealand in the event of a terrorist incident, which may have negative consequences for tourism or business.



Enquiries from international news media will be referred to the national communications lead.

International Assistance

Foreign governments may offer assistance or expertise to help respond to a domestic terrorist incident. This could be offered through a variety of channels, including diplomatic, Police, Defence or other agency channels. MFAT has responsibility for coordinating offers of international assistance in conjunction with relevant agencies. Similarly, MFAT will play a coordinating role should the New Zealand Government wish to seek the assistance of foreign government in response to the event.

Foreign consular responsibilities

Any domestic terrorist incident in New Zealand could include foreign national victims. Following a terrorist incident, the foreign diplomatic and consular corps will seek information directly from MFAT on whether any of their nationals are either involved or affected. MFAT and Police will work together to respond to enquiries and deliver consistent messages to diplomatic and consular contacts. Depending on the nature, scope and details of the incident, this could include providing regular email sitreps or briefings to the diplomatic and consular corps. Any unavoidable delay between an incident and authorisation for the release of information to foreign governments will need to be taken into account.

Should there be a large-scale event, MFAT will engage with the diplomatic corps. For small-scale events affecting few foreign nationals, Police will notify missions directly. Police will also work with missions should there be fatalities. Affected foreign governments may also wish to send representatives to New Zealand to observe resolution of the incident, or assist in any other way on the ground. New Zealand also has international legal obligations in respect of consultation and assistance in the event that foreign diplomatic, consular or other government officials present in New Zealand are taken hostage, or in the event of a terrorist attack on a diplomatic establishment or foreign aircraft in New Zealand.

VIP Visitors

MFAT, in conjunction with DIA's Visits and Ceremonial Office as appropriate, will assist high level foreign government VIP visitors in New Zealand who have been affected by a domestic terrorist incident. Should a visiting VIP be directly involved in a terror incident, MFAT will work with the relevant Embassy or High Commission to provide necessary support. If the incident only affects visit programme and logistics, MFAT may work with the relevant diplomatic mission to modify or adjust visit programmes accordingly. Consideration will also need to be given to any impact on planning for future incoming high level visits.

Investigations

New Zealand Police and other relevant agencies, supported as needed by MFAT and its international network, will work with foreign governments to understand whether the incident or threat has international links, including to determine whether foreign partners are aware of information regarding residual threats to New Zealand linked to the incident.

**TRANSPORT SECURITY RESPONSE**

ANNEX H

Transport Response Team

The Transport Response Team will activate, during a counter-terrorism response, to support the New Zealand Police as the lead agency.

The Transport Response Team consists of the Ministry of Transport (as the lead agency for the transport sector response), the New Zealand Transport Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority, Maritime New Zealand, and Kiwirail (Airways NZ and the Transport Accident Investigation Commission can also participate in the Transport Response Team as required). The Transport Response Team can be represented by the Ministry of Transport at Watch Group meetings and ODESC meetings. The Transport Response Team is also connected, via the Ministry of Transport, to the Minister of Transport. The Minister of Transport may not a member of the key Ministers committee established in response to a terrorist incident, but can be invited to attend by the committee chair if required.

Aviation security and airspace closures

The Minister of Transport and the Director of Civil Aviation have powers to introduce enhanced aviation security screening requirements in response to a security risk.

The Director of Civil Aviation also has the power to place restrictions on airspace, including directing the closure of New Zealand airspace. The complete closure of New Zealand airspace is an extreme measure with widespread impacts. The committee of key Ministers can request the Director of Civil Aviation to use their powers (to restrict airspace) to close New Zealand airspace.

Road and rail closures

Various agencies have powers to close roads, with the New Zealand Police and Fire and Emergency New Zealand having the power to close all roads; the New Zealand Transport Agency having the power to close State highways; and local authorities having the power to close local roads under their authority.

Fire and Emergency New Zealand and the New Zealand Transport Agency have powers relating to railway closure.



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


BORDER SECURITY RESPONSE **ANNEX I**

Border Security

NZ Border Agencies the New Zealand Customs Service (NZCS) and Immigration New Zealand (INZ) work together across individual and overlapping spheres of responsibility to facilitate legitimate transit of passengers (NZCS/INZ) and goods (NZCS) across the NZ border while identifying and acting on potential risk. NZCS and INZ can coordinate to manage risk at the earliest possible point by sharing information on specific risk indicators, and support lead CT agencies NZSIS and NZ Police by passing on CT-related intelligence and assisting in border-related activity 24/7. Both agencies use a combination of manual and automated targeting and direct interdiction, informed by profiles that are constantly reviewed and updated based on local and international events, trends and risk factors.

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Domestic Incident Response - How is it escalated?

Escalation of response at the border across relevant streams of responsibility would be initiated at the request or direction of lead agencies and NZ Government. Response and activity may also be escalated internally at any time as required, based on credible risk/threat information or indicators.

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CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

ANNEX J

The Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 identifies the statutory powers, structures, and arrangements that the government uses to manage an emergency. It also places obligations on agencies to prepare for and manage emergencies effectively and efficiently.

The National CDEM Plan 2015 aims to integrate and align agencies' CDEM planning and related operational activities at the national level. It also identifies those agencies, as mandated through legislation or expertise, to manage an emergency arising from specific hazards. The specific hazard, and its primary consequences to be managed in an emergency, determines which agency is the lead at the national level. The National CDEM Plan 2015 specifies that the NZ Police is the lead agency for terrorism.

Consequence management response

A potential or actual terrorist incident is likely to have a number of impacts outside the immediate response to the terrorist activity. These could include lockdown of school and businesses, displacement of individuals, transport disruption, and demand for information.

In response to a terrorism event, or where there is intelligence of an imminent threat, it has been pre-agreed that MCDEM will coordinate the consequence management for the event in support of Police, as the lead agency. This allows the Police to focus on the resolution of the terrorist element of the emergency.

Consequence management includes measures taken to preserve public health and safety, restore essential services, and provide emergency relief to communities, businesses and individuals affected by the terrorist incident. Consequence management response could include:

- Emergency accommodation (eg for evacuated individuals)
- Public information (what is going on and what they should do)
- Working with lifelines, especially transport, to restore essential services
- Provision of emergency relief such as financial assistance



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COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

ANNEX K

CT Communications

The management of public communications both during and following a terrorist event will play a critical role in both:

- protecting the public from harm; and
- supporting the public and communities recovering from a terrorist experience.

In any event there will be a need for both Public Information Management (PIM) function and Strategic Communications function.

PIM Communications

New Zealand Police as lead agency are responsible for public information in any terrorism incident. The PIM is based in the National Command and Coordination Centre (NCCC) at Police National Headquarters. The function is prepared and practiced and follows the PIM Standard Operating Procedures.

PIM responsibilities:

- ensuring timely, consistent and effective messaging for the public
- liaising and responding to the media
- monitoring and analysing media reporting and information and advising on appropriate communications strategies

PIM messaging is focused on informing the public about the incident and advising them on how to keep safe. They may also seek cooperation or information from the public.

Strategic Communications

The Strategic Communications function provides high level oversight and issues management when the National Security System is activated.

Strategic Communications responsibilities:

- supporting and advising the Officials Domestic External Security Coordination Committee (ODESC) and watch groups
- providing messaging and advice to the Prime Minister's Office and other Ministers' Offices
- providing information and advice to Chief Executives and other key stakeholders
- liaising with the media, government departments, local authorities and private sector entities

The Strategic Communications function looks at what is happening across agencies, communities and the media in an event or emergency to provide advice and manage risk and opportunities.



It would support Ministerial level public messaging focused on reassurance, de-escalation, recovery, and social cohesion.

Expected Communications Challenges

No two terrorist events are the same, but there are a number of communications challenges that can be expected at both the operational and strategic levels:

- Providing accurate information to support public safety information in fast-moving, potentially confused situation
- Pressure to confirm an attack as a “terrorist” attack in an environment in which facts and information about the individuals involved, their motives and intent may be limited
- Pressure to confirm the resolution of the immediate threat and to provide public reassurance, in situations where intelligence and facts are still being brought together
- Proliferation of information and misinformation via social media
- Ensuring appropriate engagement with key community groups and leaders, as message alignment with the local authority/authorities is critical

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GLOSSARY

Abbreviation	Description
AIC	Ad-hoc Intelligence Coordinator
AOS	Armed Offenders Squad (Police)
CE	Chief Executive
CTAG	Combined Threat Assessment Group
C2	Command and Control
C3I	Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
CIMS	Coordinated Incident Management System
CoP	Commissioner of Police
CSO	Departmental Chief Security Officer
CTG	Counter Terrorist Group (NZDF)
CT	Counter Terrorism
DCoP	Deputy Commissioner of Police
D I&A	Director of Intelligence and Assessments
ECC	Emergency Coordination Centre
ERS	Cabinet External Relations and Security Committee
4-Rs	Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery
GLN	Government Legal Network
IC	Incident Controller
ICP	Incident Control Point
ITOC	Integrated Targeting and Operations Centre (Customs House – Auckland)
JIG	Joint Intelligence Group (Police)
LC	Local Controller
NAB	National Assessments Bureau, NSG, DPMC
NC	National Controller
NCMC	National Crisis Management Centre, Beehive Basement, Parliament
NCC	National Coordination Centre
NCTP	National Counter Terrorism Plan
NSG	National Security Group, DPMC
NSS	National Security System
NSSD	National Security Systems Directorate, NSG, DPMC
NZP	New Zealand Police



NZCS	New Zealand Customs Service
ODESC	Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination
PIM	Public Information Management
PNHQ	Police National Headquarters
PNT	Police Negotiation Team
SCIF	Secure Compartmentalised Information Facility
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
STG	Special Tactics Group (Police)
TIC	Terrorism Intelligence Centre (NZSIS)

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