

Hon Chris Hipkins

MP for Remutaka

Minister of Education

Minister of Police

Minister for the Public Service

Leader of the House



OIA0758

Harold

fyi-request-19731-8b7b43ea@requests.fyi.org.nz

Dear Harold

Thank you for your Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) request of 22 June 2022 in which you sought copies of specific documents. I apologise for the delay in responding.

You will find copies of the documents you requested enclosed.

Please note that it has been necessary to withhold some information from these documents under the following sections of the OIA:

- s6(a): the making available of that information would be likely to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand
- s6(b)(i): the making available of that information would be likely to prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on a basis of confidence by the Government of any other country or any agency of such a Government
- s6(c): the making available of that information would be likely to prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial
- s7(a)(i): the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the security or defence of the self-governing State of the Cook Islands
- s9(2)(a): to protect the privacy of natural persons
- s9(2)(f)(iv): to maintain the constitutional conventions for the time being which protect the confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and officials
- s9(2)(g)(i): to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any public service agency or organisation in the course of their duty.

Please refer to the table below for a list of OIA grounds used within in each document.

	Title of document	OIA grounds used within document
1	Solomon Islands: Extension to New Zealand's security support, dated 21 March 2022	S6(a), s9(2)(a), 9(2)(f)(iv)
2	International engagement opportunity, dated 15 March 2022	s9(2)(a)
3	Meeting with Chinese community and Labour MP Naisi Chen, Wed 9 March, 7pm, dated 8 March 2022	s9(2)(a)
4	Domestic Threat Landscape, dated 14 December 2021	s6(c), s9(2)(a)
5	Facial Recognition Technologies Report – Considerations for Police, dated 1 December 2021 <i>Refer to note below</i>	s9(2)(a)
6	Police's engagement with Kāpuia, dated 17 November 2021	s9(2)(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

7	He Aranga Ake: Progress Update, dated 29 October 2021	s6(c), s9(2)(a)
8	Deputy Commissioner: Operations - Travel to Europe & the Middle East, dated 21 October 2021	s6(a), s9(2)(a)
9	Updated - Police Response to White Identity Extremism, dated 30 July 2021 <i>Talking points originally attached to this briefing are withheld pursuant to 9(2)(g)(i)</i>	s6(a), s6(c), s9(2)(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)
10	New Zealand's Policing Support to the Cook Islands, dated 16 July 2021	s6(c), s6(b)(i), s9(2)(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
11	Update on Police use of Drones, dated 6 July 2021	s9(2)(a), 9(2)(f)(iv)
12	Understanding Policing Delivery Independent Panel, dated 27 April 2021 <i>Refer to note below</i>	s9(2)(a)
13	Specialist advice on facial recognition technologies, dated 31 March 2021	s9(2)(a)
14	Crowded Places Initiative, dated 29 March 2021	s9(2)(a)
15	New Zealand's Policing Support to the Cook Islands, dated 26 March 2021	s6(c), s7(a)(i), s9(2)(a), s9(2)(g)(i)
16	NZ Police Expert Panel on Emergent Technologies, dated 3 March 2021 <i>Refer to note below</i>	s9(2)(a)

I note the two documents referenced in document 5, *Facial Recognition Technologies Report – Considerations for Police*, are publicly available here: <https://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/programmes-and-initiatives/police-use-emergent-technologies/facial-recognition-technology>

The documents originally attached to document 12, *Understanding Policing Delivery Independent Panel*, are publicly available here: <https://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/programmes-and-initiatives/understanding-policing-delivery>

The document originally attached to document 16, *NZ Police Expert Panel on Emergent Technologies*, is publicly available here: <https://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/programmes-and-initiatives/police-use-emergent-technologies/advisory-panel-emergent>

You have the right to ask the Ombudsman to review my decision if you are not satisfied with my response to your request.

Yours sincerely



Chris Hipkins
Minister of Police

PROACTIVE INFORMATION

Solomon Islands: Extension to New Zealand's security support

Deadline: N/A

Date of Response: 21 March 2022

Purpose

1. This briefing provides context and advice on a joint paper led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), supported by you, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and the Ministry of Defence. The paper seeks Cabinet approval to extend the dates of New Zealand's security support to the Solomon Islands.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

2. Talking points for your use are attached.

Police supports the extension of mandate for New Zealand Defence Force personnel

3. In early December 2021, due to the unrest in the Solomon Islands, Ministers With The Power To Act (MWPTA) agreed to a deployment of up to 60 NZDF and up to 11 New Zealand Police personnel to Solomon Islands for up to 30 days from 2 December 2021, and then a further deployment of an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) with embarked helicopter and up to 80 embarked NZDF personnel. Subsequent approval was granted to allow for a reduced NZDF contribution of five personnel to be extended from 1 January 2022 out to 31 March 2022.
4. Approval is sought from MWPTA, including you as Minister of Police, to extend Aotearoa New Zealand's security support of five New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel to the Solomon Islands until no later than 31 May 2022
5. NZDF will be working alongside the Australian Defence Force in continuing to provide community reassurance patrols s6(a). New Zealand Police supports the extension of this deployment, as it aligns with our activities in the Solomon Islands.

Police is willing to provide operational security support if necessary

6. As part of the Solomon Islands Assistance Forces (SIAF) mission agreed by Cabinet, Police initially deployed a Public Safety Team of ten personnel to provide both public order policing and community safety/engagement capabilities. Police also deployed an Intelligence Analyst to work in the Joint Intelligence Group that was established. The deployment assisted the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) to stabilise the situation and rebuild community trust and assist businesses and communities to begin the process of rebuilding from the unrest.

7. Police withdrew its first contingent at the conclusion of the original Cabinet mandate in late December 2021. Support has continued to be provided to RSIPF through our existing Solomon Islands Police Support Programme.

8. A bilateral security treaty enables the SIAF mission which is led by police. Both the SIAF and the treaty retain the security and policy partnership with the RSIPF.

s6(a)



9. s6(a) [redacted]. The Official Development Assistance definitions, under which the SIPSP is funded, does not allow the use of such funds for operational assistance.

Police will continue to support the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force through the existing Solomon Islands Police Support Programme

10. New Zealand Police has continued to support RSIPF through the existing SIPSP. Due to COVID 19, the number of New Zealand Police advisors in the Solomon Islands was reduced to four. The programme currently consists of a Team Leader and three Senior Advisors who provide mentoring and advisory support, primarily in crime prevention. Following the unrest, the team has pivoted their activities to be complimentary to the community engagement and investigation work RSIPF have been doing.

Next steps


11. s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

12. [redacted]

Reviewed by	Superintendent Steven Dunn Director - International Services Group, International Service Group	s9(2)(a) [redacted]
Approved by	Assistant Commissioner Mike Rusbatch, Security and International	s9(2)(a) [redacted]

Talking points

s9(2)(f)(iv)



PROACTIVE INFORMATION

International engagement opportunity

Deadline: N/A

Date of Response: 15 March 2022

Purpose

1. This briefing is to inform you of the Commissioner's upcoming international engagement visit to Europe, and to invite you to attend several engagements with him.

Police would like to invite you to a range of engagements from 4 – 8 July 2022

2. Provisional appointments have been made for the Commissioner to have the following engagements in London, The Hague, Geneva and Vienna from 4 – 8 July:

Sunday 3 July	Travel day
Monday 4 July	London: Meeting with the Home Secretary and/or the Minister for Crime and Policing; meeting with the Mayor of London; meeting with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service.
Tuesday 5 July	London: Meeting with the Director of the National Crime Agency; meeting with the Head of the National Police Chiefs' Council.
Wednesday 6 July	The Hague: Signing of the New Zealand and European Union Law Enforcement Information Sharing Agreement (Europol Agreement)
Thursday 7 July	Geneva: Meeting with the CEO of the Global Road Safety Partnership
Friday 8 July	Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Saturday 9 July	Travel day

Benefits of proposed engagements

3. Attending the Europol Agreement signing will embed the commitment New Zealand has to this Treaty, and to international policing.
4. Police have selected the additional proposed meetings to provide engagements in key crime and policing areas, which will provide a greater understanding of global policing challenges and New Zealand's performance from an international perspective.

5. Attendance at these international forums will also provide global attendees with increased visibility of, and connection to, New Zealand and New Zealand Police.
6. In particular, meetings with the Home Secretary and/or Minister for Crime and Policing, Mayor of London and UK Police Executives will provide opportunities to discuss and exchange views on policing diverse communities, police initiatives, and approaches to law-and-order challenges experienced by a like-minded FVEY partner.
7. Additionally, meeting with the CEO of the Global Road Safety Partnership will support New Zealand's Road policing aspirations and meetings with UNODC will provide a global view and greater understanding of tackling drugs and organised crime from an international perspective.

Additional engagements for the Commissioner

8. The Commissioner has also been invited to participate in the 'Pearls in Policing 2022 conference - Change as the New Normal: Policing Diverse and Complex Societies' from 25 to 29 June 2022, and to deliver a keynote address at the Evidence-Based Policing 2022 International Conference on 11 July 2022. He will combine attending these events with further proposed visits to the German Federal Police (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) and Interpol.

Next steps

9. Should you wish to accept this invitation, we will provide your office with any further information required to arrange your international travel.

Reviewed by	Chris Page, Senior Liaison Officer, London	s9(2)(a)
Approved by	Mike Rusbatch, Assistant Commissioner, Security and International	s9(2)(a)

INFORMATION REQUEST

**Meeting with Chinese community and Labour MP Naisi Chen,
Wed 9 March, 7pm**

Date of Response: 8 March 2022

Purpose

1. This paper provides an overview of Police initiatives with the Chinese community ahead of your meeting with the Chinese community in East Auckland, and Labour MP Naisi Chen, via Zoom.

You will be meeting with representatives of the Chinese community in Botany and Labour MP Naisi Chen on Wednesday 9 March, 7pm, via Zoom.

Area Commander Inspector Scott Gemmell and Area Community Service Manager Senior Sergeant Anson Lin will also be attending.

In 2013, areas in Botany Downs and Dannemora had the highest concentration of Auckland's Asian population (approximately 60 to 80 percent of the local population identifying as Asian). The Howick and Henderson-Massey local boards were home to the largest numbers of those of Asian ethnicity at the 2018 Census, with 65,541 and 32,523 residents respectively.

Between February 2021 and January 2022, Asian victims made up nine percent of the total victimisation in the Counties Manukau East Area. The top five crime types are burglary, family harm, fraud, theft from motor vehicles, and stolen motor vehicles.

In the past, the Chinese community has raised a number of concerns regarding community and public safety in the area including burglary; forgery; and assault in a public place. However, the most reported assault cases involving Asian victims are in the family harm context, rather than in a public setting. Burglary, forgery, and family harm prevention are the focus of Police's work with the Chinese community in the area.

Police has a range of interactions with the Chinese community in East Auckland, including prevention of victimisation, crimes, and crashes.

Key points to support your meeting

2. The key points below provide an overview of the specific activities undertaken by Police with the Chinese community in East Auckland.

Police Area

3. Counties Manukau East (Ormiston) Police serve a large area which is densely populated and culturally diverse. The boundary for Ormiston Police is between

Otara (South) to Bucklands Beach (North) and Pakuranga (West) to Maraetai (East).

4. According to the Cycle 3 of the 2019-20 New Zealand Crime and Victims Survey (NZCVS), Aucklanders experience above the national average in terms of offences, with 31.77 percent for all offences (National average 29.26), 14.70 percent for personal offences (National average 14.61), and 20.67 percent for household offences (National average 18.51).
5. According to the Cycle 3 of the 2019-20 NZCVS, nationally across New Zealand, the percentage of Chinese people who were victimised once or more was below the national average, with 23.91 percent for all offences (National average 29.26), 6.18 for personal offences (National average 14.61), and 16.84 percent for household offences (National average 18.51).
6. The most common offence types in Cycle 3 of the NZCVS were fraud and deception; harassment and threatening behaviour; and burglary. Together, these made up more than half of all offences.
7. Police is involved in community-based initiatives to prevent victimisation in the area, for example with the South Auckland Social Wellbeing Board.

The Chinese community

8. The Chinese population has grown rapidly in recent years. At the 2018 Census, over a quarter (28 percent or 442,674 people) of Auckland residents identified with an Asian ethnicity. The largest sub-group were those who identified as Chinese, followed by those who identified as Indian. This includes people who have migrated from overseas as well as those born in New Zealand.
9. In 2013, areas in Botany Downs and Dannemora had the highest concentration of Auckland's Asian population, with approximately 60 to 80 percent of the local population identifying as Asian. The Howick and Henderson-Massey local boards were home to the largest numbers of those of Asian ethnicity at the 2018 Census, with 65,541 and 32,523 residents respectively. Areas in the southeast, Auckland's city centre, parts of the Auckland isthmus and central parts of the North Shore also had over half of the local population identifying as Asian.
10. Police aims to ensure Chinese communities feel safe and are safe in New Zealand.
11. Between February 2021 and January 2022, there were 9,546 reported victimisations in the Counties Manukau East policing area. Of those victims, nine percent (850) disclosed their ethnicity as Asian (which includes Chinese, Indian and other Asian ethnic groups).
12. The top five crime types with Asian victimisation are:
 - burglary (169)
 - family harm (130)
 - fraud offences (110)

- theft from motor vehicles (86)
 - stolen motor vehicles (64).
13. The concerns raised in the past by the Chinese community include:
 - burglary in the area
 - forgery
 - assault in a public place.
 14. As burglary and forgery are among the top five crime types of Asian victimisation in Counties Manukau East, these have been the focus of Police prevention activities for the Chinese community.
 15. Assaults in public places occur at a range of locations across Tāmaki Makaurau and Police recognise the distress such assaults cause not only to those immediately affected and their whānau, but also to the wider community. Assault in a public place is often mentioned as a concern by the community, and this may be due to the extensive social media and media coverage of isolated cases when they do occur.
 16. Despite the high profile of assaults in public places, the most reported assault cases involving Asian victims are in the family harm context, rather than in a public setting. Family harm prevention is another focus of Police's work.

Building staff capability for ethnic diversity

17. Police are ready and capable of responding to the needs and emerging issues of New Zealand's increasingly diverse ethnic communities, including the Chinese community.
18. Police makes sure we have the right people with the right skills for the job. Frontline policing is a difficult job and Police recognise it becomes even harder when communication or cultural setting is a barrier, or where people come from places with negative experiences of policing.
19. The Counties Manukau East area leadership team focuses on recruiting, retaining, and developing officers of Chinese ethnicity so our staff can utilise their language and cultural skill to deliver the service our Chinese community expects. We currently have 17 Chinese Police officers across different workgroups/ranks, which allows us to provide adequate services to address the comprehensive needs of the local Chinese community.

Working with the Chinese community

20. Police have a plan for structured and meaningful engagement with ethnic communities, including feedback loops to improve our services.
21. Trust and confidence are at the centre of how we engage with the Chinese community. Preventing victimisation, crimes, and crashes rely on solid and effective partnerships between Police and communities.

22. Police build and maintain a strong partnership with many Chinese community organisations. We work closely with the Fo Guang Shan Buddhist Temple, the Tzu Chi Foundation NZ, The Asian Council on Reducing Crime, A Better Chance Charitable Trust and Chinese New Settlers Services Trust at Counties Manukau East.
23. We have hosted a quarterly Asian Leaders Forum at the Ormiston Police Station for 14 years since 2008. The members consist of community leaders from different organisations. The purpose is to provide timely area updates to the community leaders and work with them to develop plans that address crime and victimisation. It also provides a platform for the Chinese community leaders to raise any concerns the Chinese community may have.

Prevention first operating strategy


24. Police place prevention at the forefront of our business. Below are some examples of how we work together with the Chinese community to prevent victimisation, crimes, and crashes in our area.
 - Senior Sergeant Anson Lin was interviewed by Channel 33 TV and provided prevention advice on burglary, scams, and family harm.



- The Counties Manukau East Youth Aid and Community team have worked together with the Fo Guang Shan Buddhist temple on its 3G4G Festival of Cultural Sharing for the last eight years. The purpose of the program was to promote positive values and connectedness in the community. In 2021, New Zealand Police supported 38 sessions. Throughout these, there were 25 schools with over 7,730 students, teachers, and parents participating. This education program has catered to primary and secondary school students, aged 5 to 18 from different cultural backgrounds. It has included engaging role-playing sessions to encourage students to make the right decisions in life, especially around misuse of drugs and alcohol, social media safety and personal safety.



- Due to COVID-19 Alert Level restrictions, Police have been unable to interact face-to-face with our local Chinese community as much recently. Instead, Community constable Paul Zhao worked with the Chinese New Settlers Trust to arrange an online seminar regarding volume crime and scam prevention. About 150 Chinese community members attended the seminar online, with very positive results.



- Members of the Otago Neighbourhood Policing Team celebrated the 2021 Lunar New Year at the Fo Guang Temple in Botany. After weeks of practice, the team performed the first ever Police lion dance, which was very well received by all those in attendance.





Reviewed by	Inspector Scott Gemmell	s9(2)(a)
Approved by	Christopher de Wattignar, Assistant Commissioner Iwi and Community	s9(2)(a)

PROACTIVE INFORMATION	
Domestic Threat Landscape	
Deadline: N/A	Date of Response: 14 December 2021

Purpose

1. The purpose of the briefing is to highlight the changing threat landscape and detail what actions Police and the security sector are taking to monitor and prevent harm from these threats.

Important points to note

2. It should be noted that:
 - The Politically Motivated Violent Extremist (PMVE) landscape is changing and the risk increasing.
 - COVID-19, along with several other topical social, economic, and environmental issues are impacting social cohesion and, in some parts of the community, leading to acute disaffection.
 - Hundreds of individuals in New Zealand are actively creating, contributing to, or sharing anti-authority and anti-government rhetoric online. This is being consumed by thousands of New Zealanders, and a minority (possibly dozens) have the potential to become individuals of security concern.


Contributing information

3. The Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) has recently assessed:
 - The Identity-Motivated Violent Extremist (IMVE) and Faith-Motivated Violent Extremist (FMVE) environments are likely to remain consistent over the next 12 months, but there has been a shift in the violent extremism environment with an increase in Politically Motivated Violent Extremist (PMVE) rhetoric in relation to COVID-19 mitigation programmes.
 - The national threat level for terrorism and violent protest activity remains at MEDIUM (a terrorist attack is feasible and could well occur), but the signals are assessed as having moved to the higher end of the estimative range.
 - The COVID-19 pandemic and associated government mitigation programmes will continue to influence the violent extremism environment in New Zealand in the next 12 months and the potential for a lone actor mobilising to violence with little or no intelligence forewarning is a realistic possibility. This is the most likely attack scenario in New Zealand.

4. A level of public discord has been observed following the government's response to the Delta strain of COVID-19. The dynamics created by ongoing lockdowns and pressure to get vaccinated has almost certainly increased people's anxiety and frustration. The evident discontent seems, at least in part, a reflection of growing distrust in authority and the system.
5. The next larger scale anti-COVID measures/freedom and rights protest events are planned to occur in major centres on Thursday 16 December 2021. Initial assessments on these protests indicate that these events are likely to attract protestors with a diverse range of anti-government/anti-authoritarian views similar to those noted during the 9 November protests. Based on crowd numbers at previous events in Wellington and Tāmaki Makaurau, early estimates are that between 3000 and 5000 people may take part in the protests on 16 December. These protest events are likely to lead to congested inner-city precincts and short-term disruption of business activity.
6. While the current levels of discord are likely to subside over time, it is possible that some elements of the discord will have an enduring longer-term negative effect on New Zealand society. The conditions created by the discontent have allowed other divisive narratives and extreme ideologies to enter and become more mainstream. In the long-term, such narratives and ideas could become more entrenched across society with disaffected individuals becoming more susceptible to these harmful ideas and to the mis- and disinformation.
7. The Open Source Intelligence Team (OSINT) recently undertook an investigation into three prominent New Zealand-focussed anti-vaccination Facebook groups and found:
 - Approximately 20% of accounts analysed in each group were likely inauthentic, and that 62% of these appeared to be based overseas.
 - Most articles shared by inauthentic accounts were internationally-focussed and predominantly shared vaccine and COVID-related misinformation from the United States.
 - The reason so many inauthentic accounts are operating in New Zealand anti-vaccination groups is not clear. If they are not there for commercial gain, a number of risks present themselves including the potential for inauthentic accounts to inflame emotions among members. This could lead to potential protest or lawbreaking actions, members taking untested medications, or other, unforeseen outcomes.
8. The Police Security Intelligence and Threats Group (SITG) has conducted a preliminary examination of behaviour within the COVID-19 activism environment and has identified four primary types of participant:
 - 'Citizens': Everyday people with a legitimate interest in government actions, decisions, and general management of the pandemic. This entails lawful dissent and advocacy (i.e. protests) and freedom of expression. Issues typically centre on reasonable concerns such as the duration and intensity of lockdowns, or the efficacy and safety of vaccines.

- ‘Grifters’: People who exploit citizen concern for a range of reasons, but typically with financial interests (mainly online income) in mind. Of primary interest among this group is reckless or intentional participation in mis- and disinformation networks, which can have a negative impact on issue-engaged everyday citizens, and draw some towards agitation, or in a worse-case scenario, extremism.
 - ‘Agitators’: A much smaller group of people, some who may also be grifters, who are more intentionally political. These individuals are often deliberately and loudly provocative, and possibly fuelled by grievances such as job loss due to lockdowns. These individuals will often publish opinion or information that might be interpreted as incitement. Motivations within this group could range from previously existing anti-government or anti-authoritarian sentiment, to drawing internet traffic to their social media, to exploiting citizens’ pandemic-related anxiety as a means of gradually introducing broader non-COVID themes of extremist messaging.
 - Violent extremists: The smallest group, but the violent extremist group is of specific concern to law enforcement agencies. These violent extremist individuals and groups promote an ideology for the justification of violence to achieve a change in government, religion, or society. The violence is often targeted against groups seen to threaten violent extremists’ success or survival or undermining their world view. They include individuals who use an ideology, or claim an affiliation, as a pretext to justify violence in pursuit of personal grievances.
9. Contemporary COVID-19 related activism has been overwhelming legal, as well as including a broad range of opinions and perspectives of everyday people. Until recently, COVID-19 activism has not delved into the realm of violent extremism. However, an emergent feature of the extremist discourse is the increasing use of COVID-19 themes expressed using aggressive and threatening language, often directed against the Prime Minister. Such rhetoric has also included calls for the overthrow of Parliament and Government, as well as advocating violence against elected officials.
10. Recent Police assessments have highlighted increasing numbers of incidents where activism groups are engaging in acts of active resistance to COVID-19 mitigation measures. This development has the potential to create situations that lead to incidents of violent extremism. Three recent incidents demonstrate individuals undertaking, or preparing to undertake, isolated acts of violent extremism in ways that would constitute acts of national security significance.

- s6(c)



s6(c)

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Current situation

11. To prevent some of the detrimental longer-term effects of the current discord, benefits will be realised from system level efforts focused on:
 - Enhancing trust in authority and our institutions.
 - Preventing polarisation in New Zealand and enhance social cohesion.
 - Developing a new inclusive narrative to unite all New Zealanders against COVID-19.
 - Building bridges between the unvaccinated population and mainstream society.
 - Developing a framework for constructive conversations on polarising issues - and subsequently teaching and modelling the approach.

12. Police is working closely alongside the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) at the system level and with partner agencies at the operational level to identify, understand, assess, and mitigate any potential risks or threats to security. This entails the triage (collection, collation and assessment) of lead information for credibility, relevance, and potential use in the initiation of an investigative response where appropriate. This may include Police enquiries or possible charges where criminal thresholds are reached, the use of other graduated response processes such as welfare visits, or the use of warnings to address threatening behaviour. Lead information may be shared with other agencies, including the Department of Internal Affairs or the Office of the Chief Censor, to initiate content removal or to commence processes to classify material as objectionable.

- 13. The National Intelligence Centre (NIC) has contributed various products at the strategic and operational level relating to the subjects of social cohesion, social discord, and violent extremism risks. This information has been widely shared with relevant agencies, informed recent DPMC briefing papers to Cabinet, and made a significant contribution to the recent review of the national threat level.
- 14. Operationally, Police is working closely with our security partners ranging from the NZSIS to Parliamentary Security's Security Enablement Team to identify and manage threat information. s6(c)
[REDACTED]
- 15. As a consequence, Police rely significantly on the public to report concerning behaviour and to assist in the identification of potential violent extremist threats.

Recommendations

- a) **Note** the change in the domestic threat environment, specifically with regard to an increase in Politically Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE),
- b) **Note** the national threat level for terrorism and violent protest activity remains at **MEDIUM** (a terrorist type attack is feasible and could well occur),
- c) **Note** the actions that Police and other agencies are taking as a consequence of the changing domestic threat environment, and
- d) s6(c)
[REDACTED]

Reviewed by	Dan Wildly, Director National Intelligence	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
Approved by	Mark Evans, DCE Insights and Deployment	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]

PROACTIVE INFORMATION

Facial Recognition Technologies Report – Considerations for Police

Deadline: N/A

Date of response: 1 December 2021

Purpose

1. This briefing provides an update on Police's Emergent Technologies Work Programme engagement with two leading Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) researchers.
2. In March 2021, Police engaged Dr Nessa Lynch and Dr Andrew Chen to provide in-depth advice on the complex issues associated with FRT and considerations for policing in an Aotearoa New Zealand context.
3. Their report, 'Facial Recognition Technology: Considerations for Use in Policing' (the Report) and accompanying Police response are to be publicly released on Thursday 9 December 2021. A copy of the Report and Police response is attached to this briefing. Please note that these are embargoed until 9 December 2021.
4. Police has worked with Dr Lynch and Dr Chen to produce the Report. Dr Lynch (an Associate Professor at Victoria University of Wellington) and Dr Chen (a Research Fellow at the University of Auckland) are two of New Zealand's leading experts and academic researchers in the field of FRT. Both are actively engaged in research on the issue and, in 2020, Dr Lynch co-authored a 118-page Law Foundation-funded report on FRT.
5. Following a comprehensive international literature review, and after undertaking a large number of interviews with Police staff and external experts, Dr Lynch and Dr Chen have provided us with their expert advice.
6. The Report makes ten recommendations, all of which Police accept.
7. Prior to publication, the Report underwent multiple reviews along with detailed consideration by Police's Emergent Technology Expert Panel (which was established and publicly announced on 11 March 2021, IPR/21/37 refers).

The Report provides Police with in-depth advice and insight on the use of FRT

8. The Report is insightful and provides Police with an understanding of what FRT is, the spectrum of use, and researched examples of how overseas policing jurisdictions have used FRT.
9. FRT has benefits and risks for collective and individual rights and interests. The use of FRT needs to be exercised with caution.
10. Adopting technologies, such as FRT, that are not perceived to be sufficiently understood, publicly accepted, or appropriately regulated has the potential to undermine public trust and confidence, especially where any negative impacts

(such as impingement on privacy and inequitable impact on certain groups) may be perceived to outweigh public benefits and limit our ability to police by consent.

11. Law enforcement agencies internationally have trialled the use of live FRT in a range of situations. These trials have attracted controversy and highlighted difficult ethical considerations about when the use of live FRT may be justified on public safety grounds, and what safeguards ought to be in place.

The Report makes ten recommendations, and Police have developed a high-level response plan in respect of each of them which Police will work towards adopting

The Report's ten recommendations are:

- i. Police continues to pause any consideration of live automated FRT
 - ii. Police reviews collection and retention of facial images and their use by any FRT systems
 - iii. Police continues to strengthen processes for ethical commissioning of technology
 - iv. Police ensures continuous governance and oversight of deployment of FRT technologies
 - v. Police upholds Te Tiriti in partnership with Māori
 - vi. Police maintains transparency
 - vii. Police produces a policy statement on use of FRT surveillance in public places
 - viii. Police implements guidelines for access to third party FRT systems
 - ix. Police embeds a culture of ethical use of data in the organisation
 - x. Police implements a system for ongoing horizon scanning in respect of FRT technologies
12. Police accept and will work towards adopting all ten recommendations. In particular, Police accepts the recommendation to pause any consideration of deploying live automated FRT. Police does not currently use live FRT and will not do so, until the impact of any use from a security, privacy, legal and ethical perspective is fully understood.
 13. Due to the potential for inaccuracies, bias and negative impact on particular community groups, Police will work to ensure impacts on Māori, children and young persons are fully considered and mitigated before any use of live FRT is considered.
 14. Police will develop robust oversight, governance and policy to guide and ensure the proper use of FRT and the situations where it can be used.
 15. Police will be clear and transparent on how we intend to deliver on each of the recommendations.

Publicity

16. We expect there to be interest in the Report, and its recommendations, across a range of government agencies and departments. We plan to share an

embargoed early copy of the report with a range of key stakeholders, including many that were consulted in the drafting of the Report. These include: Office of the Privacy Commissioner, IPCA, Government Chief Digital Officer and the Digital Council for Aotearoa New Zealand.

17. A media release will be issued on Thursday 9 December 2021. Police's Media and Communications group will send your office the release and proposed timing when it is confirmed. DCE Mark Evans will be the Police spokesperson.
18. Police has set up a page on our public website to increase awareness and visibility of our approach to Emergent Technologies.

Reviewed by	Carla Gilmore, National Coordination Lead, Emergent Technologies	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
Approved by	Mark Evans, DCE: Insights and Deployment	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]

INFORMATION REQUEST	
Police's engagement with Kāpuia	
Deadline: 17 November 2021	Date of Response: 17 November 2021

Purpose

1. The purpose of this document is to support your response to Minister Little and the Chair of Kāpuia, Arihia Bennett MNZM, regarding Police's engagement with Kāpuia. We provide a letter responding to Minister Little and Ms Bennett (the Response Letter) at **Appendix 1** for your consideration.
2. This document also gives an update on Police's presentations to Kāpuia on recommendations in the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques (RCOI).

You have received a letter from Minister Little, in his capacity as Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques, co-signed by the Chair of Kāpuia, Arihia Bennett MNZM. The letter asks you (and other relevant Ministers) to acknowledge the establishment of Kāpuia and the terms of reference and direction of effort of the stakeholder group. We have drafted a reply for you, which outlines Police's recent positive and constructive engagement with Kāpuia. There are no issues of concern. We propose to update you further on progress with RCOI recommendations as the Government reports on these with some further oversight by Kāpuia.

Background

3. On 14 October 2021, Minister Little and the Chair of Kāpuia, Arihia Bennett, sent you a letter regarding the establishment of and engagement with Kāpuia (the Kāpuia Letter) (attached as **Appendix 2**). Kāpuia is the Ministerial Advisory Group that is tasked with providing independent advice directly to the Government on the Government's Response to the RCOI, including the work programme, priorities, and implementation design [IPR/21/19 refers].

Minister Little and Ms Bennett are concerned regarding appropriate levels of engagement with Kāpuia

4. The Kāpuia Letter provides background information to the establishment of Kāpuia, much of which you will be across in your role as one of the lead Ministers in the response to the RCOI. It sets out a clear expectation that agencies will engage with Kāpuia early and often in the development of policy and operational initiatives.

The Response Letter and Police's work with Kāpuia

5. We have prepared a suggested letter of response to Minister Little and Ms Bennett (at **Appendix 1**). In short, the suggested response welcomes the establishment of Kāpuia and the appointment of Ms Bennett as Chair. It also notes that Police has already had constructive engagement with Kāpuia

Police presented at Kāpuia's November 2021 hui

6. Police engaged with Kāpuia at its fifth hui on 4 November. This engagement canvassed RCOI Recommendation 12, regarding the establishment of a reporting system for public reporting of concerning behaviours/incidents. It also addressed

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Recommendation 24, which proposes mandatory reporting of firearm injuries by health professionals to Police.

7. Kāpuia provided detailed feedback on each of these subjects.
8. While there were some divergent views, the feedback on the purpose, scope, and characteristics of a public reporting system (per Recommendation 12) generally aligned with Police's thinking at this early stage of design [refer BR/21/86].
9. As agreed [refer BR/21/86], we are currently working with agencies to explore and refine high level proposals for a public reporting system for concerning behaviours/incidents. We will provide advice on progress and next steps on this work to support your discussion at ERS (scheduled for 24 November) on Minister Little's report back to Cabinet on an overall RCOI response work plan. s9(2)(f)(iv)
[REDACTED]
10. Feedback regarding Recommendation 24 affirmed that the current scope of the Recommendation was appropriate. Members observed that wider discretion and information sharing from health professionals may be an appropriate area to consider. Wider protections for the health practitioner/patient privilege may were also discussed by the members, to ensure that any new information sharing arrangement would not disincentivise people from seeking medical assistance. The hui suggested that further consultation may be appropriate with health professionals and firearms owners/users with a view to create a zero harm mechanism model.
11. Deputy Commissioner Wally Haumaha and Deputy Chief Executive Mark Evans attended to hear members' feedback and a participate in a Q&A session. This level of senior engagement from Police was recognised and appreciated by Ms Bennett, on behalf of other members.
12. s 9(2)(f)(iv)
[REDACTED]
13. Police's initial engagement with Kāpuia has been very positive and constructive. We anticipate working increasingly closely with Kāpuia as we continue to develop work on the Police-led recommendations.
14. Our engagement with Kāpuia aligns with the approach we take to Police's Muslim Reference Group, where transparent and detailed engagement, including by members of the Police Executive, supports a positive relationship. Our most recent engagement with the Muslim Reference Group was a hui on 6 November, where we updated members on our RCOI response work. We continue to receive excellent feedback from this Group on our engagement.

Next steps

15. We will shortly provide you with advice on Minister Little's pending report back to Cabinet on the government's progress with implementing RCOI recommendations.

Reviewed by	Tim Blackmore, Manager - National Security and International Policy	s 9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
Approved by	Gillian Ferguson, Director - Policy	s 9(2)(a) [REDACTED]

Hon Poto Williams

MP for Christchurch East

Minister for Building and Construction

Minister of Police

Associate Minister for Children

Associate Minister of Housing (Public Housing)



Ref:

Hon Andrew Little

Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques

Ms Arihia Bennett MNZM

Chair, Kāpuia

Tēnā kōrua Minister and Ms Bennett

Thank you for your letter of 14 October 2021, outlining the establishment of Kāpuia – the new Ministerial Advisory Group on the Government's Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques.

As Minister of Police I welcome the establishment of Kāpuia, as an important partnership supporting the Government's response to the Royal Commission Report, and congratulate you, Ms Bennett on your appointment as Chair.

I am pleased to note that Police has already engaged with Kāpuia, having presented directly on police-led Royal Commission of Inquiry recommendations. I understand that the Commissioner of Police is planning to meet with you, Ms Bennett, shortly as well.

Police welcomed the opportunity to present to Kāpuia at its recent hui, and received helpful feedback on the desired characteristics of a public reporting system concept that will help in our thinking about the scope and design of a new reporting service. Police and Kāpuia have also addressed the scope and details of introducing a reporting system for firearms incidents by health professionals to Police, for which further consultation with health professionals and firearms users is likely.

I look forward to working with you both more generally on how Recommendation 12 could work in practice. This can be informed by further reflections on Kāpuia's advice. I anticipate discussing how a refined Police-led proposal may be best reflected and incorporated in your forthcoming review of RCOI resourcing priorities.

I look forward to continuing to engage with you and the advisory group on this important mahi.

Nāku noa, nā

Yours sincerely

Hon Poto Williams
Minister of Police

Hon Andrew Little

Minister of Health

Minister Responsible for the GCSB

Minister Responsible for the NZSIS

Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations

Minister Responsible for Pike River Re-entry

Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques



Kāpuia

Ministerial Advisory Group on the Government Response to the
Royal Commission of Inquiry on the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques

Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister and Minister for National Security and Intelligence
Hon Grant Robertson, Minister of Finance
Hon Chris Hipkins, Minister for the Public Service and Minister of Education
Hon Carmel Sepuloni, Minister for Social Development and Employment
Hon Nanaia Mahuta, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hon Poto Williams, Minister of Police
Hon Kris Faafoi, Minister of Justice and Minister of Immigration
Hon Jan Tinetti, Minister of Internal Affairs
Hon Meka Whaitiri, Minister of Customs
Hon Priyanca Radhakrishnan, Minister for Diversity, Inclusion and Ethnic Communities, and
Associate Minister for Social Development and Employment

14 October 2021

E Ngā Rangatira Ma

Re: Kāpuia, the Ministerial Advisory Group on the Government's Response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques

As you are aware, the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques (RCOI) recommended the establishment of an Implementation Oversight Advisory Group to ensure that communities, civil society, local government and the private sector are involved in the Government's response to the report. It highlighted the need to involve communities in the design of the Government's implementation plan to effectively deliver social change and rebuild trust and confidence in public sector agencies.

The further terror attack in Auckland on 3 September has sadly only reinforced the importance of progressing the changes that were recommended by the RCOI.

In March 2020 Cabinet agreed that the Implementation Oversight Advisory Group recommended by the RCOI would function as a Ministerial Advisory Group, and the Cabinet Appointments and Honours committee has agreed to appoint 32 members to the group.

The group has taken the name Kāpuia and (as we discussed at the last Responsible Ministers meeting) it has already started to provide independent advice to the Government - on its response to the RCOI and ways we can make New Zealand a safer, more inclusive country for everyone.

Kāpuia's diverse membership reflects its role in ensuring that communities are at the centre of the Government's response to the RCOI. Members include affected whanau, survivors and witnesses, people from civil society and diverse communities (such as iwi, Pacifica, rural, disabilities, Rainbow, ethnic and faith communities, and more) plus experience of local government and the private sector. They bring valuable perspectives for the RCOI response from across New Zealand.

As Ministers with responsibility for implementing the recommendations and intent of the RCOI report, we welcome your agencies' engagement with Kāpuia.

Kāpuia's role, as set out in its terms of reference, is to advise on strengths, opportunities, weaknesses and gaps across the Government's response. This includes providing advice on the work programme and its priorities, implementation of initiatives and the ongoing progress of the response.

This means that Kāpuia should be engaged by agencies early in the development of policy and operational initiatives – including in defining problems and opportunities, how and when consultation should be undertaken, and on proposals for change. Kāpuia itself is not responsible for the development of policy or implementation options and cannot direct agencies, but it can provide feedback to agencies and advice to Ministers.

While engagement with Kāpuia is not intended to replace broader community engagement, it also has a key role in providing advice and guidance to agencies on how to structure engagement so that it is accessible and supports the development of policy that meets communities' needs.

Once Kāpuia's advice to the Lead Coordination Minister has been considered, it will be released publicly. However, its members are bound by a code of conduct that protects the confidentiality of official advice. We are confident that the members of Kāpuia take this responsibility seriously.

An early focus for Kāpuia is to develop its work plan and priorities. Kāpuia has held three hui, with a fourth planned for 13 October 2021. Kāpuia is already working with some agencies, and is currently considering the draft work programme for the government response to the RCOI ahead of Cabinet considering a final work programme later this year that will be based on this feedback.

Kāpuia will be able to operate most effectively if it has oversight of the work underway across government and both the secretariat and the group are able to have an ongoing dialogue with Ministers and agencies about the progress of the response. We would strongly encourage Ministers and agencies involved in the response to share project and engagement plans with Kāpuia in advance of engaging on specific proposals.

Kāpuia is supported by a secretariat within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Project leads can contact Kāpuia directly at kapuia@dpmc.govt.nz. This letter has been copied to the Chief Executives of the agencies involved in the RCOI response for cascading as appropriate.

We both look forward to continuing to engage with you and your agencies on this important work.

Nāku noa, nā



Hon Andrew Little
**Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's
Response to the Royal Commission's Report into
the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques**



Arihia Bennett MNZM
Chair, Kāpuia

CC: Brook Barrington, Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; Caralee McLiesh, Secretary to the Treasury; Peter Hughes, Public Service Commissioner; Iona Holsted, Secretary for Education; Debbie Power, Secretary for Social Development; Carolyn Tremain, Secretary for Business, Innovation and Employment; Chris Seed, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade; Andrew Coster, Commissioner of Police; Andrew Kibblewhite, Secretary for Justice; Paul James, Secretary for Internal Affairs; Christine Stevenson, Comptroller of Customs; Mervin Singham, Chief Executive, Ministry for Ethnic Communities

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PROACTIVE INFORMATION	
He Aranga Ake: Progress Update	
Deadline: N/A	Date of Response: 29 October 2021

Purpose

1. This paper provides a progress update on the development and delivery of the 'He Aranga Ake' Programme, that you may wish to share with the Ministers from the agencies directly participating in He Aranga Ake; Minister Davis (Oranga Tamariki, Corrections), Minister Hipkins (Education), Minister Little (NZSIS, Health) and Minister Sepuloni (Social Development and Employment).

He Aranga Ake Programme

2. Police is leading the development and implementation of a sustainable disengagement programme, 'He Aranga Ake' (to emerge, to arise, to become visible): a multi-agency programme designed to provide individually tailored interventions and support for national security persons of concern to disengage them from violent extremism and/or terrorism.
3. All interventions will be individualised and proportionate to the person of concerns' risk, needs, responsivity and circumstances. It is expected that ~30 persons of concern will be engaged in the programme annually, with the expectation that some may be on the programme for several years.
4. New Zealand Police received funding of \$8.44M over four years from 1 July 2021 to develop and implement the programme for New Zealand as part of the Government's response to the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCOI) into the terrorist attack on Christchurch Masjidain on 15 March 2019. This funding will be used to develop practice and processes to assist in the disengagement of persons of concern, additional Police resources to support that work, and a case management system to record the journey of the individual throughout the programme. s9(2)(f)(iv)
5. Individuals who have been identified as espousing a harmful ideology and pose a growing risk to their community and New Zealand can only be referred to the programme through the He Aranga Ake agencies. Once operational, any widening of this referral path will be considered as part of the long-term development of the programme.
6. The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) Terrorism Indicators Framework¹ will be used alongside other resources to assist agencies identify the most appropriate individuals, aged 12 years and over, for referral. On a case by case basis individuals who demonstrate grievance-fuelled violence, including some school shooter threats will also be considered for acceptance.

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¹ NZSIS Terrorism Indicators Framework is still to be finalised, with work currently underway to adapt this framework to enable a public facing resource to be released.

A project team has been established to develop and deliver the programme

7. This project, led by Police, has been established to formalise the processes, procedures and information management around identification and support of national security persons of concern through to their disengagement. The project utilises subject matter experts from each of the participating agencies to contribute to the outcomes.
8. A multi-agency Governance Group, comprising Police, the Ministries of Education, Social Development, Health, the Department of Corrections, Oranga Tamariki, and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service has been established and a terms of reference agreed.
9. Project reporting on He Aranga Ake is included in reporting to RCOI Responsible Ministers through the Police RCOI programme. He Aranga Ake is a deliverable of the New Zealand's Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism National Strategy work programme.
10. The project will build on learnings from the predecessor programme established in 2015, including retaining the ability to engage non-government service providers and individuals, as appropriate, to provide the best intervention for the person of concern. He Aranga Ake will have an active role in promoting the growth of new services nationally, particularly those which can address the role of technology in our person of concern's radicalisation or extremist journey.

The project is on track for He Aranga Ake to become operational in 2022


11. The project team has high-level requirements confirmed. Initial discussions for the Case Management System have commenced. A Business Case has been developed and is in the approval process. The project team's current work is focused on:
 - continuing to develop and document He Aranga Ake Programme requirements, processes, and practices.
 - communicating to each agency what they need to implement to effectively identify, assess, and refer individuals to the programme, as well as to lead interventions for individuals on the programme. These changes are being led by each agency as these are outside the scope of the project.
 - continue engagement with the preferred vendor for the case management system.
 - implementing a New Zealand designed assessment framework with measurable outcomes.
 - developing a comprehensive privacy impact assessment.

Key dates

12. The following are the expected delivery dates for the implementation of the He Aranga Ake programme:

Date	Deliverable
April 2021	Project set up
April 2021 – June 2022	Internal processes and procedures developed, implemented, and continually improved
July 2022	ICT case management system in place


s9(2)(f)(iv)



The development and implementation of He Aranga Ake requires ongoing agency resources

13. Police has been working with agencies on the development of He Aranga Ake and this collaboration has been positive.
14. Police and agencies have agreed the need for each agency to contribute resources to the development of this multi-agency initiative at the appropriate level to:
- proactively support the project as processes are developed around assessment of individuals, intervention planning and bespoke programme implementation. This requires experienced and senior people to take on this role at each agency.
 - develop and agree internal agency processes to identify and assess individuals displaying concerning behaviour and decide on appropriate interventions, including referral He Aranga Ake.
 - develop intervention management processes that provide feedback on tasked interventions into He Aranga Ake.
 - where required, ensure a sustained effort at national and local levels: which includes family, whanau, and community if possible, to achieve long-term positive outcomes for each individual.

There is significant interest in the status of He Aranga Ake

15. s9(2)(g)(i)
- 

16. Police will continue to manage media queries, and queries from individuals or communities who are seeking more direct involvement in the design and implementation of the programme.
17. s9(2)(g)(i) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It is expected that interest in He Aranga Ake will continue well into the future and especially if any further terrorist attacks occur in New Zealand.

Next steps

18. s6(c) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
19. You may wish to share this paper with the Ministers noted above for their information.

Prepared by	Fleur De Bes, Inspector, Counter-Terrorism Prevention Manager.	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
Reviewed by	Paul Berry, A/ Detective Superintendent, A/Director – National Security Counter Terrorism	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]
Approved by	Michael Rusbatch, Assistant Commissioner: Security and International	s9(2)(a) [REDACTED]

PROACTIVE INFORMATION

Deputy Commissioner: Operations - Travel to Europe and the Middle East

Deadline: NA

Date of Response: 21 October 2021

Purpose

1. This briefing provides an overview of the international travel arrangements for Deputy Commissioner: Operations, Glenn Dunbier, between 12-30 November 2021.

Deputy Commissioner Dunbier will represent Police at the INTERPOL General Assembly

2. Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, Deputy Commissioner Dunbier is standing in for Commissioner Coster as the Head of Delegation at the INTERPOL General Assembly (IGA) which will take place in Istanbul, Turkey from 23-25 November 2021. We provided information to your office on the IGA on 6 September 2021. [IPR/21/237 refers].
3. Attending this event presents an opportunity for travel and engagement with other partners as part of the travel programme. Deputy Commissioner Dunbier will also visit the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, in addition to attending the IGA.
4. While travelling, Deputy Commissioner Dunbier will be accompanied by the following Senior Officials:
 - 4.1. Turkey – Detective Senior Sergeant Paul Hamlyn, National Coordinator, Interpol, Police National Headquarters.
 - 4.2. UAE, Jordan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – Detective Superintendent Chris Page, Senior Liaison Officer, London.
5. On return to New Zealand, Deputy commissioner Dunbier will complete 14 days in Managed Isolation.
6. While the final programme is still to be confirmed, the following list of meetings and interactions anticipated at each location is detailed below:
 - 6.1. UAE (Dubai and Abu Dhabi)
 - Meeting with Dubai Police
 - Visit Dubai Expo Site
 - Meeting with Abu Dhabi Police
 - Meeting with UAE Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior (responsible for policing)
 - Meeting with New Zealand MFAT staff based in UAE

s6(a)

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6.3. United Kingdom (London)

- Meeting with Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Dame Cressida Dick.
- National Counter-Terrorism Policing Discussion – RCOI, Prison Release cadre and Afghanistan.
- Meeting with National Crime Agency Director, Lynne Owens.
- Visit to United Kingdom Police College.
- Meeting with Joint National Advisory Committee – Trans-National Organised Crime and Unstable States.
- Meeting with Action on Race Independent Chair, Abimbola Johnson.
- Meeting with New Zealand High Commissioner and staff.
- Attend Commemorative Service for Sergeant Matiu ‘Matt’ Ratana.

6.4. Netherlands (The Hague)

- Visit New Zealand Police Staff – Detective Senior Sergeant Tim Chao.
- Meeting with New Zealand MFAT staff based in The Hague.
- Meeting with EUROPOL Director, Catherine de Bolle.

6.5. Turkey (Istanbul)

- Attend IGA.
- Meetings with National Central Bureau partners around the IGA Agenda.
 - India
 - South Africa
 - Turkey
 - 5EYE Partners
 - Singapore (incoming request)
 - China

7. We will update your office with any significant changes to this proposed itinerary prior to Deputy Commissioner Dunbier’s departure.

Prepared by	Senior Sergeant Andy Melville Visits and Events, International Service Group	s9(2)(a)
Approved by	Mike Rusbatch Assistant Commissioner: Security and International	s9(2)(a)

PROACTIVE INFORMATION	
Updated - Police Response to White Identity Extremism	
	Date of Response: 30 July 2021

Purpose

1. This note updates our previous note, IPR-21-137, to support your meeting with Te Pāti Māori Co-leaders - Debbie Ngarewa-Packer and Rawiri Waititi, to discuss concerns about white identity extremism. This meeting is now scheduled for Thursday 5 August. Talking points are attached at **Appendix 1**.
2. 'White identity extremism' is the broad term used by Police (and the National Security System) to encompass white supremacy and extreme fascism ideology.
3. This note provides information on:
 - How Police responds to threats of white identity extremism.
 - What Police is doing, generally, about white identity extremism.
 - What the Government is doing more broadly about white identity extremism.
4. As requested, this note also updates, as background, the status of the:
 - Criminal investigation into the uploading of the 23 May YouTube video which made threats against Māori; and
 - Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) investigation into the Co-leaders' complaint of alleged failure of Police to respond, including to protect the Co-leaders.
5. However, as the criminal investigation and IPCA complaint are operational matters, we recommend that you direct any specific questions about these to the Police Commissioner.

Background

6. A YouTube video, uploaded on 23 May, included hate speech expressing a desire to kill and undertake other violence against Māori 'elite' and Māori in general, and incite others, motivated by a white identity extremism ideology. The Co-leaders subsequently complained to Police, and to the media about Police shortcomings (including racism against Māori) in responding to online white identity extremist threats.

Status of the criminal investigation

7. On 24 May, Police executed a search warrant at the alleged offender's address in Tauranga, seizing the equipment that had been used to make the video. On 3 June, the Chief Censor classified the video as being objectionable under the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 (FVPCA). That same day Police charged the alleged offender with 'making an objectionable publication having reasonable cause to believe that the publication is objectionable' under section 124(1) of the FVPCA (punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment).

8. On 15 July, Police received consent from the Attorney-General to charge the individual with 'inciting racial disharmony' under section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 (punishable by up to three months imprisonment or a fine up to \$7,000). The charge was filed by Police that same day and the matter adjourned to 27 July. On 27 July, the matter was further adjourned without plea to 16 September for a Sentence Indication Hearing.
9. Interim name suppression and suppression of facts applies for both charges. The Co-leaders have been informed throughout.

The Independent Police Conduct Authority complaint

10. On 1 June, Te Pāti Māori lodged a complaint to the Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) on the basis that Police failed to adequately respond to or investigate the threats or hate speech, including a failure to provide active protection to the Co-leaders. The Co-leaders compared this to the way Police recently investigated threats made against MP Simeon Brown, following which two individuals, who happened to be Māori, were charged with threatening to kill. A key distinction between the two incidents is that the YouTube video did not make specific threats against the Co-leaders.
11. The IPCA responded to Te Pāti Māori on 28 June 2021 (attached) and exercised its discretion to decline the complaint. The IPCA has informed the Commissioner of Police that no further action is necessary.

12. 9(2)(f)(iv) [Redacted]

Co-leaders' proposal for a joint task force

13. Te Pāti Māori has also called for a joint task force between the Police and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) to investigate anti-Māori hate speech and targeting of Māori by white identity extremist groups. We understand that the Co-leaders have met with Hon Andrew Little, Minister Responsible for NZSIS and Rebecca Kitteridge, Director-General of Security, to discuss this issue.
14. Police does not support the proposal for a joint task force. Currently hate speech, without the accompanying element of incitement, is unlikely to meet criminal prosecution thresholds. As noted below, Police already has relationships and processes in place to work with the intelligence agencies to identify concerning online extremist content and respond to credible leads of potential criminal violence.


How Police responds to threats of white identity extremism

Police responds to credible leads of threats or suspected potential violence

15. Police does not differentiate between threats on the basis of the ideological position of the person suspected of making the threat. All threats are investigated on the basis of the potential offences committed and, in particular, whether there appears to be a credible threat of violence or the potential for violence is suspected. Where this is the case, investigations are prioritised in order to better understand and mitigate potential danger to the community.
16. Other protective actions may also be necessary, depending on how rapidly the investigation can progress. For example, in the case of the threatening communications targeting the University of Otago graduation ceremonies earlier in 2021, Police worked with the university, local authority, and community around security until the suspect responsible for the threats was identified and apprehended.
17. The nature of the investigation will depend on the circumstances, such as how the threat was communicated, its nature, and whether the individual can be readily identified. It is not always clear what ideology an individual may hold, or whether the ideology they appear to hold is genuine. Police regularly investigates cases which involve hoaxes or individuals where the matter is more complex than what may first appear. In this instance, the person suspected of being responsible for the video was able to be rapidly identified due to the nature of their video and information held on them from prior interactions with Police. In other instances, such as anonymous threats on message boards, other investigation techniques are needed to establish the location and identity of the person thought to be responsible.
18. As noted above, Police does not formally differentiate between ideologies when carrying out these investigations. However, references to issues such as the Christchurch attacks or attacker, or potentially credible commentary linking the threat with other violent extremist incidents, individuals, movements or groups would be taken into account when assessing the likely seriousness of, and therefore priority given to, the matter.

What Police is doing about white identity extremism generally

Police receives intelligence and scans open source activity related to white identity extremism in New Zealand to maintain an awareness of the threat

19. Holding white supremacist or racist views is not a criminal offence in New Zealand and this type of sentiment is prevalent amongst a minority element in society. It is driven by ideologies relating to ethnic, religious, and conspiracy-based views.
20. Police scans some open source activity in a limited capacity and works with the intelligence agencies to identify concerning online extremist content. However, Police cannot scan all online activity and also relies on reporting from the public to identify issues.
21. Between 15 March 2019 and 10 December 2020 Police received 2825 pieces of lead information from a variety of sources, which were assessed as being of potential national security interest. Of these, 2278 were attributable to identified individuals and 854 were identified as individuals that may possibly adhere to white supremacy ideology.
22. s6(c)

s.o(a)
23. Most of the extremist rhetoric attributed to New Zealand-based extremists occurs online – where a sense of anonymity and the ability to seemingly act without consequences results in a larger volume of hate-based sentiment and activity. In terms of physical harm, the threat of a lone actor attack remains the most likely form of violent extremism in New Zealand, where an individual (or small group of individuals) might undertake a form of low-level opportunistic violence, using unsophisticated means.

Te Raranga is a Police programme to improve the recording and response to hate incidents and hate crime

24. As part of the Government's immediate response to recommendations of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques (RCOI), Te Raranga / The Weave was announced by the Prime Minister in December 2020. It is a four-year programme to improve frontline practice to weave people, whānau and communities together with a shared understanding of each other to, in the long-term, reduce incidents of hate crime and support those impacted by the hurt of hate crime.

25. Specifically, Te Raranga will improve Police's data quality and monitoring, and awareness and reporting of hate incidents, to better understand and identify hate crime and progress successful prosecutions. A Cross Agency Data Collation and Sharing working group will improve standards of collection of hate crime data and share information across agencies to create a 'richer picture' of hate crime at a national level and deliver a service that is more responsive to victims.
26. Police has started the first phase of consultation with iwi Māori, community, and agency partners to inform the design of Te Raranga.

He Aranga Ake (formerly known as the Multi-Agency Coordinated Intervention Programme) works with at risk individuals


27. Police is leading the initiative, He Aranga Ake, formerly known as the Multi-Agency Coordinated Intervention Programme (MACIP), to further develop current prevention efforts focused on individuals vulnerable to violent extremist influences. He Aranga Ake received funding as part of the Government's response to the RCOI findings.
28. Police has undertaken similar work with agency and community partners for some years, but this was not specifically funded for or recognised. While He Aranga Ake is being developed, individuals are still receiving coordinated support within existing arrangements and resources. We similarly work with vulnerable youth to address risk factors such as mental health, education, welfare, housing, and family support. Where appropriate and possible, individuals are assigned mentors who can provide personal support.
29. As with other Police efforts, this initiative considers individuals irrespective of their particular ideology. s.6(c)

s.9(2)(f)(iv)

30. s.9(2)(f)(iv)

31. s.9(2)(f)(iv)


32. s.9(2)(f)(iv)



Designation of terrorist entities under the Terrorism Suppression Act

- 33. The designation of terrorist entities is one measure that New Zealand takes to contribute to international efforts to counter terrorism. A designation applies sanctions through the ability to freeze and forfeit the assets of the entity, and makes it a criminal offence to participate in or support the activities of the designated terrorist entity, including financing designated entities.
- 34. The Prime Minister may, under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (TSA), designate entities (person, group, trust, partnership, fund unincorporated association or organisation) as terrorist or associated entities if the Prime Minister believes on reasonable grounds that the entity has **knowingly carried out, or has knowingly participated in the carrying out of, one or more terrorist acts**. This includes planning or other preparation to carry out a terrorist act, a credible threat or an attempt to carry out a terrorist act.
- 35. New Zealand has designated one identity-motivated terrorist, the offender responsible for the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack on two Christchurch mosques. To date, New Zealand has not designated any white identity extremist group, however Five Eyes partners such as Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada have.

36. s.9(2)(f)(iv), s.6(c)



What the Government is doing more broadly about white identity extremism

Changes to hate incitement provisions will broaden the scope of protection

- 38. On 7 December 2020, Cabinet agreed that a number in-principle amendments be made relating to hate speech incitement provisions [CAB-20-MIN-0507]. On 25 June 2021, the Ministry of Justice released a public consultation document seeking feedback over six weeks on proposals to:

¹ The TDWG is chaired by New Zealand Police, and comprises officials from Crown Law, NZ Defence Force, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

- Broaden the range of groups protected by the civil provision of section 61 (Racial disharmony) and the criminal provision of section 131 (Inciting racial disharmony) of the Human Rights Act (HRA) from just four of the “prohibited grounds of discrimination” - race, nationality, ethnicity and colour - to possibly include the other prohibited grounds in the HRA. These grounds are gender, sex, sexual orientation, religious belief, ethical belief, disability, age, employment status, family/marital status, and political opinion. However, Cabinet agreed that incitement of hatred against a group with a political opinion would not be covered by the new offence [CAB-21-MIN-0163]. The consultation document also proposes adding further grounds to list of prohibited grounds of discrimination, so the incitement provision may also protect trans, gender diverse and intersex people.
 - Move the section 131 HRA criminal provision into the Crimes Act 1961. The wording of this offence would also be amended to be clearer as to what constitutes incitement of hate. The proposals remove descriptors such as inciting “hostility”, “ill-will”, “contempt” and “ridicule” and replace them with inciting “hatred” which is perceived to be a higher test. However, that term will be open to interpretation by the public and the courts. The proposed new offence will be for intending to stir up, maintain or normalise hatred against any protected group of people through threatening, abusive or insulting communications, including inciting violence, made by any means. The penalty for this offence is also proposed to increase to a maximum imprisonment of 3 years or fine of \$50,000 (from 3 months / \$7,000).
 - Change the wording of section 61 of the HRA to include “inciting/stirring up, maintaining or normalising hatred” alongside the existing wording and also make speech that is likely to cause incitement to discrimination unlawful.
39. There has been some media questioning about how low these proposals will set the ‘bar’ for what is considered incitement of hatred towards another group. The Cabinet paper was clear that the offence is aimed at the most extreme end of hate speech to minimise justifiable limitation on freedom of expression. s9(2)(f)(iv)
- [REDACTED]
40. s9(2)(f)(iv)
- [REDACTED] there is further work around hate incidents and hate crime happening in the broader Government response to the RCOI. The proposed changes will not address person-to-person instances of hate speech, which is the basis of most complaints to Police. Police will continue to face challenges in managing public expectations of a criminal justice response to hate speech, which falls short of incitement of hatred against a group.

Proposed amendments to the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act to provide for faster decisions about classifying objectionable material

- 41. The FVPCA enables the Chief Censor to classify material as “objectionable” if it meets certain criteria under section 3 of the FVPCA.² Currently, the Chief Censor must give a comprehensive written decision before material can be deemed objectionable. During this time, public harm can still occur, and the objectionable content may be disseminated further. This occurred during the 15 March 2019 Christchurch terror attacks where the livestream of the attack was not classified until 18 March 2019, and the terrorist’s manifesto was not classified until 22 March 2019.
- 42. The Governance and Administration Select Committee is currently considering amendments to the FVPCA, which would enable the Chief Censor to rapidly make an interim classification decision, pending a final written decision, which would have the same effect as a written decision for up to 20 days. This allows for an initial, fast response to instances of clear objectionable content. The amendments also propose to create take-down notices which would require the removal of objectionable online content. The Government is also undertaking a broad review of the media content regulatory system.

Christchurch call

- 43. The Christchurch Call, led by the Prime Minister, is a commitment by Governments and technology companies to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. The Call outlines collective, voluntary commitments from Governments and online service providers intended to address the issue of terrorist and violent extremist content online and to prevent the abuse of the internet as occurred in and after the Christchurch attacks.

First contact	Gillian Ferguson, Director, Policy	s.9(2)(a)
Second contact	Glenn Dunbier, Deputy Commissioner, Operations	s.9(2)(a)

² A publication is objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that that availability of the publication is likely to injurious to the public good...promotes or supports...acts of torture or the infliction of extreme cruelty...degrades or dehumanises or demeans any person, and/or promotes or encourages criminal acts or acts of terrorism.

INFORMATION REQUEST

New Zealand's Policing Support to the Cook Islands

Deadline: 16 July 2021

Date of Response: 16 July 2021

Purpose

1. The purpose of this briefing is to provide you with updated information in relation to New Zealand Police's (Police) engagement with the Cook Islands Police Service (CIPS) ahead of your upcoming meeting with Cook Islands Prime Minister (PM) Hon. Mark Brown.
2. This paper should be read in conjunction with a) the proactive information paper (IPR/21/67) previously provided to you which provides an overview of New Zealand's policing support to the Cook Islands and b) the briefing pack provided to you by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT).

Important points to note

3. Police has a long-standing and mutually beneficial working relationship with CIPS. Despite the challenges posed by COVID-19, Police remains committed to working with CIPS to build their organisational capacity and capability, and strengthen our police to police relationship.
4. Police has been assisting in the priority areas raised by PM Brown at your previous meeting, primarily through the Pacific Island Prevention Policing (PIPP) Programme.
5. Police is finalising arrangements to deploy three staff members to the Cook Islands to assist with CIPS' investigation into ^{s6(c)} [REDACTED] ^{s9(2)(g)(i)} [REDACTED].
6. The appointment of a former Police staff member to the role of CIPS Commissioner has been confirmed. The new Commissioner, James Keenan, started his new role in June 2021.

Key points arising from previous meeting with Prime Minister Brown

7. ^{s6(b)(i)} [REDACTED]
8. ^{s6(b)(i)} [REDACTED]
9. As outlined in IPR/21/67, Police has three key activities in support of CIPS. One of these is the PIPP Programme developed a prevention first strategic direction

for CIPS, focussing on reducing crime and increasing community trust and confidence. PIPP worked with CIPS to identify their key 'drivers of demand' (alcohol, roads, family harm, youth and maritime) and develop a Prevention Operating Model (POM). A copy of the CIPS POM is attached for your information.

10. PIPP is delivered in a partnership approach, enabling CIPS to request support from Police to operationalise its POM. Key activities delivered in partnership with CIPS include:
 - 10.1. Developing Action Plans to help identify key activities to operationalise the CIPS POM.
 - 10.2. Developing of a tactical options framework and delivering tactical and firearms training to ensure officer safety.
 - 10.3. Reviewing Criminal Investigations Branch training material.
 - 10.4. Assistance to build a road safety plan.
 - 10.5. Providing breathalyser devices and associated training package that was integrated into the road policing recruit package. A review of breath test procedure forms was also completed.
 - 10.6. Sharing appropriate Police COVID-19 documents and assisting CIPS to contextualise, review and write their own COVID-19 plans and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
11. Core policing training is also a consistent priority that has been identified for CIPS. Police is in the initial stages of developing a project to provide basic police skills training for Realm countries. We will be consulting with stakeholders on the concept soon.
12. COVID-19 has hampered the ability of the PIPP Advisors to travel into country and deliver activities. Whilst support has been provided remotely where possible, the opening of the borders with the Cook Islands is welcomed. Police look forward to reengaging with CIPS to provide support to their POM.

Additional policing support

13. s6(c) [REDACTED]
14. s6(c) [REDACTED]
15. s6(c) [REDACTED]

16. s6(c) [Redacted]

Appointment of the new Cook Islands Police Service Commissioner

17. Since your previous meeting with PM Brown, the appointment of Turepu ‘James’ Keenan as the new Commissioner of CIPS has been formally announced. Commissioner Keenan took up his new position in June 2021.

18. s9(2)(g)(i) [Redacted]

19. Police is engaging with Commissioner Keenan, and we look forward to developing a positive relationship with him.

Reviewed by	Steve Dunn - Director: International Service Group (Relieving)	s9(2)(a) [Redacted]
Approved by	Mike Rusbatch - Assistant Commissioner: Security & International	s9(2)(a) [Redacted]

INFORMATION REQUEST	
Update on Police use of Drones	
	Date of Response: 6 July 2021

Purpose

1. This note provides you with an update on New Zealand Police (Police) use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, commonly referred to as drones. It outlines the key factors that will impact and inform Police's future use and management of drones including the proof of concept evaluation report s 9 (2)(f)(iv) [REDACTED] as well as internal work programs.
2. This information responds to your request for further advice on Police use of drones following the Officials' meeting on 14 June 2021.

Current use of drones by Police

3. Drones are becoming more commonly used by emergency services and Police globally as they provide a viable alternative to helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. They are also used by public and private organisations for taking photographs, surveying, transportation and carrying a range of specialist camera systems (such as adding geographical information to imagery).
4. Police currently use drones in some districts for:
 - crime scene and exhibit imaging
 - search and rescue
 - serious road crash scene surveying
 - providing enhanced situational awareness to tactical interventions such as Armed Offender Squad Operations and natural disasters to assist decision making.

Police conducted a proof of concept to verify the benefits and efficacy of drone use for policing

5. The growing use of Police drones in districts has highlighted the benefits of developing drone capability including efficiency, safety and improved decision making. As a result of the growth in Police use of drones we decided to undertake a proof of concept to verify the benefits of drone use in a policing context.
6. On 12 June 2019, Police approved a six-month proof-of concept and evaluation of the use of drones in Northland, Waikato, Canterbury and Tasman Districts. The proof of concept sought to establish the circumstances in which drones were used, whether it improved operational effectiveness, how it compared to other options available, if it reduced risk and its cost efficiency. Police wanted to ensure drone capability aligned with Police's vision to support the frontline, ensure communities are safe and feel safe, and that it would modernise service delivery.

7. Evaluations of drone use were sometimes extended to operations in areas outside these districts for significant search and rescue operations. Other evaluations included deployment of drones for locating fleeing drivers, situational awareness for tactical operations, arson and crime photography, Armed Offender Squad operations, accident and sudden death scenes and serious crash incidents. The range and level of air support required was not in scope of the evaluation.

The proof of concept findings verified the benefits of drone use by Police

8. The internal evaluation of the proof of concept found that the use of drones enhanced operational efficiency and effectiveness. For example, drones can search areas that are dangerous for manned aircraft (e.g. White Island) and can operate in extreme weather conditions that helicopters cannot. Drone use also provided greater safety benefits for Police and communities. The final report recommended each District consider investment in a fleet of drones, and that centralised purchasing and a national roll-out should be considered to manage cyber security and other procurement risks.
9. Although the proof of concept confirmed the benefit of drone use for policing, the recommendation regarding a more centralised approach, and other internal work programs such as the Aviation Strategy and Emergent Technology work, prompted further consideration. In response, Police decided to pause any purchasing of additional drones to ensure next steps for procurement and use were well informed. ^{s 9 (2)(f)(iv)}
[REDACTED]
10. The seven Police Districts (Northland, Waikato, Auckland City, Bay of Plenty, Wellington, Tasman, Canterbury) who have already purchased fleets, are still permitted to continue their use of drones in line with Police Instructions and current legal requirements until a centralised model of deployment is considered.

The Civil Aviation Bill introduces a new regulatory framework for the use of drones and will impact Police operations

11. Police currently operates drones legally under the Civil Aviation Act 1990. The widespread growth of public drone use and the risks they pose has led the Ministry of Transport (MoT) to develop a new regulatory regime for drones as part of the Civil Aviation Bill (the Bill). In April 2020, Cabinet agreed that the Bill include amendments to create powers to intervene against illegally operated drones. ^{s 9 (2)(f)(iv)}
[REDACTED]
12. The Bill will include new powers for Police to manage risks of drones being used for criminal activity by enabling Police to seize or detain a drone where there are reasonable grounds to suspect it is being used for crime. This will include the power to intercept when the criminal offending is occurring. The Bill also enables enforcement powers to authorised persons (other than Police) to manage drone enforcement. There is also a new offence for operating drones in a controlled or restricted airspace without authorisation, which will impact Police when supporting major events that restrict airspace such as the America's Cup.

13. s 9 (2)(f)(iv) [REDACTED] a new offence for operating a drone in restricted or controlled airspace. The introduction of these new provisions means Police will need to ensure we meet the requirements. For example, training will need to be updated and provided to ensure staff are aware of the new legislation.

Internal work programs will help inform decisions around future use and management of drones

14. In addition to legislative changes, there are a number of work programs in progress, which will inform the consideration of our approach police deployment and use of drones. This will enable Police to respond to the proof of concept by involving relevant areas of the business to ensure future procurement and use of drones is fit for purpose, and has considered the appropriate privacy, security, public perception and legislative frameworks for their continued use.
15. Development of an internal Police Aviation Strategy is underway to identify what air support is needed (including use of drones) for Police. The Strategy will consider what the overall aviation capability of Police should look like so we can invest in the right technologies as they advance. This piece of work was out of scope of the proof of concept and will fulfil a gap in knowledge to ensure drone capability meets Police's needs.
16. The Police policy 'Proposals to test or trial use of emergent technologies' introduced in September 2020 ensures appropriate consideration of security, privacy, ethical and human rights implications are taken ahead of the trial or use of new technology capabilities. In March 2021, an independent expert panel was appointed to provide advice and oversight from an ethical and policy perspective of emergent technologies. In assessing any proposed drone countermeasure technology, it is likely the panels advice will be sought as part of the emergent technologies framework. The findings will enable Police to make decisions on the future procurement of drone technologies to ensure we are safe and responsible in our decisions.
17. Operators and law enforcement agencies, including Police, require certification under Part 101 of the Civil Aviation Rules to be permitted to operate an Unmanned Aircraft (drone). Police has an application lodged for a Part 102 certification s6(c)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

Next steps

18. Following the outcomes of key internal work programs s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted] Police will consider the best approach for the future use of drones by Police. This will include whether a centralised approach could be implemented.

Reviewed by	Gillian Ferguson, Director - Policy	s9(2)(a) [redacted]
Approved by	Glenn Dunbier, Deputy Commissioner - Operations	s9(2)(a) [redacted]

PROACTIVE INFORMATION

Understanding Policing Delivery Independent Panel

Deadline: NA

Date: 27 April 2021

Purpose

1. This briefing provides you with a brief overview of the Independent Panel established to provide insight and advice on the research programme titled *Understanding Policing Delivery* and related policing practice.

Police is undertaking a research programme to identify bias in Police's operating environment

2. To safeguard Police's ability to police by consent (working alongside and with the broad support of the communities we ourselves come from, in order to be effective), it is important that the delivery of policing services is provided in ways that are fair, impartial, ethical and just. In this context, New Zealand Police, with Te Puna Haumarū, NZ Institute for Security and Crime Science at the University of Waikato, is undertaking research to identify whether, where, and to what extent, bias exists at a system-level in Police's operating environment. This research programme has been titled *Understanding Policing Delivery*.
3. This research will initially cover three key areas that have been identified as being of potential concern:
 - 3.1. who we stop and speak to and how we engage with them;
 - 3.2. use-of-force decision-making; and
 - 3.3. charging decisions.
4. The research findings are intended to inform work across Police to strengthen how and who we are as an organisation in line with the Commissioner's Priority of *Be First, Then Do*. This work reflects Police's commitment to Māori and Te Tiriti o Waitangi, to ensure Police's actions and activities are fair, reasonable, and appropriate for all New Zealanders.

The Commissioner of Police has appointed an independent panel to provide insight and advice on the research programme

5. The Understanding Policing Delivery Independent Panel (the Panel) has been convened to bring together a diverse range of skills and experience, to ensure the research analysis and advice is informed by a holistic range of views and perspectives, particularly tikanga Māori.
6. Chaired by Tā Kim Workman, the proposed Panel comprises experts on tikanga Māori, academics, a former Police District Commander, and a representative from the Office of the Children's Commissioner.

7. A full list of Panel members, along with a brief biography for each, are detailed in Appendix 1.

Next Steps

8. Panel members have been provided with a draft Terms of Reference which outlines the Panel's role, mandate and operating procedures. We expect the Terms of Reference to be discussed and confirmed by the Panel at their first meeting, likely to take place in May or June. A copy of the Terms of Reference has been included in Appendix 2 for your information.
9. Over the coming weeks, Police, along with some members of the Panel and the University of Waikato, will meet to discuss the Terms of Reference for the Research Steering Group, key components of the research programme, as well as the specific service agreement with the University.
10. We are also developing a wider communications strategy and plan for the research programme, including a public announcement that will capture the role, mandate and membership for both the Steering Group and the Independent Panel as well as immediate next steps. We expect this announcement to take place in May.

Reviewed by	Bailey Tuiomanufili, Project Manager	s.9(2)(a) OIA
Approved by	Mark Evans, DCE Insights and Deployment	s.9(2)(a) OIA

PROACTIVE INFORMATION

Specialist advice on facial recognition technologies

Deadline: N/A

Date of response: 31 March 2021

Purpose

1. This brief provides an update on Police's emergent technologies work program and the appointment of specialist advisors to assist with understanding facial recognition technologies (FRT).
2. Following the establishment of an independent Expert Panel on Emergent Technologies, Police has now engaged leading FRT researcher's Dr Nessa Lynch and Dr Andrew Chen to provide additional in-depth advice on the complex issues associated with this type of technology.

Important points to note

3. Police recently announced the establishment of an [Expert Panel on Emergent Technologies](#), chaired by Professor Colin Gavaghan from Otago University [IPR/21/37 refers]. This Panel will contribute to ao Māori, domestic, and overseas perspectives on technology matters Police refers to it for advice. While the Panel has a broad brief, it is anticipated most of its work will be peer review and expert advice on specific proposals to inform Police decisions.
4. Police also recognises that there are technology-related issues the organisation would benefit from more in-depth external research and policy advice. The complexities surrounding possible law enforcement uses of facial recognition technology (FRT) provide a clear case for such advice. Dr Nessa Lynch and Dr Andrew Chen have therefore been engaged on a contract basis for approximately six months to provide arms-length expert advice on the issue.
5. Dr Lynch (an Associate Professor at Victoria University of Wellington) and Dr Chen (a Research Fellow at the University of Auckland) are two of New Zealand's leading experts and academic researchers in the field of FRT. Both are actively engaged in research on the issue and, notably, Dr Lynch recently co-authored a [Law Foundation-funded report](#) on the technology.

Police will benefit from specific FRT expertise

6. Law enforcement agencies internationally have trialled the use of live facial recognition in a range of situations. These trials have attracted controversy and highlighted difficult ethical considerations about when the use of live FRT may be justified on public safety grounds, and what safeguards ought to be in place.
7. There is a degree of public and academic debate on such issues in New Zealand, even though Police does not, and currently has no plans to, use any form of 'live' or near real-time FRT. Police does, however, have software that allows static suspect images to be automatically matched against Police photo collections (such as known offenders). This software may be considered FRT. Embedded

FRT capabilities (of one kind or another) are also becoming more common across a wide range of technologies that are not necessarily acquired for facial recognition purposes, which may raise additional complexities for technology procurement generally.

- Public debate, and Police’s organisational understanding, would benefit from being informed by specific expert research examining the issues specifically from a New Zealand policing perspective. It is expected the contractors will produce a paper that clarifies definitions and advises on key ethical, human rights and legal considerations for current and any possible future uses of FRT in New Zealand. The advice will include consideration of Māori data sovereignty issues, as well as implications from a Treaty of Waitangi perspective.

Publicity

- A media release will be issued at the appropriate time on this next step in Police’s strengthened governance and oversight around technology-enabled capabilities. The Media and Communications group will send you the release and proposed timing when it is confirmed.
- Final advice is currently anticipated to be received towards the end of this year. Police intends to publish the advice in due course, once it has been considered.

Contributing information

- Police conducted an [Assurance review](#) of public-facing emergent technologies in July 2020, and drew upon this initial review work to develop and introduce a [new policy](#) around proposals to test or trial new technologies in September 2020.
- In addition, Police became a signatory to the [Algorithm Charter for Aotearoa New Zealand](#) in September 2020.
- A New Zealand Police [Expert Panel on Emergent Technologies](#) has been established and was publicly announced on 11 March 2021.

Reviewed by	Mike Webb, Director: Assurance	s.9(2)(a) OIA
Approved by	Mark Evans, DCE: Insights and Deployment	s.9(2)(a) OIA

PROACTIVE INFORMATION	
Crowded Places Initiative	
Deadline: NA	Date of Response: 29 March 2021

Purpose

1. To inform you about the All of Government Crowded Places initiative led by Police, which delivers a public facing strategy and guidance to address public safety in terrorism or violent extremism incidents in crowded places.

The Crowded Places Strategy was launched on 17 September 2020

2. Police led a multi-agency Crowded Places Advisory Group (CPAG)¹ to develop a “Protecting Our Crowded Places from Attack” Strategy, drawing on Australian security documents tailored to the New Zealand environment.
3. The Strategy was launched on 17 September 2020 with associated documents to support businesses and communities to make their places safer. Its purpose is to preserve the public’s use and enjoyment of crowded places, while ensuring that their safety has been considered. Crowded places have been a target for attackers both in New Zealand (Christchurch) and overseas. In most cases, the large volume and concentration of people at a crowded place is what makes it an attractive target, rather than the location itself.
4. New Zealand’s Strategy to protect crowded places from attack rests on four elements:
 - i. building stronger partnerships - between Government, Police, and its partners (local government, owners and operators, and communities) to increase awareness of risks and increase resilience to attacks
 - ii. better sharing of information and guidance
 - iii. implementing effective protective security - to deter, detect, delay, respond to and recover from an attack
 - iv. increasing resilience – to reduce likelihood of an attack and lessen its consequences.
5. The Strategy emphasises that all New Zealanders have a role in helping detect and prevent attacks, and that everyone who works in, or uses, a crowded place should be aware of their surroundings and report suspicious or unusual behaviour to authorities. It provides owners and operators of crowded places with greater awareness of the risk of terrorism or similar incidents and guidance to enable them to carry out their own assessment of risk and vulnerability for their crowded place.

¹ CPAG includes representatives from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Ministry of Transport, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service, Department of Internal Affairs, Protective Security and Police.

6. The key message to people at public places is Escape. Hide. Tell in the event they are involved in an attack at a crowded place.
7. The Crowded Places Strategy and supporting documents are available on the Police website www.police.govt.nz/crowdedplaces. This also includes ESCAPE. HIDE. TELL. posters in multiple languages.
8. The Crowded Places Strategy is a deliverable of New Zealand's Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism National Strategy.² The Crowded Places initiative also aligns with the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques, to improve New Zealand's counter-terrorism effort (Part 10, Chapter 2).

Implementation of the Crowded Places Strategy

9. Relevant staff at all Police Districts have been briefed on the Crowded Places Strategy and supporting documentation in order to be able to respond effectively to queries from owners and operators.
10. The next phase to establish a Business Advisory Group (BAG) and Community Advisory Group (CAG) is underway, with an initial launch meeting to engage with potential advisory group members being held on Wednesday 31 March 2021. Approximately 40 CEOs of large national companies and organisations have been invited to attend. An original event on 17 February 2021 was deferred due to COVID level changes.
11. The launch of the BAG and CAG is a key step in engaging owners and operators with the Crowded Places Strategy and starting to change mindsets to more proactively ensure New Zealanders are kept safe in their crowded places. These two groups will be a key conduit of information to and from their sector to CPAG.
12. The Strategy and supporting documentation as published provide a baseline of support for owners and operators to use to protect their crowded place.
13. In addition, Police has a Budget 2021 bid to deliver the capability needed to support business and community owners and operators as part of the investment package. This bid has been submitted as part of the DPMC and Security and Intelligence Board Counter-Terrorism Investments option to Treasury where it is currently under consideration. The decision on the funding request is expected by end of April. If approved, a further programme of work has been defined to promote and enhance the Strategy, to bring wider awareness of it and promote prevention actions into common practice.
14. Notwithstanding the outcome of the funding bid, CPAG are focussed on continuity and contingency planning to maintain the CAG and BAG structures once established.

² The Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism National Strategy was launched in February 2020 by the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security (ODESC) - a committee of Chief Executives which manages national security in New Zealand.

Reviewed by	Eric Tibbott, Superintendent, Director – Community Partnerships & Prevention	s.9(2)(a) OIA
Approved by	Chris de Wattignar Assistant Commissioner: Iwi & Communities	s.9(2)(a) OIA

PROACTIVE INFORMATION

New Zealand's Policing Support to the Cook Islands

Deadline: 26 March 2021

Date of Response: 26 March 2021

Purpose

1. The purpose of this briefing is to provide you with an overview of Police's engagement with the Cook Islands Police Service (CIPS) and to note the provisional appointment of the new CIPS Commissioner, ahead of your meeting with Cook Islands Prime Minister Hon. Mark Brown on Monday 29 March.
2. This paper should be read in conjunction with the briefing pack provided to you by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), which covers New Zealand and the Cook Islands political, security, and development engagement.

Important points to note

3. Police has three key activities in support of the CIPS. Activities include the Pacific Island Prevention Policing (PIPP) Programme, Pacific Detector Dog Programme (PDDP), and the New Zealand Transnational Crime Unit (NZTCU).
 - 3.1. Despite the challenges posed by COVID-19, Police remains committed to working with the CIPS to build their organisational capacity and capability and strengthen our police to police relationship.
 - 3.2. **If raised**, any request for additional policing support should be noted, and referred to Police and MFAT officials for consideration.
4. In 2020, the CIPS Commissioner position was advertised following the retirement of former Commissioner Maara Tetava. The position was advertised locally in the Cook Islands and internationally on the Cook Islands Office of the Public Service Commission website. s.9(2)(g)(i) OIA

4.1. s.9(2)(a) OIA, s.9(2)(g)(i) OIA

New Zealand Police has an active and strong partnership with the CIPS

5. The bilateral relationship between Police and CIPS is a long-standing one, built on a strong partnership between the two organisations and underpinned by the constitutional relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands.

Pacific Island Prevention Policing (PIPP) Programme

6. The PIPP Programme assists the policing services of the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau, and Tuvalu to develop and implement their Prevention Operating Model (POM). Police PIPP advisors have worked with the CIPS to develop and identify key drivers of demand, and they provide mentoring and advisory support to the CIPS to operationalise their POM through the development of operational policies and processes, thereby reducing crime and increasing community trust and confidence in the CIPS.
7. Police supports the CIPS with fly in fly out advisors. In the current COVID-19 environment, Police continues to provide support remotely.

Pacific Detector Dog Programme (PDDP)

8. Police supplies detector dogs and provides ongoing training and mentoring to the Cook Islands Detector Dog Unit (DDU). There is currently only one detector dog handler and dog within the Cook Islands DDU. Until borders open, Police is unable to provide an additional detector dog or bring new handlers to New Zealand for training. PDDP advisors based at the Police dog training centre in Trentham continue to provide support remotely.

9. s.6(c) OIA, s.7(a)(i) OIA
[REDACTED] The PDDP allows the DDU to intercept packages of drugs and firearms, some of which would have been destined for New Zealand or other Pacific countries. Consequently, the harm associated with these commodities has been prevented from impacting on communities in New Zealand and across the Pacific.

New Zealand Transnational Crime Unit (NZTCU)

10. The NZTCU supports counterparts in the Cook Islands TCU (as well as other Pacific TCUs) to work together at an agency level to mitigate the risks posed by transnational organised crime. Activities include the development of the TCU's intelligence, analysis, and investigative capacity and capability.
11. The NZTCU is currently undergoing a multi-agency design process comprising representatives from Police, Customs, Immigration and Corrections to seek long-term funding for the Unit. A decision on funding for the unit and future activities is expected in May 2021. The NZTCU was subject to an independent review and evaluation which highlighted the significant benefit it provides to the region and made several recommendations around continuing and enhanced support.

Provisional appointment of the new Cook Islands Police Service Commissioner

12. In 2020, the CIPS Commissioner position was advertised following the retirement of former Commissioner, Maara Tetava. s 9(2)(g)(i) OIA
[REDACTED]

- 13. s.9(2)(a) OIA [Redacted]
- 14. s.9(2)(a) OIA [Redacted] Police will seek to engage with any new Commissioner to provide an overview of current engagement and support activities provided by Police to the CIPS.
- 15. s.9(2)(g)(i) OIA [Redacted]

Reviewed by	Steve Dunn - Director: International Service Group (Relieving)	s.9(2)(a) OIA [Redacted]
Approved by	Mike Rusbatch - Assistant Commissioner: Security & International	s.9(2)(a) OIA [Redacted]

PROACTIVE INFORMATION	
New Zealand Police Expert Panel on Emergent Technologies	
Deadline: N/A	Date of response: 3 March 2021

Purpose

1. As foreshadowed last year, Police has established an independent Expert Panel on Emergent Technologies, which can help provide advice on Police's proposed use of new technologies, or issues relating to the use of existing technologies. This note confirms the membership of the panel; the subject of the first referral to the panel for advice; and the timing of an associated public announcement.

Important points to note

Expert panel

2. Police [committed in September 2020](#) to establish an independent expert panel to advise on technology matters. A six-member panel has now been established, chaired by Professor Colin Gavaghan from Otago University, and incorporating experts who can contribute te ao Māori, domestic and international perspectives. Brief biographies of the appointed panel members are [attached](#).
3. Also [attached](#) are the formal Terms of Reference for the panel. These state that its primary role is to provide advice to the Police Commissioner on issues formally referred to it. While referrals and advice are confidential, the presumption is that advice received from the panel will be made publicly available, once it has been considered by senior officials and used to inform decisions by Police's Executive.
4. Preparations are being made to issue a media release on Thursday 11 March to confirm the establishment of the panel, its membership, and the fact that Police has made its first referral to the panel for advice. The inaugural referral will relate to a recently-completed stocktake of Police's use of algorithms.

External stocktake of algorithms

5. In November 2020, Police commissioned specialist consulting firm Taylor Fry to conduct a stocktake of algorithms in use or development by New Zealand Police, and to provide advice on best practice to assure safe and ethical development and use of algorithms moving forward.
6. Taylor Fry's report ([attached](#)) identifies 10 moderate or higher risk algorithms. A high-level analysis of each of these algorithms, including the reasons for their risk categorisation, is contained in the report. The report does not find that any of the identified risks have materialised, because the detailed work required to test algorithm performance was beyond the scope of the work. Rather, the risks identified will need to be monitored and reviewed through ongoing life-cycle management of the algorithms.

7. The report also makes general and largely positive observations about New Zealand Police’s use of algorithms; noting, for example, widespread recognition of the need for proportionality in design, human oversight (including control over final decisions), and strong awareness of privacy requirements.
8. Taylor Fry’s report offers eight recommendations aimed at ensuring adherence to international best practice in algorithm development and stewardship. In summary, these recommend that: Police further revise and strengthen governance controls; establish centralised life-cycle management processes for the development, testing, monitoring, and review of algorithms; and establish best-practice algorithm developer standards, guidance, and associated training.
9. The first referral to the new expert panel (also attached) seeks advice on implementation of the report’s recommendations. Advice is sought by early April. Once that advice has been received and used to inform consideration by one of Police’s Executive governance groups, it will be published to Police’s website; along with the Taylor Fry report, and a likely indication of Police’s intentions to follow-through on the recommendations in the report.

Contributing information

10. Police conducted an [Assurance review](#) of public-facing emergent technologies in July 2020, and drew upon this initial review work to develop and introduce a [new policy](#) around proposals to test or trial new technologies in September 2020.
11. In addition, Police became a signatory to the [Algorithm Charter for Aotearoa New Zealand](#) in September 2020.

Reviewed by	Mike Webb, Director: Assurance	s.9(2)(a) OIA
Approved by	Mark Evans, DCE: Insights and Deployment	s.9(2)(a) OIA