

## Briefing for call with Hon Jeremiah MANELE, Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade (Solomon Islands)

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Date: Monday 21 June 2021

Time: 2.00 to 3.00

Venue: MFAT Auckland office, Level 6, 139 Quay St

This meeting will cover both Disarmament and Arms Control matters, and PACER Plus. There is no formal agenda for your meeting. However, we have indicated to the Solomon Islands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade that you wish to discuss disarmament and arms control matters, and PACER Plus. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

### Haurongo – Biography

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**Jeremiah Manele** [*“ma-nel-ee”*] was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade in 2019. A career diplomat, he was previously Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs and External Trade. An in-person visit to New Zealand by Manele scheduled for March 2020 was deferred due to COVID-19. This is our first ministerial-level engagement with Manele on Disarmament and Arms Control issues. Minister Manele attended the inaugural PACER Plus Ministers’ Meeting in February 2020, and spoke with Minister Mahuta by Zoom in February 2021, during which they discussed COVID-19 recovery, the Pacific Islands Forum and RSE.

### Whāinga – Objectives

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- Acknowledge the strength of the New Zealand-Solomon Islands relationship, <sup>s6(a)</sup>
- Discuss Solomon Islands’ views on PACER Plus as a vehicle for economic and social development, especially in light of the impacts of COVID-19.
- Emphasise that New Zealand and Solomon Islands have a long tradition of working together on nuclear disarmament issues and <sup>s6(a)</sup>

### Pito kōrero – Talking points

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- Our relationship with Solomon Islands is important to New Zealand. The scope and scale of the activities in our partnership is impressive, and our ambition remains high as we work together to address the impacts of COVID-19. We look forward to continuing our long-standing, deep and respectful partnership.

- Solomon Islands' approach to COVID-19 has been decisive, timely, and effective. However, there is a long road ahead in addressing the economic impacts of the virus.

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- We are committed to supporting recovery across the region and will be working closely with Solomon Islands on how best to address these impacts.

*PACER Plus*

- New Zealand sees PACER Plus first and foremost as a development agreement, representing the deepening of our relationship with the Pacific and our enduring commitment to the region.
- It is important to ensure that the benefits of PACER Plus are realised. The pandemic has made it even more crucial that the region remains committed to strengthening the region's trade capacity, access to international markets and regional economic integration, in order to support economic diversification and resilience.
- The New Zealand- and Australia-funded Development and Economic Cooperation Fund, valued at approx. NZ\$27.5million (AU\$25.5million), will help shape the trading environment in the Pacific. Parties to the Agreement have the opportunity to steer a work programme of trade capacity building activities to be implemented by the PACER Plus Implementation Unit.
- While the development and economic cooperation activities will focus on multi-country projects for PACER Plus Parties, Aid for Trade funding will allow New Zealand to support bilateral trade-related priorities in Solomon Islands.

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- New Zealand sees value in expanding PACER Plus membership to include other Pacific Island Countries <sup>s6(a)</sup> We see this as enhancing regional trade integration <sup>s6(a)</sup>

*Labour mobility*

New Zealand is committed to enhancing the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme and exploring new opportunities once border settings permit this, under the Labour Mobility Arrangement.

- We have appreciated Solomon Islands' commitment to repatriating stranded RSE workers, which has alleviated welfare issues among workers and enabled Solomon Islands to be eligible to participate in the second RSE border exception. We

understand there is strong interest from employers in undertaking a recruitment of workers from Solomon Islands later this year.

*Disarmament and the Pacific*

- We have appreciated working together with Solomon Islands as part of a Pacific community to reject nuclear weapons.
- We are grateful for your support for the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and are pleased that there are now 10 states parties from the Pacific. As a total prohibition on nuclear weapons, the TPNW reflects decades of Pacific aspiration and advocacy and sends the strongest possible message about the illegality and immorality of nuclear weapons.

• s6(a)

- Universalisation of the TPNW is one of New Zealand's top disarmament priorities and I can assure you of our support should you require assistance as you consider joining the Treaty.
- New Zealand is also continuing our efforts to promote implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
- One of the groupings through which we are seeking to achieve a robust outcome to the deferred NPT Review Conference is the Stockholm Initiative, which is promoting agreement on a set of "stepping stones" that we believe could help move disarmament forward. I would encourage Solomon Islands to support these "stepping stones" and endorse the overriding message that nuclear weapons states must urgently implement their past nuclear disarmament commitments.
- I was sorry to learn of the accidental deaths of two citizens resulting from an explosion of historic unexploded ordnance in Honiara last month, as well as the deaths of two mine clearance workers in Honiara last year. New Zealand has been pleased to support efforts to clear unexploded remnants of war in Solomon Islands, such as through the Australian-led Operation Render Safe. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

• Officials have been in contact over the past few years to support your government's consideration of joining the Arms Trade Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. New Zealand is a strong advocate for both of these treaties, which seek to address the humanitarian consequences of uncontrolled or illicit arms flows and of cluster munitions. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

## Papamuri – Background

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### *Solomon Islands - New Zealand Bilateral Relationship*

1. Solomon Islands is the recipient of one of **New Zealand's largest bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) programmes.** <sup>s6(a)</sup>  
 Infrastructure projects have been delayed, the country's largest export (logs) is in decline and GDP contracted in 2020 by 4.5 percent (Asian Development Bank figures). In addition to our regional response, to date **New Zealand support to Solomon Islands' COVID-19 response** has included NZ\$3 million budget support (allocated to the Ministry of Health); NZ\$2 million for Solomon Islands' vaccine rollout, and other ad-hoc support. <sup>s6(a)</sup>
2. Solomon Islands has recorded **20 cases of COVID-19**, all identified and contained at the border. The Government is focused on preventing COVID-19 community transmission through strict border policies, including policing the western border with Papua New Guinea. Vaccine rollout is underway.
3. During our **High Level Consultations with Solomon Islands** in December 2020, <sup>s6(a)</sup>

### *Labour mobility*

4. **Solomon Islands has expressed strong labour mobility ambitions,** <sup>s6(a)</sup>  
 there were 900 Solomon Islands RSE workers in New Zealand. <sup>s6(a)</sup> . In March 2020,

### *PACER Plus*

5. **Planning, including confirming the agenda, is proceeding for the upcoming PACER Plus Ministers' meeting.** While no date has been set it looks increasingly likely to be held on 30 June. <sup>s6(a), s6(b)(i)</sup>

s6(a), s6(b)(i)

6. The Development and Economic Cooperation work programme is being informed by a Rapid Needs Assessment (RNA) being conducted by the Institute for International Trade of the University of Adelaide (IIT). **Stakeholder consultation has been completed for the RNA for Solomon Islands.** <sup>s6(a)</sup>

#### *Solomon Islands Disarmament Matters*

##### Nuclear disarmament

7. **We have a history of close cooperation with Solomon Islands on nuclear disarmament issues**, including as States Parties to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga). Nuclear legacy issues are of particular importance to Pacific partners and New Zealand is keen to support the work of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) Task Force in this regard.
8. Solomon Islands has been supportive of the **Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)** – voting in favour of its adoption and for subsequent resolutions in support of it, and attending the Auckland Conference on the TPNW in December 2018 – but has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. <sup>s6(a)</sup>
9. Of the TPNW's 54 States Parties, it has strong support from the Pacific (the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, New Zealand, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu have ratified the Treaty, with Timor-Leste also having signed). <sup>s6(a)</sup>
10. **Solomon Islands also aligned itself with the Pacific Small Islands Developing States' (PSIDS) statement** to the 2020 UNGA Meeting to Commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which "said no to nuclear weapons" and encouraged ratification of the TPNW.

##### Conventional weapons

11. Solomon Islands is party of the **Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention**, but not the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) or Cluster Munitions Convention (CCM).
12. Solomon Islands participated in the Pacific Conference on Conventional Weapons hosted by New Zealand in Auckland in February 2018 which focussed on the ATT, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions <sup>s6(a)</sup>

s6(a)

14. Solomon Islands continues to be impacted by un-cleared **explosive ordnance from the Second World War**, which it lacks the resources to deal with effectively. In May 2021, two Solomon Islanders were killed by an explosion at a private residence in Honiara. In September 2020, a New Zealander and an Australian working as de-miners for Norwegian People's Aid were killed while undertaking clearance work in Honiara. New Zealand has provided support with survey and mine clearance in Solomon Islands (including through the Australian-led Operation Render Safe).

Fukushima – discharge of treated water into the Pacific

15. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

In assessing the potential **environmental impact of any discharge from Fukushima** we are guided by the IAEA which has the mandate and technical expertise on this issue. We are pleased that the IAEA Director-General engaged directly with PIF members on regional concerns about the discharge earlier this month (in a meeting facilitated by New Zealand). We also welcome the IAEA's offer to provide technical expertise and engage in further regional consultations to ensure any disposal is carried out without adverse impact on the environment.

16. The upcoming Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) with Japan in July will also provide an opportunity for PIF members to discuss this matter with Japan directly and communicate expectations for ongoing engagement. New Zealand will stay in touch with the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat about the convening of a meeting of the Consultative Committee under the Treaty of Rarotonga, <sup>s6(a)</sup>

*International Security and Disarmament Division*

*Trade Policy Engagement and Implementation Division*

*Pacific Bilateral – Melanesia and Micronesia Division*

*June 2021*

**Hon Phil Twyford**

**Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control**

**FIRST MEETING OF PARTIES TO THE  
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY**

**15 December 2020, 11am – 1pm**



**NEW ZEALAND**  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE

## Delegation Contact Details

Name	Position and organisation	Contact number
<b>Minister's delegation</b>		
<b>Hon Phil Twyford</b>	Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth, Associate Minister for Environment and Immigration	s9(2)(a) (Michael Carruthers, Minister Twyford's Senior Private Secretary) s9(2)(a)
<b>William Blackler</b>	Private Secretary (Advisory)	
<b>Accompanying Officials</b>		
<b>Ben King</b>	Deputy Chief Executive (Policy), MFAT	
<b>Dell Higgle</b>	New Zealand Ambassador for Disarmament	
<b>Nicholas Clutterbuck</b>	Senior Policy Officer, International Security & Disarmament Division	
<b>Other contacts</b>		
<b>Cecile Hillyer</b>	Divisional Manager, International Security & Disarmament Division	
<b>Tharron McIvor</b>	Unit Manager, Pacific Regional Division	
<b>Caroline Eszes</b>	Senior Policy Officer, Pacific Regional Division	
<b>Jonathan Curr</b>	New Zealand High Commissioner to Fiji	
<b>Jessica Thorn</b>	Private Secretary	

## Meeting Connection Details

The Zoom link for the meeting is provided below:

<b>Topic</b>	First Meeting of the Parties to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
<b>Time</b>	Dec 15, 2020 10:00 AM Fiji Islands, Marshall Islands, 11.00am Auckland
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KEY BRIEFING MATERIALS

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## Participant List – Heads of Delegation

<b>Australia</b>	Ambassador for Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation (and First Assistant Secretary International Security Division), Amanda Gorely
<b>Cook Islands</b>	Prime Minister Mark Brown
<b>Fiji</b>	Minister for Defence and National Security Inia Seruiratu
<b>Kiribati</b>	Minister for Environment, Land and Agriculture, Ruateki Tekaiara
<b>Nauru</b>	President Lionel Aingimea (TBC)
<b>New Zealand</b>	Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, Hon Phil Twyford
<b>Niue</b>	Premier Dalton Tagelagi (TBC)
<b>PNG</b>	Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Elias Wohengu
<b>Samoa</b>	<i>To be confirmed</i>
<b>Solomon Islands</b>	<i>To be confirmed</i>
<b>Tonga</b>	Minister of Lands and Natural Resources and His Majesty's Armed Forces Lord Ma'afu
<b>Tuvalu</b>	Minister of Justice, Communication and Foreign Affairs Simon Kofe
<b>Vanuatu</b>	Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Ati

## Observers

<b>PIFS</b>	Secretary General Meg Taylor Deputy Secretary General Filimon
<b>UN ODA</b>	Under Secretary General Izumi Nakamitsu
<b>CROP agencies</b>	<i>May be represented</i>
<b>OPANAL</b>	<i>May be represented</i>
<b>African Commission of Nuclear Energy</b>	<i>May be represented</i>
<b>FSM</b>	<i>May be represented</i>
<b>French Polynesia</b>	<i>May be represented</i>
<b>New Caledonia</b>	<i>May be represented</i>
<b>Palau</b>	<i>May be represented</i>
<b>RMI</b>	<i>May be represented</i>

## Overview Paper

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### Objectives

- Reinforce New Zealand's credentials as an active, effective and principled advocate for nuclear disarmament;
- Demonstrate our steadfast commitment to working with the Pacific on issues of mutual interest, and to supporting our Pacific partners on issues of priority to them;
- Highlight the ongoing importance of the Treaty of Rarotonga as a symbol of our region's long-standing opposition to nuclear weapons, <sup>s6(a)</sup>

1 Early last month, the Forum secretariat forwarded an invitation to all Forum members to take part in a Ministerial-level **First Meeting of the Parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga**. <sup>s6(a)</sup>

Forum Leaders expressed concern in 2019 over the significance and **potential threat of nuclear contamination to the Blue Pacific** and called, "as necessary", for the **operationalisation of the Treaty**.

<sup>s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

5 More generally, we see considerable value in moving forward region-wide to address nuclear legacy issues and are supportive of the separate initiatives of the Forum in this regard (for example, the establishment in 2020 of a Taskforce on Nuclear Legacy Issues in the Pacific).<sup>s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

#### *Agenda*

7 The meeting will be **chaired by Fiji** (their Minister for Defence and National Security, Inia Seruiratu) as forthcoming Chair of the Forum. See full list of Heads of Delegation at page 5. It will last for two hours.

8 The two substantive items on the agenda of the First Meeting are:

- an open session to discuss **developments, issues and opportunities** arising from the 35 years of the Treaty of Rarotonga (proposed draft intervention by you is at page 12). This session will also see the presentation by the Secretary General, as Depositary of the Treaty, of a report on the status of the Treaty (see full text of report at page 7 of accompanying background papers)
- a closed session to finalise and release a **Ministerial statement** (draft text of statement as of 11 December is at page 15). New Zealand chaired the Drafting Committee finalising the text of the statement and officials see the text as broadly satisfactory from New Zealand's point of view.

#### *Nuclear Weapon Free Zones*

9 In addition to the nuclear-free status of Antarctica (under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty) and the single state nuclear weapon-free status of Mongolia (declared in 1992), there are at present **five Nuclear Weapon Free Zones**:

- Latin America and the Caribbean (under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967);
- South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985);
- South East Asia (Bangkok Treaty, 1995);
- Africa (Pelindaba Treaty, 1996); and
- Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty, 2006).

10 Article VII of the (global) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) specifically preserves the right of states to enter into regional nuclear weapon-free agreements (it could scarcely do otherwise since the Tlatelolco Treaty had already been adopted at the time when the NPT was put in place). While there are some differences between the provisions in the zone treaties (see page 34-41 for a

comparison of their provisions) all clearly reflect their region's commitment to the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

11 All the zone treaties have **protocols attached to them** intended for ratification by certain states *outside each zone* – notably China, France, Russia, UK and the US (the five states *recognised as nuclear weapon possessors under the NPT* – the P5). When (if) these protocols are ratified by the P5 nuclear weapon possessors, those states are anchored in to respecting key obligations within the zone, e.g. not to use or test their weapons in it.

12 From time to time proposals for other zones have emerged e.g. one which would cover Austria and Switzerland; one for South Asia; and an NGO-led proposal for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The enduring but probably most contentious proposal is for a zone covering the **Middle East**. The proposal for a Middle East zone was part of the deal facilitating the indefinite extension of the NPT (beyond its original expiry in 1995)<sup>s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

#### *Treaty of Rarotonga*

13 The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (known also as the Treaty of Rarotonga) has been in force since 1986. It has **13 parties (Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Samoa)**. Others have since become eligible to join it – although none have done so – after the Forum's membership was expanded in 1987 (to admit the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands), in 1995 (to admit Palau), and in 2016 (for French Polynesia and New Caledonia).<sup>s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

14 The Treaty of Rarotonga is focused on banning "**nuclear explosive devices**" (any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy) within the "territory" of the zone (which for most purposes excludes high sea areas within the region). Parties to the Treaty undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device inside or outside the zone; to prevent the testing and stationing of these in their territory; to apply International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and prevent the diversion of fissionable material; and not to dump radioactive wastes at sea within the zone. (For a more detailed outline of the Treaty's obligations see pages 20-21.)

15 The ban in the Treaty of Rarotonga on its parties dumping radioactive waste at sea anywhere within the zone is the reason why the Treaty is called a **nuclear free zone** (rather than a *nuclear weapon free zone* like the other zonal treaties).

16 As part of its "control system" for verifying compliance with the its obligations, the Treaty has a complaints procedure handled via a **Consultative Committee**. The Consultative Committee is also responsible for considering any proposals to amend the Treaty. The Consultative Committee has never yet met <sup>s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

17 The Treaty has **three protocols** annexed to it relating to *obligations for the Five States* recognised as nuclear weapon possessors under the NPT (China, France, Russia, UK and the US – the P5). Under Protocol 1 the three states with territory actually within the zone (France, UK and US) agree to apply key provisions of the Treaty to their territories. Under Protocol 2 and 3 the P5 undertake not to use or threaten to use their weapons against any party to the Treaty and not to undertake nuclear testing in the zone. (See further detail on the protocols on page 9.)

#### *Value of Regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zones*

18 Zone treaties have played an important role over the years in denuclearising certain regions and promoting nuclear disarmament objectives. <sup>s6(b)(i), s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

#### *Cooperation between Zones*

19 Cooperation between the respective zones has been fairly limited. <sup>s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

*Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*

23 Of note, too, is the fact that with the advent of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) there is now a **global prohibition** in place on nuclear weapons. The TPNW performs *at the global level* a broadly similar function to the role played by the zone treaties in the five regions listed above. The TPNW does not however have any analogue to the zone protocols for P5 states (given that the TPNW is registering a *legal prohibition on nuclear weapons across the board* - and not looking simply to constrain the presence of these weapons in a particular region). See also the brief on TPNW at page 32.

24 There are **10 Pacific parties to the TPNW** (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu).<sup>s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)</sup>

*Nuclear contamination*

27 As noted above, the convening of this First Meeting of Parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga is taking place alongside the Forum Secretariat's efforts to implement the Forum Leaders' undertakings relating to the legacy issues from the many tests which took place in the region. New Zealand strongly supports the Secretariat in this endeavour.<sup>s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>



28 s6(a), s9(2)(g)(f)

*International Security and Disarmament Division  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
December 2020*

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## New Zealand Intervention (*Open Session*)

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Thank you, Mr Chair.

I welcome this opportunity to meet today with Pacific colleagues to discuss our landmark Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga.

I am grateful to Minister Seruiratu [pron. se-ru-ee-ra-tu] for his able chairing of this Meeting and I would like to register, too, my gratitude to Dame Meg Taylor and her colleagues at the Secretariat for their organisation of it and for their ongoing stewardship of our important Treaty.

The Treaty of Rarotonga is more than just an instrument establishing a nuclear weapon free zone. It is a record of our region having come together to stop the testing here of the most destructive weapon the world has ever seen. It is about our determination to preserve the "bounty and beauty of the land and sea" in our region to ensure it "remains the heritage of our peoples... in perpetuity".

Our Treaty has been successful in seeing the termination of nuclear tests here - but their effects remain today. Tragically, some parts of the Pacific have been left to live with catastrophic damage. New Zealand is strongly supportive of efforts to address legacy issues of nuclear testing and we welcome the leadership of the Pacific Islands Forum in this regard. We value the ongoing work of the Secretariat and all Forum Members, including through the establishment of a Taskforce on nuclear legacy issues. Parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga can also play an important role in sustaining the Forum's focus on these issues.

Today, we are all here to reaffirm our commitment to the principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Such a commitment is, I think, in the very DNA of all New Zealanders and I can, of course, confirm the New Zealand Government's enduring support as well.

This convening of our First Meeting of the Treaty of Rarotonga, and the discussions that are taking place separately on nuclear legacy issues, reinforces the degree to which nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are also an intrinsic part of our region's identity.

I am looking forward to the release of the Meeting's Ministerial Statement later today. This Statement positions our region well to continue to press for the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

Our Statement will serve to remind the nuclear weapon states of their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Our Statement reiterates calls for barriers to the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be overcome via its ratification by key remaining states.

The Statement makes clear how greatly our region would welcome ratification of the Treaty of Rarotonga's Protocols by all nuclear weapon states in order to give the Treaty its full legal effectiveness.

And the Statement also records the strong support of so many in our region to the entry-into-force next month of the very significant Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Turning back to the decisions to be taken here today, I should note that New Zealand is very open to the proposal to convene the Consultative Committee put in place under the Treaty of Rarotonga. We are grateful to the paper recently prepared by the Secretariat on this topic and look forward to hearing views of colleagues here.

In closing, Mr Chair, I repeat my gratitude for the opportunity to come together today and register the significance the Treaty of Rarotonga continues to hold for us all in having ended the chapter of nuclear testing in our region.

Thank you.

## Talking Points for use as required (Closed Session)

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### General

- New Zealand is happy with the proposed Ministerial Statement for release at this meeting. We think it is a strong and fair reflection of the concerns that we all share regarding regional nuclear issues, as well as global ones.

s6(a)

### Nuclear Contamination

- Legacy contamination from nuclear testing in the Pacific is of very serious concern to the New Zealand Government.
- The damage it caused – with ongoing effects today – is devastating.
- New Zealand sees the real need to determine the extent of contamination as a result of nuclear testing, and to support the necessary remediation efforts.

### *If raised: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*

- New Zealand – along with a further nine Forum Members – has signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
- The formulation that has been put forward for the Ministerial Statement reflects wording Leaders agreed to in 2018. It is a factual and objective account of what has happened (i.e. ten Forum Members have joined).

s6(a)