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Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Defence For action by

30 September 2022

For action by 30 September 2022

Aotearoa	New Zealand's	assistance	for	Ukrainer stocktake	and
looking to the future					

**BRIEFING** 

Overview Submission

**PURPOSE** 

This paper reports on the situation in Ukraine and provides an assessment of

Aotearoa New Zealand's assistance to date and potential future contributions.

## Tukunga tūtohua - Recommended referrals

Prime Minister

Minister of Finance

Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs

For information by

For information by

7 October 2022

7 October 2022

7 October 2022

## Taipitopito whakapā - Contact details

NAME s9(2)(g)(ii) ROLE Head DIVISION

WORK PHONE s9(2)(a)

Director
Director
Lead Adviser

Ukraine Response Unit, MFAT Strategic Commitments, NZDF Global and Deployments, MoD Ukraine Response Unit, MFAT

# Mate Tari Minita e whakakī - Minister's Office to complete

•		
Approved	Noted	Referred
Needs amendment	Declined	Withdrawn
Overtaken by events	See Minister's notes	
Comments		

### Pito matua – Key points

The war in Ukraine has continued for over six months. With both sides likely holding

Ukraine has sought to bolster international support for its recognised international borders, including by hosting the second annual International Crimea Platform on 23 August. s6(a)

s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)

Aotearoa New Zealand's assistance to date has been considered by Ukraine and other partners to be highly credible, valued and well-targeted. Our assistance has an in-kind value of \$45.8 million, and has supported our overall objective to act in a timely way that adds value to the international effort to support Ukraine.

- Aotearoa New Zealand's response has focused on three pillars of support: economic; diplomatic; and military.
  - Economic: Our sanctions measures under the Russia Sanctions Act compare well with likeminded partners, despite being a much more nascent regime. We have sanctioned almost 1000 individuals and entities that are influential or strategically important to the Putin regime. We have also provided \$7.93 million in humanitarian assistance.
  - Diplomatic: We continue to work with likeminded partner countries s6(a) Our support for Ukraine through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) seeks both legal accountability for Russia's actions and reinforcement of international law and the multilateral system.

Military: Ukraine and other partners have consistently conveyed appreciation for our military contributions to date. Provision of surplus New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) equipment, procurement of satellite imagery, military equipment and assed under the Official Information Act

The official Information materiel, and deployments of NZDF personnel and C-130H aircraft have made a welcome contribution to Ukraine's self-defence. NZDF deployments have also had

s9(2)(f)(iv)

s6(a)

s6(a)

KR Short Air Marshal Chief of Defence Force

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Trade

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Aotearoa New Zealand's assistance for Ukraine: stocktake and looking to the future

## Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is !	recommended that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence:	
1	s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)	Yes / No
2	Note that Ukraine has stated that its ambition is to restore its pre-2014 internationally recognised borders, and that Aotearoa New Zealand and likeminded partners have pledged support for Ukraine's full territorial integrity;	Yes / No
3	s6(a)	Yes / No
4	Note that Aotearoa New Zealand's successive packages of assistance, valued at \$45.8m, have been calibrated to be responsive, credible, and well balanced, and that the assistance has been well received;	Yes / No
5	s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv)	Yes / No
6	Note that New Zealand Defence Force's deployments have been welcome contributions to support Ukraine's ability to defend its territorial integrity, and have had important secondary benefits to New Zealand Defence Force morale, capability development, and experience;	Yes / No
7	s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)	Yes / No
8	ingle	Yes / No
9	Note that Defence officials will prepare advice to Cabinet on future New Zealand Defence Force deployment options before the expiration of the current deployments' mandates on 30 November 2022, and that if Ministers wish to extend or enhance existing NZDF deployments in support of Ukraine additional funding would be required;	Yes / No
10	s6(a)	Yes / No
11		Yes / No

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12 **Refer** a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Released under the Official Information Act Hon Nanaia Mahuta Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere Date: Hon Peeni Henare Minister of Defence Date: /

### Pūrongo – Report

Current state of the war

1 s6(a)

#### **European Partner Support**

2 s6(a), s6(b)(i)

3. s9(2)(g)(i)

etur etur In recent weeks Ukraine has made it clear that it sees a return to 2014 borders as it's ultimate military objective, backed up by s6(b)(i), s6(a) future attacks. Early indications of this ambition included several well-publicised blows in late summer deep into Russian-held territory, including occupied Crimea.

#### Ukraine's War Objectives and Crimea

- 4. Ukraine has sought to bolster international support for its recognised international borders, including by hosting the second annual International Crimea Platform Summit on 23 August. Attendees indicated their joint "resolve to maintain pressure on Russia to end the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol without delay to restore Ukraine's control over its territory."
- In her remarks, Prime Minister Ardern noted that Aotearoa New Zealand stands with Ukraine "in complete solidarity for its sovereignty and territorial integrity." s6(a) s6(a) Poland's President Andrzei Duda emphasised the necessity of liberating the entire territory of Ukraine, including

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

Crimea, and not reverting to the February 2022 lines of occupation. Canada's President Justin Trudeau asserted that the Ukrainian people have the right to defend themselves and defend Crimea from Russia's invasion. Turkiye's President Recep Erdogan said that the return of Crimea to Ukraine is a requirement of international law.

6. s6(a)

7. s6(a)

#### Political and Economic Situation in Ukraine

8. s6(a)

9

ice or up 10. The economic price of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is immense: Ukraine's GDP is expected to fall by more than 30% this year; unemployment is at 35%; and Ukraine needs US\$5 billion every month to balance its budget. The latest estimate from the World Bank puts the cost of reconstruction at 349 billion Euros, but this figure is climbing all the time with Russia's continued targeting of civilian infrastructure in contested areas.

#### Political and Economic Situation in Russia

11. On 10 September, Russia's Ministry of Defence released a statement which declared that to "achieve the declared goals of the special military operation" to "liberate" Donbas, Russia decided to "regroup" its forces in Izyum and Balakliya.3 The Ministry provided the same explanation regarding its withdrawal from Kyiv and Chernihiv regions back in March. While

<sup>3</sup> Territories that Ukraine recovered in Kharkiv Oblast in the days prior.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lavrov referred to Russia's military doctrine under which there is "a strategy envisioning the threat of a limited nuclear strike that would force an opponent to accept a return to the status quo ante."

the Russian military's sudden reversal in Kharkiv has called into question Russia's ability to hold all the territory that it has captured, on 20 September Russian-backed officials in four regions of eastern and southern Ukraine (Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhizhia) announced that "referendums" would be held on the question of whether to join Russia from 23-27 September. Separate advice on Aotearoa New Zealand's response to Russia's annexation plans has been provided in a Ministerial Submission to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

- 12. On 21 September, President Putin announced a "partial" mobilisation of up to 300,000 reservists to buttress the Russian response to Ukraine's recent success on the battlefield. s9(2)(g)(i)
- 13. As a consequence of unprecedented sanctions imposed since February 2022, Russia faces s6(a)

#### The Three Pillars of Aotearoa New Zealand's Response

- 14. For Aotearoa New Zealand, as a small state seeking to manage risk in an uncertain world, upholding our values and interests in the face of President Putin's war of aggression required a meaningful response, proportionate to the unprecedented nature of the challenge. There have been three pillars to our response:
  - a. <u>Economic:</u> Our sanctions measures under the Russia Sanctions Act compare well with likeminded partners, despite being a much more nascent regime. We have sanctioned almost 1000 individuals and entities that are influential or strategically important to the Putin regime. We have also provided \$7.93 million in humanitarian assistance.
  - b. <u>Diplomatic:</u> We continue to work with likeminded partner countries <sup>s6(a)</sup>
    Our support for Ukraine through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) seeks both legal accountability for Russia's actions and reinforcement of international law and the multilateral system.
  - Military: Ukraine and other partners have consistently conveyed appreciation for our military contributions to date. Provision of surplus New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) equipment, procurement of satellite imagery, military equipment and materiel, and deployments of NZDF personnel and C-130H aircraft have made a welcome contribution to Ukraine's self-defence. NZDF deployments have also had a positive secondary effect in boosting the morale, professional development, and experience of those deployed.
- 15. Aotearoa New Zealand's assistance has been calibrated to be responsive, credible, and well balanced. Ukraine and partners have consistently conveyed appreciation for our

contributions to date. In total, Aotearoa New Zealand's assistance to Ukraine (including inkind contributions and deployments) has been worth just over \$45.8 million.

#### Update on Secondment to the ICC

	assistance with ICC investigations and promote	C Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) to provide co-operation; with a particular focus on the
	a. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)	
	b.	
	C.	collina
	d.	
17.	conflict in Ukraine. Following a scoping visit 13 August 2022, it has been confirmed that sold Prosecutor and undertake the following tasks:  a. s6(a), s6(b)(ii)  b. c.  d.  s6(a), s6(b)(ii)	Cia
s6(a	a), s9(2)(f)(iv)	
18	3.s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i)	
19	Release	

4 CPC-22-MIN-0020.

7 CAB-22-MIN-0232.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> As is approved in CPC-22-MIN-0020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> As identified through extant NZDF procedures and instructions.

20 s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i), s9(2)(f)(iv)

#### Looking to the Future: Potential Requests for Defence Support

- 21. Ukraine remains engaged in a phase of ongoing hostilities with Russia. As the war continues, Aotearoa New Zealand is likely to continue to receive enquiries from both Ukraine and other partners to provide further military assistance, especially as Ukraine seeks to maintain the recent battlefield success and momentum. Often partners conduct planning in isolation due to their own requirements to manage information and expectations, but then move quickly to engage a range of partners at pace to test if partner contributions might be possible. Defence continues to use existing resources (such as liaison officers and international coordination meetings) to ensure that we are regularly engaging with partners to obtain as much visibility as possible of any potential future support opportunities.
- 22. Officials will provide advice to Cabinet on the future of Aotearoa New Zealand's military support throughout 2023 in a proposed Cabinet paper, ahead of the current mandate expiry date of 30 November 2022. Advice is likely to consider the previously approved themes of intelligence, liaison, logistics, and training.

23. s6(a)

"9 nuger fine 24. Intelligence: S6(a

- 25. Liaison: Ensuring that Aotearoa New Zealand's response is co-ordinated with international partners will continue to be a key principle underpinning our support to Ukraine for the duration of the conflict.
- 26. Logistics: Officials continue to proactively engage with partners to determine if an NZDF personnel contribution would be of value to support international co-ordination centres in

<sup>8</sup> CBC-22-MIN-0034.

<sup>9</sup> CAB-22-MIN-0243; CAB-22-MIN-0191; CAB-22-MIN-0317.

<sup>10</sup> Recent NZDF regional contingency opertions have been: Support to Australian bushfires - \$0.092M, Papua New Guinea COVID-19 Support - \$0.089M, Support to Papua New Guinea elections - \$0.046M, Solomon Islands Support - \$1.101M, Pacific Relief in Tonga - \$2.347M.

Aotearoa New	Zealand's	assistance	for	Ukraine:	stocktake	and	looking	to
the future								

Europe. s9(2)(f)(iv)

27. <u>Training</u>: Officials envisage training support will be required for members of the Ukraine's Armed Forces (AFU) well into 2023. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

28. <u>Surplus equipment</u>: The NZDF is regularly reviewing Ukrainian requests for equipment to determine whether any additional surplus equipment could be provided –  $s^{9(2)(g)(i)}$ 

Contributing

military equipment remains an important priority for partners during the continued hostilities phase of the conflict, <sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>

s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

29. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

Aotearoa New Zealand. The NATO Trust Fund remains another valuable funding mechanism, for non-lethal support.

## Other Potential Requests

30. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

31. Ukraine is also preparing a proposal to the UN for a registry of evidence of damages, with a view to establishing a compensation mechanism at some stage in the future. This will be a focus of Ukraine's engagements at high-level week at the UN General Assembly in  $_{s6(a)}$ 

32. Humanitarian Assistance: While the humanitarian response to the war in Ukraine is well funded in the short-term, further contributions from the international community will be required to sustain the response over the medium-term. We anticipate fresh international appeals to emerge during the Ukrainian winter at the end of 2022 or in early 2023. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)Inder the official Information Act

33. s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i)

34.

35.

Risks for Aotearoa New Zealand

36. s6(a)

37. Consular: While it is impossible to confirm exact numbers, anecdotal reports suggest an estimated several dozen Aotearoa New Zealanders are either living in or regularly travelling s6(a), s6(d)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> CAB-22-MIN-0243.

38. Nuclear: Russia continues to use the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), Europe's largest, as a base from which to launch strikes across the Dnieper river. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) undertook a Support and Assistance Mission to the ZNPP in late August/early September to complete an independent assessment of nuclear safety and security risks. Two IAEA experts have remained onsite to provide ongoing independent monitoring of the situation. IAEA Director General Grossi briefed the UN Security Council on the Mission on 6 September, recommending the urgent establishment of a Nuclear Safety and Security Protection Zone at the ZNPP to ensure that the physical integrity of the plant is not compromised. Putin's threats in his 21 September speech to use "all means at our Released under the Official Information of the Official In disposal" to defend Russia's "territorial integrity" have again raised the spectre of Russia's use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. A nuclear disaster in Europe presents risk to Aotearoa New Zealand across our security, economic, environmental, and consular interests.

39. s6(a)