33 Molesworth Street
PO Box 5013
Wellington 6140
New Zealand
T+64 4 496 2000
19 June 2023
AI
By email:
[FYI request #22480 email]
Ref:
H2023024715
Tēnā koe AI
Response to your request for official information Thank you for your request under the Official Information Act 1982 (the Act), received as a
transfer from Te Whatu Ora – Health New Zealand on 4 May 2023 for information regarding the
COVID-19 Disinformation Assessment and Response Team (DART). You requested:
“I am making a request for the reporting that DART produced during the time the team
existed from mid 2021 to 2022… I've found mention to 'landscape reports' which I am
requesting any and all of please Any regular or ad hoc reporting such as monthly or weekly reporting Any formal memos or briefings DART members produced or contributed to on
disinformation during their existence.”
On 31 May 2023, the due date for responding to your request was extended under section
15A(1)(b) of the Act as consultation was necessary to make a decision on your request.
By way of context, DART acted as a clearinghouse for reporting on disinformation when it was
in operation. DART received information about disinformation through a variety of forms,
including leaflets, digital items, weblinks and social media. While most instances were brought
to the attention of Manatū Hauora by members of the public or external parties, some were
generated internally through monitoring by our Social Media team. For example, if the Social
Media team noted disinformation on a post on our channels, this was provided to DART.
Documents identified within scope of your request are itemised in Appendix 1 of this letter.
Please note that in relation to Document 2, while DART intended to provide these reports
monthly, only the September 2022 report was completed. The DART team ceased to exist by
November 2022.
Further to this, DART did not produce or contribute to the 'landscape reports' or any
disinformation landscape format reporting referenced in your request. Landscape view reports
were generated by The Disinformation Project1 (formerly part of Te Pūnaha Matatini) under a
research grant through the COVID‐19 Response Fund administered by the Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment. It may be that these are the reports to which you refer.
The Disinformation Project (the Project) is now an independent research programme and is not
subject to the Official Information Act; however pursuant to section 13 of the Act, Manatū
Hauora consulted with the Project and have been advised that there is currently no
consideration for publishing all landscape reports.
For your information, I can advise that Manatū Hauora received disinformation landscape format
reports from the Project on the following dates:
•
22 December 2021
•
1 January 2022
•
23 December 2021
•
2 January 2022
•
24 December 2021
•
3 January 2022
•
25 December 2021
•
5 January 2022
•
26 December 2021
•
6 January 2022
•
27 December 2021
•
7 January 2022
•
28 December 2021
•
8 January 2022
•
29 December 2021
•
9 January 2022
•
30 December 2021
•
10 January 2022
•
31 December 2021
•
11 January 2022.
Manatū Hauora, in consultation with relevant agencies and the Project, is willing to consider
your request under the Act for any specific reports from the abovementioned list to further
assist with your request.
If you wish to discuss any aspect of your request with us, including this decision, please feel
free to contact the OIA Services Team on
[email address].
Under section 28(3) of the Act, you have the right to ask the Ombudsman to review any
decisions made under this request. The Ombudsman may be contacted by email at:
[email address] or by calling 0800 802 602.
Please note that this response, with your personal details removed, may be published on the
Manatū Hauora website at
: www.health.govt.nz/about-ministry/information-releases/responses-
official-information-act-requests. Nāku noa, nā
Sarah Turner
Deputy Director-General
Government and Executive Services l Te Pou Whakatere Kāwanatanga
1 The Disinformation Project observes and analyses open-source publicly available data related to Covid-
19 mis- and disinformation on social media, mainstream media, and in physical and other digital forms of
information and knowledge dissemination. The Disinformation Project became an independent research
programme in 2022.
Appendix 1: List of documents for release
#
Date
Document details
Decision on release
1
22 November
COVID-19 Disinformation Refused under 18(d) of the Act. Document
2021
and harmful content
is publicly available at the following link:
(Draft)
www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-
11/dpmc-roia-oia-2021-22-1068-mis-
disinformation.pdf (refer to pages 16 to 30)
2
September 2022
DART Monthly Report
Released in full
(September 2022)
Document 2
1982
ACT
DART Monthly
Report
September 2022
INFORMATION
RELEASED UNDER THE
OFFICIAL
Document 2
Executive Summary
•
All information has been collected via open source data.
1982
•
The report this month focuses on Voices for Freedom (VFF) as this group is a key driver of health disinformation in New Zealand.
THE
•
VFF is unique in that it is well funded, well branded, and more sophisticated than other disinformation groups. It is media-savvy,
ACT
portrays itself in a less confrontational manner and its primary focus has been spreading COVID-19 disinformation.
•
VFF has a record of anti-authority behaviours encouraging removal of masks and vaccine exemption, using domain spoofing to
redirect user to the group’s website, encouraging participation in the Parliamentary occupation and attempting to ‘skirt’ bans on
UNDER
platforms such as Meta/Facebook.
•
The group’s material has been the subject of over 100 complaints to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA).
•
Since most of the COVID-19 mandates lifted in September 2022, audience engagement with VFF’s disinformation appears to be
waning.
•
VFF is pivoting away from anti-vaccine messaging to more political anti-authority messaging and clandestinely running members
INFORMATION
in local elections, however they could reignite their health disinformation when relevant such as around a new COVID-19 wave or
during DPMC’s upcoming COVID-19 antivirals campaign.
RELEASED
Key take home:
•
As the COVID-19 health response recedes from the national consciousness the ability of health disinformation by VFF to impact
on daily operations will reduce but should a new outbreak, other health crisis, or new campaign emerge then VFF, or another
group, could exploit it as before. OFFICIAL
Document 2
Voices for Freedom by numbers
1982
•
We have scanned VFF’s open channels*
THE
with a focus on Telegram and their website
as these are where they most activity takes
ACT
place
•
Their main method of communicating with
people has been via flyer, with over 4.5
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•
VFF is responsible for over 70% of all
public reports of disinformation made to
the Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT) New Zealand for the 2021/2022
INFORMATION period.These reports were of any item or
activity seen by the public which they
RELEASED
believed to be or have disinformation in it.
*Full methodology can be found in Appendix
doc
OFFICIAL
3
Document 2
Themes of mis/disinformation
1982
THE
VFF’s content from their blog and Telegram channel has
been analysed to generate a word cloud with the most
ACT
common themes being politics (39%), health (36%),
miscel aneous (13%), and mistrust (12%) with examples of
these themes being:
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The government is hiding the data about vaccine
deaths;
•
COVID vaccines are experimental and harmful
(particularly to children);
•
Mainstream media is just government propaganda;
INFORMATION and
RELEASED
•
COVID vaccines and mask wearing are ineffective.
OFFICIAL
Document 2
How VFF influences
•
Anti-vaccine groups and disinformation have existed since
1982
vaccinations began
THE
•
VFF have co-opted the positive language and imagery of
ACT
the wel ness industry and so cal ed “momfluencers” to
construct their brand
•
The group has also copied the branding of the Unite
UNDER
Against COVID-19 campaign in some of its material
•
The group use flyers and bil boards to lead people to their
digital content
•
Digital platforms have enabled the group to increase
visibility and gain a sufficient follower base to propagate
INFORMATION
their messaging
RELEASED
•
The group has specifical y targeted parents with fear
based content arguing that vaccines harm children
•
VFF members have protested outside of schools,
OFFICIAL
vaccination centres and along roadsides
Document 2
VFF’s influence is waning
1982
THE
•
VFF’s subscribers gain has dropped and been low
post its peak in Nov 2021 (green line)
ACT
•
The group’s total subscribers count (light blue
line) has had a smal but noticeable decline since
March 2022
UNDER
•
There has been a significant drop in views per
post (dark blue line)
•
There has been a very significant drop in
engagement per post (purple line) which tel s us
INFORMATION their messages are no longer resonating as well
with their audiences
RELEASED
OFFICIAL
Document 2
What is the importance of what we’ve learnt?
1982
•
The successful spread of VFF’s message was directly tied to
THE
events such as the pandemic and the health mandates and
ACT
through aggressive distribution of disinformation content both
physical y and digital y
•
COVID-19 dis and misinformation has reduced in recent weeks
UNDER
due to the removal of most COVID-19 public health mandates,
but the benefits (financial or otherwise) of those like VFF who
promoted mandate-based disinformation wil not have gone
away and are likely to be redirected elsewhere such as on topics
such as antivaxx and antiviral myths.
•
VFF is stil putting out some disinformation about the safety of
INFORMATION
vaccines and their
most recent flyers were specifically targeted
RELEASED
at parents with disinformation messages likely to promote fear
around children getting vaccinated.
•
They are also continuing to put out messaging saying that the
government is hiding the data about vaccine deaths.
OFFICIAL
Document 2
Comms planning to mitigate risks 1982
•
With an understanding of what VFF has been putting out in its
•
We wil support DPMC and Te Whatu Ora around the upcoming
messaging, the channels the group has been using, and analysing its
antivirals campaign to ensure that we have solid messaging and
THE
reach, the Ministry is able to create messaging to pre-bunk and
reactives around the safety and efficacy of COVID-19 antiviral drugs, as
counter that of VFF and other disinformation groups.
this is an ideal topic for VFF to reignite their disinformation campaign
ACT
with.
•
The COVID-19 comms team wil
continue to track trending narratives
to develop responsive communications and risk mitigations. This wil
•
The key topics would be around:
be even more important at specific times such as if we see another
COVID-19 wave.
o
Antivirals being safe
UNDER
o
Why it’s important that those most at risk have access to them
•
We wil
feedback to the National Immunisation Programme
as they can help to prevent serious il ness for those most
communications team regarding the need for messaging to counter
vulnerable
VFF’s messaging about the dangers of children being vaccinated
against COVID-19, with a particular need to focus messaging on more
o
Antiviral eligibility and accessibility
vulnerable communities such as Māori and Pasifika
o
The different types of antivirals
•
It might be worth proactively putting up someone from the Ministry
•
As Stuff’s Whole Truth campaign, which MOH fed in to on a monthly
INFORMATION
such as Andrew Old to do a interview about the mortality analysis an
basis with story ideas, has now come to a close, MOH wil develop it’s
and vaccine related deaths to emphasise the safety of the COVID-19
own COVID-19 Myth Busting page on our website. This wil cover
RELEASED
vaccine and highlight how New Zealand’s COVID-19 response has
specific topics around COVID-19 such as antivirals, and vaccines, the
resulted in one of the lowest deaths per population in the world to
top ten myths about each topic, with accompanying information to
counter VFF spin about COVID-19 mortality/vaccine safety.
dispel the myths.
DART wil feed into this by pul ing up the key
themes of disinformation/misinformation that is being spread for
•
With further change to COVID-19 policy in October the DART function
wil be monitoring disinformation activity relating to these changes so
each topic.
that common themes/disinformation can be debunked by proactive
OFFICIAL
messaging ahead of the announcements.
Document 2
1982
THE
ACT
UNDER
Thank you
INFORMATION
RELEASED
OFFICIAL