The New Zealand Counter Terrorism strategy (Draft)

VERSION 7 – as at 23 September 2015

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New Zealand is neither a victim nor a source of terrorism

Proposed Foreword [*by the relevant Minister*]

As [*relevant Minister*] my overarching responsibility is to oversee New Zealand's national security.

This covers a wide variety of threats and risks from earthquakes and extreme weather events to cyber-attacks, espionage and terrorism.

National security is all about protecting our way of life, our freedoms and our democracy.

Terrorism is all about undermining all this and we as a government reject all forms of violent extremism and are determined to do our utmost keep our country and its citizens safe both here at home and abroad.

For some time now we have seen terrorism becoming more evident and obvious across the globe and in some areas of the world it is becoming endemic.

The instability in various parts of the world, the Middle East, but also in wider Africa and , South East Asia, has resulted in an increasing number of domestic terrorist attacks, some very large and well organised but many unplanned and quite random in appearance.

Whilst the threat of terrorism occurring here in New Zealand remains low, the threats are sufficiently real to be taken very seriously.

In November 2014 I announced a series of measures to strengthen our security arrangements and in the recent budget, more resources were directed towards our Intelligence Agencies.

There are two key reasons for keeping our focus on the terrorism risk. The first is that it is our clear duty is to do our best to protect our citizens from harm, the second and is to do our upmost to protect our values and way of life, that terrorism by its very nature, seeks to disrupt or destroy.

This strategy describes the government's approach to countering the terrorist threat. Our principal aim is that New Zealand is neither a victim nor a source of terrorism and we achieve this through a series of activities designed to reduce the risk of terrorism both here and abroad and to be ready to respond decisively to any potential threat which might occur.

We will be resolute in our aim to protect our country, our people and our interests from terrorism. Equally we will achieve this by working to maintain our peaceful way of life and hard won democratic freedoms all of which are so vitally important to all New Zealanders.

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Part One

New Zealand's counter terrorism approach

1 Introduction

1.1 What is terrorism?

In this Strategy we define terrorism as "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."

Facilitating terrorism

Work to counter terrorism also extends to those who *finance or facilitate terrorism*. This can include nation states, large organisations right through to motivated individuals. Terrorist groups often build sophisticated infrastructure to channel funding, arms and military capability to support terrorist operations.

Funding can amount to financial support in the way of donations, charitable and other types of fund raising and terrorist groups often resort to kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies, organised crime and cybercrime to raise revenue streams.

In the Middle East more recently, terrorist entities have seized and exploited ungoverned territory to take over banks, financial currency and gold reserves, oil fields and other state owned infrastructure.

Supporting terrorism

Also supporting terrorism are those *who are active or sympathetic to the cause.* Again these can amount to nation states through to individuals. With the growth of social media and the internet, terrorist groups are actively seeking support through propaganda and active marketing methods.

Radicalisation and Extremism

Other concepts related to terrorism are the notions of violent extremism and radicalisation. In this document we define violent extremist behaviour by persons who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. Radicalisation is the act or process of developing those extremist ideologies or beliefs.

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1.2 The scope of this Strategy

Whilst government agencies have worked for many years on terrorism threats and risks, this is the first published counter terrorism strategy produced by a New Zealand Government. Our purpose here is to describe how counter terrorism is managed domestically and internationally and how we seek to work with friends and allies around the world to share the load.

The strategy focuses on the here and now and outlines our approach to deal with the most significant terrorist threats which potentially could reach New Zealand's shores. We describe risks which are of concern today and the policies and activity designed to deal with them.

We also are commissioning work to explore some wider approaches to ensure that the government has enough options to deal with any emerging threats of domestic violent extremism, including dealing with the very small number of people who have gone overseas to engage in foreign conflicts or who have been expressly banned from doing so through revocation of their passports.

The strategy concludes with some areas for special focus over the short to medium terms and sets out specific action points, key result areas and performance indicators.

How does counter terrorism fit into other national security risk management?

The government has developed a National Security Framework which captures a wide variety of natural and man-made risks (e.g. earthquakes, weather events, pandemics, financial emergencies etc.) which face the country and outlines the way these risks are contextualised. The framework seeks to compare and contrast the way various risks present, identify their potential impact to New Zealand and sets out general guidance and principles by which those risks are understood and mitigated.

Terrorism is a key man-made security risk within the framework but the very nature of these acts (criminal in nature, often planned in secrecy and carried out by determined people often with violent and self-destructive intent), defies normal systematic risk management. Whilst in relative terms most terrorist risks (with the clear exception of the 9/11 events) may be less likely to cause very serious or catastrophic damage to society, the political and social consequences of any domestic terrorist attack would be taken very seriously by people and government alike.

Counter terrorism therefore requires consistent government focus and investment in sufficient risk reduction, readiness and response capability to help deter those who mean us harm and ensure that, if a terrorist threat did take place, the consequences are properly managed to avoid lasting harm.

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1.3 Underlying planning assumptions

It is important in this first published strategy to discuss the planning assumptions government has made in determining the shape and level of counter terrorism activity. Through these assumptions, judgements can be made about what general level of national resource, capability and capacity should be set aside to deal with the current terrorist threat to New Zealand. Some of these assumptions relate to New Zealand's domestic will and capacity to address any terrorist threats which may emerge, others relate to our place in the world and our willingness to act as a responsible international citizen and share the load in managing what are essentially global and regional threats.

- ***Assumption One: New Zealand has the will, capacity and capability to protect itself from threatened direct harm.***

  Whilst New Zealand actively collaborates with friends and likeminded nations globally and within the Southeast Asian Region, at the domestic level we sustain sufficient police, military and government capability to deal with any domestic terrorist threat which may present. This also includes the capability to recover from a terrorist attack.

- ***Assumption Two: New Zealand will sustain an appropriate level of systematic vigilance and response readiness to respond to the threats***

  Our security and intelligence apparatus is active on a 24/7 basis and can escalate from general monitoring to specific operational readiness and if required, physical action at very short notice.

- ***Assumption Three: New Zealand is able to deny the exploitation of its people, territory and infrastructure and works to prevent the space, support, sanctuary or indoctrination of its citizens by terrorist entities.***

  Whilst New Zealand's relative isolation helps to protect its physical and maritime borders from harm, we ensure that our security and border agencies and Defence Forces are geared to combat and deny terrorists the opportunity to attack or exploit our country or its citizens. This being said, the growth of internet threats and the abuse of social media are of increasing concern here and in all democratic countries.

- ***Assumption Four: New Zealand interests offshore can be protected from direct or indirect harm through collaboration with risk sharing partners***

  Our foreign policy is based on the normal rules and conventions of international diplomacy and New Zealand actively collaborates with friends and likeminded countries to cooperate

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mutually against many threats, including terrorism. We have in the past, and are ready now to assist friends and allies under terrorist threat and, in the unlikely event that there be the need here at home, would anticipate receiving help in return.

- ***Assumption Five: New Zealand's counter terrorist capability can be drawn upon for wider regional or international security objectives consistent with international law.***

  New Zealand maintains wide professional and diplomatic linkages with the international community at all levels including government ministers, diplomats, military, police and other agency officials. A specific area of focus of this strategy, discussed below, is a *newly strengthened international engagement approach*.

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1.4 Governments intentions

Strategic Aim

New Zealand is *neither a victim nor a source of terrorism.*

Strategic Objectives

Whilst counter terrorism is achieved through a series of interlinked activities conducted by agencies or groups of agencies, this strategy contains some specific areas of focus for achievement in the short to medium term.

Maintaining strong international engagement

- *Contribute to the national security of New Zealand and to the protection of New Zealanders at home and abroad;*
- *promote New Zealand's security interests abroad as they relate to terrorism, including the stability of the rules-based international order;*
- *build our own external situational awareness, networks and capability to respond to terrorist threats at home*
- *Contribute to New Zealand's reputation as a trusted and valued contributor to international efforts to counter terrorism.*

Countering Violent Extremism by

- Providing broad options to manage violent extremist and radicalisation risks and curb the appeal of violent extremist narratives.

Strengthening Communities

- *Undertake coordinated activity to strengthen communities within New Zealand in order to prevent violent extremism and protect communities from terrorist related harm.*

Broadening government's counter terrorism risk management

- *Manage counter terrorism through a single strategic approach*
- *Enhance and strengthen all of government counter terrorist coordination*
- *Build better counter terrorism risk management*
- *Establish better methods of agency coordination.*

Each of these focus areas and specific objectives is discussed more fully later.

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1.5 Strategic counter terrorism principles

Government has laid down a series of working principles which provide guidance as to how counter terrorism policy and operations will be conducted by New Zealand. These are important in that they set out important markers and boundaries – rules of engagement – which echo our liberal democratic view of the world. For example we believe that counter terrorism should be managed alongside other security risks in a proportional way within the bounds of normal government activity. We believe also in the rule of law and that our people must be treated in accordance with the Bill of Rights Act. Flowing from this, suspected terrorists should be subject to New Zealand's normal criminal law (as opposed to being treated as combatants or prisoners of war).

The principles are as follows:

The rule of law

Acts of terrorism with be treated as criminal offences of serious violence, not acts of war against the nation state and will be subject to legal due process under civil codes.

Proportionality

Powers available to the state to act against terrorism will be exercised proportionately and with full accountability.

Alignment with normal NZ emergency/risk management

New Zealand will manage its counter terrorism policies in alignment with normal national emergency management and will employ risk management principles.

International alignment

NZ aspires to a Counter Terrorism regime closely aligned with the emerging body of international law and practice established by UNSC resolutions, and compliant with its obligations.

Outward looking approach

New Zealand is outward looking and its CT plans and programmes consistent with its broader foreign policy settings emphasising collaboration with likeminded friends and allies.

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1.6 Terrorism today

Introduction

New Zealanders abroad have, tragically, been caught up in a number of major terrorist events since (and including) the 9/11 attacks, both as victims of violence targeting civilians. We have come to realise, though, with the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and its exhortation to attack Western targets that there is a new set of threats to deal with and that they have the potential to be domestic in their nature.

Evolution of the threat

The al-Qa'ida attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon shifted global thinking about the threat of terrorism. Al-Qa'ida itself was at that time a powerful, well-resourced terrorist entity with global outreach and jihadist intent. It also spawned a number of dangerous regional affiliates in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. ISIL, notably, was one of these groups, but has since become a particularly powerful and independent entity. After 9/11 New Zealand joined with its friends and allies in a global effort to combat al-Qa'ida and other similar terrorist entities. The Bali bombing in 2002, the terrorist event in which the largest number of New Zealanders died, served to emphasise the direct global and regional threat that jihadist terrorism presents. New Zealand has responded in many ways. Missions to Afghanistan, the Arabian Gulf, Iraq and elsewhere have been mounted to reinforce New Zealand's commitment to addressing the terrorist threat with and in support of likeminded friends and allies. Domestically and regionally we have increased capacity and capability both to understand and manage the terrorist threats coming from overseas and to reinforce and sustain counter terrorism capability at home.

ISIL

The aftermath of the Arab Spring movements across Africa and the Arabian Peninsula has resulted in the collapse of order in some states and, in Syria and Iraq in particular, has evolved into extremely damaging civil wars. ISIL, a major protagonist in both wars, differs from many previous terrorist groups. ISIL is by far the richest and strongest terrorist entity in history, and currently controls up to 8 million people across Syria and Iraq. Although not legally recognised as such, it carries many of the attributes of a geographic state entity, with aggressive and expansionist intent and stated ambitions to overturn governments and erase state boundaries.

ISIL's use of social media to influence people globally

Just as threatening as its attempt to tear apart the Middle East is ISIL's unprecedented ability to use social media to make contact with and influence into direct action a global support community.

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While al-Qa'ida has made use of these tools too, ISIL's internet presence is vastly greater and significantly more sophisticated. ISIL uses the social media to encourage potential recruits to speak directly with its own representatives (active terrorist fighters based in Syria). For many converts, particularly young Europeans with feelings of isolation and disenfranchisement, the message has been potent and irresistible.

ISIL's global propaganda campaign and its potential to directly speak to and influence individual citizens and communities is a dangerous and unprecedented phenomenon and may in its way be as significant a threat as 9/11 was at the start of this century. ISIL has invested major expertise and resources into harnessing the internet and social media to export its propaganda and amplify its terrorist effect by filming terrorist atrocities and publishing them world-wide. ISIL is attempting to reach Muslim communities, from migrant communities and new converts alike, throughout the world. Its graphic and relentless message of hate and violence, often packaged as a defence of Islam, is completely rejected by the vast majority of Muslims living in the West. Yet, unfortunately, ISIL's message has proven attractive to a socially disconnected fringe. While ISIL's horror videos repel many more intended recruits than they attract, the manipulation of social media is able to draw together and target marginal disaffected elements. This includes, so far in only small and isolated numbers, individuals here in New Zealand.

ISIL's methods and outreach targeting lone wolves and self-radicalisers

This global outreach facilitated by the internet has a direct impact on the risks faced by nation states. Hitherto most terrorist threats in countries like New Zealand have been identified through intelligence and quickly passed to law enforcement agencies like the police to deal with. The ISIL phenomenon gives concern that this traditional counter-terrorist approach may now be not sufficiently comprehensive, nor timely, to deal with individuals and groups becoming self radicalised and persuaded, to take generally unplanned immediate direct action (lone wolf attacks) against so called 'soft targets' at home.

ISIL has proven to be far more successful than al-Qa'ida at inspiring self-radicalised individuals to carry out acts of terrorism. A disturbing number of ISIL inspired attacks on soft targets in the West since the group emerged to prominence in mid-2014 demonstrates that we are in a new and worrying phase of the domestic terrorist threat. Violence attributed to ISIL affiliated extremists in places like London, Belgium, Paris, Sydney, Ottawa and Texas, has shone a spotlight on the phenomenon of domestic or 'home grown' violent extremism. At the same time the immediacy of social media has facilitated disaffected individuals and groups to combine in ways which allow new levels of collaboration to take place across the globe.

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Foreign terrorist fighters

A second longer term problem akin to that of self-radicalisation, is that of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) which is also currently requiring considerable attention in many countries. FTF's have already started returning to their countries of origin from the Syrian conflict (where numbers are estimated as some 20,000). There is evidence that at least some of these are returning home battle hardened and ready and willing to persuade others to join the fight either in the Middle East or at home. As there is little useable evidence connecting these people to criminal actions in the combat zone, there are few tools available to law enforcement to manage returning FTF's and control their behaviour.

Other violent extremism

Other (non Middle East related) violent extremists, or those who support or commit acts of terrorism to further political goals, can come from many different domestic and international sources and appear in a range of different guises. Extremist ideologies can be seen in perspectives and worldviews such as far-right fascism, anti-immigration movements, animal rights and environmental activism, as well as a variety of other political, cultural and religious extremism.

Conclusion: new terrorist threats require new responses

The threats posed then are multifaceted and require a comprehensive set of policy responses that are coordinated across a range of diverse government agencies, including those with strong community engagement. In recognising that New Zealand is not immune from the terrorist threat, and needs to take appropriate counter measures, the value of increased vigilance and security needs to be carefully weighed against the values that underpin our society. Those include a host of civil rights, guaranteed to all New Zealanders, including the due process of law. Many terrorist entities use the threat of, or actual terrorist violence, to provoke governments and their citizens to over-reaction. Another extremist tactic is to promote mistrust between ethnic and faith communities in an effort to promote sectarian conflict. As we in New Zealand face new and potentially serious terrorist challenges, we need to remain mindful of quintessentially Kiwi notions of fairness and tolerance which built this nation and continue to keep us safe and at peace with ourselves.

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1.7 The terrorism threat to New Zealand and New Zealanders abroad

Threat assessment process

A number of security agencies including the Combined Threat Assessment Unit, DPMC, Police, NZSIS, GCSB, NZDF and MFAT have collaborative roles in scanning the global and domestic environment to determine the level of terrorist threat which applies to New Zealand. In addition these agencies collaborate with Five Eye partners and other friends and allies to consider global and regional terrorist related risks - the *what ifs* – in an effort to anticipate how these might affect the domestic and international threat picture.

Terrorist threat currently 'low'

Notwithstanding the emerging risks prompted by Jihadism, New Zealand's geographic isolation, relatively small population and selective economic and trade centred immigration policies have up to now helped to keep the domestic threats low. In formal terms a low threat state indicates that whilst a terrorist event is possible, it is not thought at this time to be likely, in saying this, however, it should be noted that the threat level was raised late in 2014 due to the domestic threat assessment.

Self-radicalisation threat

That being said, the effectiveness of terrorist propaganda proliferation through social media, has raised concern that a small number of individuals within New Zealand have already or are at serious risk of self-radicalisation and could be sufficiently motivated to attempt violent extremist action. NZSIS, NZ Police and other support agencies are working to identify and manage any threat posed by these people

Returning Foreign Fighter threat

Related to the self-radicalisation and lone wolf threat is the fact that a very small number of New Zealand citizens have joined the many thousands of so-called foreign fighters from Europe, Australia and elsewhere and have become directly engaged in conflict most notably in Syria and Iraq. The civil war in Syria and related instability in many other parts of the Middle East have been attracting individuals from many countries whose militancy can be exploited and converted into violent extremism. The direct threat to host countries, possibly including New Zealand, relates to the returnees themselves, and those domestic residents wishing to travel but who have had their passports revoked and their capacity and willingness to influence others (directly or on-line) towards self-radicalisation.

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The violent extremist pipeline

Figure 1 (adapted from Australian sources) illustrates the dynamic of the violent extremist threat to which New Zealand and other countries are now exposed. The political instability in the Middle East has spawned Jihadist Islamic groups who export their ideology via propaganda, returning foreign fighters and other supporters. This works to increase the possibility of extremism in the host country and also raises the political profile and potential legitimacy of the terrorist cause to a small minority of supporters. They in turn raise support and funds for the cause, propagate the Jihadist mantra, actively recruit new sympathisers some of whom are sufficiently radicalised to consider lone wolf attacks and or foreign fighting expeditions.



Issue Motivated Groups

There is ongoing concern about the possibility of other issue-motivated groups becoming acutely and dangerously radicalised. Whilst in New Zealand such people have been few and have generally mounted their social protest within democratic , if occasionally illegal, boundaries, the possibility remains that a small minority will cross the line and resort to serious violence or highly disruptive, and criminal, direct action. The recent threats to contaminate food sources in an attempt to coerce government action regarding the use of 1080 poison is an example of this.

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Threats to New Zealanders and New Zealand interests overseas

New Zealand's concerns regarding terrorism do not relate just to the possibility of incidents occurring at home. Regrettably, attacks in other countries have resulted in a number of New Zealand deaths and injuries. Whilst our immediate neighbourhood in the South Pacific is relatively benign in this regard, the wider Asian region is experiencing active terrorist problems. . In most cases, significant terrorist incidents occurring abroad lead to disruption to travel plans and trade and thereby negatively affect New Zealand's overseas interests and contribute to global or regional insecurity.

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1.8 Counter Terrorism arrangements within New Zealand

In order to meet these threats, New Zealand has established a counter terrorism management framework. Policy is driven from the National Counter Terrorism Strategy and guided by intelligence gathering, risk management, threat assessment and other specialised protective security activity all designed to reduce the risk of terrorism. The whole is governed by ministers and senior officials responsible for determining policy settings, setting in place adequate security arrangements and building sufficient capability to deal with any risks which might occur.

1.8.1 Governance

Counter terrorism policy and practice is managed through a hierarchy of arrangements whereby ministers oversee national security settings, managed by senior officials who in turn are responsible for coordination arrangements throughout the security and other government sectors.

The specifics include:

- The Prime Minister is in charge of National Security. He or she is supported by the Minister with oversight of NZSIS and GCSB. A National Security Committee (NSC) made up of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and other ministers with security related responsibilities has been established to oversee national security risk management including terrorism.
- Progressive steps have been taken in recent years to strengthen national security governance including the establishment of a specific Officials Domestic and External Security Coordination Committee (ODESC) charged with governance of our security management. Subordinate to this are two high level boards namely the Security and Intelligence Board (SIB) who work alongside a Readiness and Response Board (RRB) in an effort to identify risk and set up appropriate readiness and response mechanisms. Membership of both these boards is set at extremely senior public service levels (Chief Executives). Working to the boards in the counter terrorism space are a number of coordination and capacity building committees and mechanisms.
- The Commissioner of Police is a statutorily independent officer within New Zealand's constitutional arrangements with the authority to order such independent action as is lawful and proportionate in the circumstances. Sworn constables are similarly empowered by statute to take sufficient measures (including, where warranted, the use of lethal force) to

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prevent a serious crime taking place. If a terrorist attack did occur, it is the role of the police to take the lead in dealing with the event.

- In addition to the police role, a range of agencies provide for domestic and international terrorist threat monitoring, intelligence gathering, risk assessment and risk management and there is a well-defined operational process in place, enshrined in legislation, whereby the NZ Police, supported if necessary by the New Zealand Defence Force, can deploy to meet and combat any terrorist emergency.
- Should there be sufficient time, the Prime Minister and other ministers, are empowered through legislation to monitor the emergency and authorise emergency action to deal with the incident. (e.g. sieges, hostage taking, hijackings, etc). (See Appendix 1)

1.8.2 Legislation

The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002

Enacting appropriate legislation is an important part of countering terrorism. The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, provides a legal definition of terrorism as well as establishing and providing necessary powers to intelligence, security, law enforcement, border control and defence agencies to enable them to prevent, suppress and respond to terrorism. It establishes serious offences and penalties for activities involved in the planning, organising, financing and carrying out of terrorist acts, both to act as a deterrent and to enable prosecution of those who involve themselves in such activities.

Other relevant counter terrorism legislation

New Zealand Acts relevant to countering terrorism include:

- Terrorism Suppression Act 2002
- International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987
- Crimes Act 1961
- Defence Act 1990
- New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969
- Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations and Associated Personnel and Hostages) Act 1980
- Aviation Crimes Act 1972
- Maritime Security Act 2004
- United Nations Act 1946
- NZ Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987

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- Extradition Act 1999,
- Financial Transactions Reporting Act 1996
- Immigration Act 1987
- Customs and Excise Act 1996
- Proceeds of Crime Act 1991
- Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of terrorism Act 2009

Appendix 2 summarises the effect of this legislation in New Zealand's counter terrorism arrangements.

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

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1.10 New Zealand's counter terrorism in practice

The Four R's

As specified in the Strategic principles discussed above, New Zealand's counter terrorism strategy and tactical methods align with and follow its normal emergency and risk management approach. These are summarised by a management framework known as the 4R's namely:

i. Terrorism risk REDUCTION
ii. Counter-terrorism READINESS
iii. Counter-terrorism RESPONSE
iv. RECOVERY from a terrorist threat or event

With its general threat picture remaining as low, the bulk of day to day counter terrorism work in New Zealand is directed at reducing the risk of terrorism. That being said security agencies maintain a state of readiness in this country to ensure that we can react quickly if the threat picture were to suddenly change. This requires considerable investment in counter terrorist exercises and stress testing. Were an attack to take place New Zealand needs to respond with determination and effectiveness. New Zealand Police is the lead agency with regard to this and can call on the support of the New Zealand Defence Force in extreme circumstances. Subsequent to a period of escalated threat or an actual attack, New Zealand needs to recover and return to business as usual as quickly as possible and government agencies will play a major role in managing this.

Examples of activities under each heading

The following provides examples of typical counter terrorism activity under each of the 4R's headings

i. Terrorism risk REDUCTION

This is achieved through systematic agency vigilance, deterrence, disruption and prevention where possible and includes:

- *Horizon scanning* - Intelligence agencies search for threat indicators based on national and partner data through:
  - Knowledge management – consolidation integration analysis and distribution
  - Interrogation of well-maintained information and intelligence databases

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- Passive collection of open source and windfall information.

- Wider agencies and organisations carry out *specific risk reduction activities* including:
  - Profiling terrorist entities, groups and affiliates and designating where necessary
  - Target hardening (critical infrastructure, airport security, regulatory agencies, travel advisers, etc).
  - Integrated multi-agency border control to limit the risk of terrorist opportunism.
- A yet wider group of security and social agencies activate *broader social engagement* and *outreach* with communities in NZ to foster stronger links with mainstream society, encourage social cohesion and limit social isolation and marginalisation.
- Specific *operational cooperation* occurs at home and abroad to encourage best-practice operational capability, and mutual learning and support including:
  - CT focused collaboration, information and intelligence sharing capacity and capability sharing etc.
  - National and international participation in specific offshore operations;
  - National counter terrorism stress testing, exercises and international participation in counter terrorism exercises.
- International counter terrorism *engagement* approaches with allies, friends and partners including strong UN engagement.
- *Identity protection and document security*.

ii. Counter-terrorism READINESS to deal with an attack with security and mitigation to minimise consequences includes:

- Strategic readiness:
  - Establishment of *specific counter terrorism capacity and capability* regularly exercised.
  - Pre-established integrated inter agency *governance*, national and international *cooperation, coordination and planning* regimes
  - Mitigation measures that *reduce the vulnerability* of potential victims and targets
  - *Infrastructural redundancy* and alternative sources
  - *Preparedness* such as training and the provision of contingency resource
  - *Strong action-based links* with the community and business
- Tactical readiness
  - Targeted and potentially intensifying *surveillance*
  - Joint tactical *intelligence gathering* and *tactical planning*
  - Active *deterrence* measures

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- Active *disruption* measures options
- Active *threat confrontation* measures

iii. RESPONSE with appropriate and timely resources should an attack or coercion occur

- Establishing the *skills, capabilities and capacity* needed to respond to a specific threat or threat state, prevent further harm and/or reduce potential cascading effects following a threat, incident or attack. These include:
  - Coordinated *governance, command, control and accountability arrangements* able to authorise and harmonise responses from differing agencies and sources.
  - Sufficient and satisfactory *operational capability* pre trained and pre-arranged to manage threat.
  - *Public information* management systems
  - Appropriate *operational support capacity*
  - Effective New Zealand arrangements in place to ensure the *security of New Zealanders or New Zealand interests overseas* including readily deployable medical and consular support.

iv. RECOVERY from a terrorist threat or event

- Pre-arranged *financial, legal and social recovery* systems in place to recover quickly from a domestic security event including:
  - Rapidly restoring *normal economic and social functioning*
  - Replacing or rebuilding *affected infrastructure*
  - Re-establishing *reputational effects*
  - Minimisation of further *consequential effects* of the event
  - Promoting the *care and rehabilitation of affected people*
  - Rapid *rebuilding* programmes

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Figure 1a The terrorist pipeline impacted by risk reduction activity



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Part Two

2.1 Towards a more comprehensive and coordinated approach

Policy context

The range of existing and new comprehensive CT work streams underway necessitate the adoption of clearer sectorial strategy and greater levels of coordination. To ensure this a number of measures are underway or are currently proposed:

1. **Creating a New Zealand counter terrorism strategy**

   The creation of a published New Zealand CT strategy will provide a cohesive counter terrorist narrative for use in domestic and international settings. The strategy will help bring together CT effort across the Government and non-government sectors and underpin operational and policy development into the medium term. Henceforward all CT policy planning will be based on the direction of the CT Strategy and The Strategy will be revised regularly to meet new conditions.

2. **Enhancing all of government CT coordination**

   A much stronger all of Government CT coordination from the centre will be achieved through formal programme management situated at the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. This will be managed through the Counter Terrorism Coordination Committee (CTCC) and the various working committees that sit under this.

3. **Broadening the counter terrorist risk management approach**

   This will include encouraging the involvement of a much wider group of social agencies hitherto not specifically involved in counter terrorism. As the CVE and FTF risk management approach is better understood, it is apparent that this work needs to be spread over a much wider group of agencies including those from the Justice and social sectors, Health, and Education. Non-government entities will also be essential such as providers of social and pastoral care, religious entities, ethnic communities and other community focused groups.

4. **Establishing more formal coordination of agency roles and responsibilities including coordinating CVE missions, mandates and understandings between statutorily accountable agencies**

   The security agencies such as New Zealand Police and NZSIS work together to ensure work on CVE and FTF risks are well coordinated, properly resourced and fully accountable. Whilst both agencies are used to operational collaboration, the new CVE and FTF risks may prompt a more formal review to ensure that CVE and FTF work is are appropriately case-managed and resolved. This includes establishing clear case management practice, agreed operational expectations, operational boundaries, the use of specific statutory powers and methods of case disposition.

   Other agencies need to be brought into similar coordination so that counter terrorism risk management lives within one agreed operational framework.

The benefits of a stronger coordinated approach

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Reducing the risk of terrorism by:

- *More effective coordination and collaboration among relevant stakeholders*. Will help to ensure agencies share their assets, information and judgements. A comprehensive, All of Government approach to CT needs effective coordination and collaboration between a wider range of stakeholders and across the domestic/international and policy/operational dimensions.

- *Establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities* for Government agencies involved in CT. As the number of agencies increase, there will be a more pressing requirement to understand mandates and nuance the roles and responsibilities that contributors can (and cannot) offer.

- *Prompting a more collaborative and sharing culture* between agencies used to a much more closed and secretive approach. (While acknowledging there are areas of operational sensitivity, and privacy, the new threats require open management and maximum sharing of information and intelligence, often in real time).

- *Encouraging ongoing operational and policy review and analysis to determine what is effective and what needs to change.* The ISIL phenomenon may well herald a ratcheting of the terrorist threat dynamic. This will require equally dynamic review of policy, legislative, and operational settings and the urgent addressing of gaps in the system.

- *Establishing strengthened broad sector accountability.* There is a necessity to ensure as much as possible is being done by the agencies to mitigate the threat. This accountability will not infringe on agencies statutory roles, but support them in playing their role in our collective CT effort.

- *The facilitation of periodic independent evaluation of and reporting on these coordinated efforts.* Collaboration between agencies (and stakeholders) can be enhanced by evaluating and reporting on what worked, what can be improved, and progress to address long-term objectives.

Figure 1.0 Governance and coordination arrangements for Counter Terrorism.



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2.2 International Engagement

Policy Context

The growth of international terrorism and the borderless nature of its reach has increased the need for coordinated global counter terrorist action. Along with the threat that foreign terrorist fighters may return home, radicalised and with military training, there is the direct concern that someone in New Zealand could commit an act of terrorism inspired through the internet.

Other threats to New Zealand include:

- The safety and well-being of New Zealanders and New Zealand's economic and security interests;
- The safety and security of key partners in the Pacific region and beyond; and
- The potential to exacerbate existing tensions in Asia Pacific, the Middle East and Africa, and the creation of new fragility in previously stable states.

Objectives for our international response to terrorism

1. Contribute to the national security of New Zealand and to the protection of New Zealanders at home and abroad;
2. promote New Zealand's security interests abroad as they relate to terrorism, including the stability of the rules-based international order;
3. build our own external situational awareness, networks and capability to respond to terrorist threats at home;
4. Contribute to New Zealand's reputation as a trusted and valued contributor to international efforts to counter terrorism.

Focus areas

1. Global engagement
2. Regional engagement
3. Support for New Zealand's whole of government approach to counter terrorism

Focus Area 1 Global engagement

A. Cooperate with and support key partners to counter terrorism

- *Sharing information and promoting coordinated approaches where possible.*
- *Helping to prevent terrorist financing, violent extremism radicalisation and recruitment*

B. Support UN action on terrorism

- *Advocate for UNSC action against key terrorist actors*

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- *Promoting UN sanctioning of key terrorist entities*

C. Encourage practical cooperation through multilateral fora

- *Pursuing objectives through the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF)*
- *Taking part in the inter faith dialogue including the UN Alliance of Civilisations*

Focus Area 2 Regional Engagement

D. Continue consultation with South East Asian partners to enhance New Zealand's awareness of terrorism in our region and to determine where cooperation is most useful.

E. Enhance cooperation on counter terrorism in regional fora including:

- *The Pacific Working Group on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime;*
- *ASEAN Regional Forum Inter sessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime;*
- *Work with Ministry of Justice and Asia and Pacific Group on Money Laundering including Donors and Providers Group to encourage regional compliance with terrorist financing resolutions and recommendations*

F. Deliver projects to build the capacity of South East Asian States to counter terrorism, and support international and regional organisations that build counter terrorism capacity building

- *Supporting projects to prevent terrorist funding, violent extremism, radicalisation and recruitment.*
- *Facilitating the sharing of best practice*
- *Fostering New Zealand's relationship with regional centres of excellence*
- *Working with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime on regional capacity building specifically legislative*

Focus Area 3 International efforts to directly support New Zealand's national security

G. Ensure New Zealand's international engagement strategy on counter terrorism reflects and contributes to New Zealand's counter terrorism approach.

H. Enhance New Zealand's foreign policy and response to specific terrorist entities where they directly threaten New Zealand and our interests.

- *Develop and communicate New Zealand's comprehensive foreign policy on terrorism.*
- *Contribute to the development and implementation of comprehensive strategies which may include military, intelligence, diplomatic and humanitarian options.*

I. Ensure coordination of New Zealand's counter terrorism activities through the 'Counter Terrorism Engagement Working Group'.

- *Information sharing*

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- *Capacity building and*
- *Supporting agencies international engagement on counter terrorism to enhance New Zealand's overall CT resilience.*

J. Work with the Intelligence Community and New Zealand Police to ensure a comprehensive approach to the global threat of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

K. Work with the Counter Terrorism Designations Working Group on national terrorist designations under UNSC Resolution 1373

- *Identify and implement new national designations with the Counter Terrorism Designations Working Group*
- *Share information with New Zealand on the designation activities of key partner*

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2.3 Countering Violent Extremism and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs)

Objective

1 Explore broader options to manage violent extremist and radicalisation risks and curb the appeal of violent extremist narratives.

Policy context

As recent terrorist attacks in France, Canada, and the US showed, it is the radicalised 'lone wolf' actors that have proved to be, despite the efforts of security agencies, the most difficult to identify, monitor and disrupt.

In October 2014, Cabinet considered the residual risk posed by FTFs, [CAB Min (14) 32/2] and this led to additional investment in NZSIS, and targeted legislative amendments. These measures, while necessary, were predominantly reactive and law enforcement oriented and have prompted the need to broaden the options to deal with the root causes of radicalisation as evidenced here in New Zealand and what might be done to manage and dissuade individuals from choosing to radicalise.

The challenging methods by which individuals may be de-radicalised and reformed is beyond the remit and capability of security agencies. The efforts by the Office of Ethnic Communities (OEC), Department of Internal Affairs (DIA), and other social agencies to develop a New Zealand approach to strengthening local communities and helping people feel safe and socially included are essential.

At the other end of the spectrum, the government will seek to strengthen efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE) and FTF activity by developing policy and practice to manage these risks and, where possible, encourage de radicalisation.

ISIL's ability to reach out globally via social media is particularly notable. Building on its success, ISIL has undertaken a sophisticated outreach campaign designed to draw extremists to its cause – whether as individual FTFs, lone wolf terrorists in Western countries, or as affiliated extremist groups or factions. ISIL's online narrative is engaging and voluminous, and uses Twitter, Tumblr, and other social media applications. The US State Department estimates that ISIL rank and file can generate 90,000 tweets a day. Many FTF's are recruited directly through online propaganda and/or direct contact with online recruiters.

While recruitment to terrorist groups via contact with a charismatic leader or personal network may have lessened in recent times, social media has provided an ideal 'virtual community'. Importantly the use of the internet has helped to 'compress' the threat timeline and there are global examples of otherwise normal and law abiding individuals, surprising their friends and families, by being turned towards violent radicalisation very quickly. This presents a significantly greater risk for authorities to manage.

New converts

ISIL is essentially selling an identity, meaning, and cause (the Syrian conflict), to susceptible individuals. In Europe, many are second generation immigrants, rejecting the moderate Islam of their parents whilst many others are completely new converts, often of Caucasian background with no previous Islamic links. US analysis judges that up to one fifth of ISIL converts from Europe have no ethnic link to the Middle East, and suggests that the problem of Western Jihadism should not be viewed solely in ethnic or sectarian terms. In sociological terms, previously non-religious but

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socially marginalised individuals are finding ready-made solace and excitement in the ISIL brand and are happy to take part in ISIL sourced (and funded) travel opportunities to fight in what are, to their eyes, fully justifiable conflicts.

While a portion of Jihadists are attracted by the violence alone, FTFs and their wider support community are unlikely to be psychologically disturbed and may even feel significant social justification for taking part in what they might perceive to be appropriate and morally defensible acts of self-defence. There is a crucial link between personal experiences and wider identity formation and for some socially disadvantaged groups, including a small minority of Western Muslims, personal isolation and perceived social and racial discrimination is seen as part of a wider global struggle. In extreme, an essentially "us versus them" identity politics. . Experts agree, however, that this phenomenon is evidence of deep and complex social problems which defy simple (and universal) causal explanations.

An increasing risk of radicalisation in New Zealand

The NZSIS and NZ Police continue to experience a sustained increase in the total number of FTF related investigations. These are focused upon: NZ persons overseas fighting; NZ based facilitation efforts; and individuals planning to undertake domestic activities. The NZSIS is aware of a small number of New Zealand foreign fighters operating in Syria, but assess that the actual number of fighters is potentially higher. While some individuals have been prevented from travelling to the conflict, it is possible others will avoid detection and manage to fight in Syria.

Recent overseas cases where an individual's passport was cancelled due to their intention to engage in FTF activity highlight the residual risks that need managing. In 2014, Numan Haider stabbed an Australian Policeman a week after his passport was cancelled. Also in 2014, Martin Couture-Rouleau engaged in a hit and run attack which killed a Canadian soldier. His passport had been cancelled several months earlier. Importantly for New Zealand's policy analysis, both individuals were on the respective security agencies watch lists but there was insufficient criminal evidence to prosecute them.

New Zealand examples

New Zealand cases also highlight the complex nature of the risks we need to manage. They also show a range of presenting underlying issues that can make an individual more vulnerable to be radicalised to violent extremism. These include environmental factors such as the community a person might live in; negative experiences of mainstream society; and exposure to extremist propaganda, either directly through associates or indirectly online.

The case studies which follow moreover show how an individual's own personality and personal characteristics can influence their attraction to extremism. For some, an extremist ideology becomes an extension of existing activist beliefs; for others extremism provides solace from loneliness whilst at the same time engendering a new sense of purpose, and the feeling of belonging to a new and worthwhile cause.

Current efforts to counter violent extremism in New Zealand

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Considerable effort is already underway to counter home grown violent extremism and to ensure that New Zealand is "neither a victim nor a source of terrorism". These include refreshed collaboration around the CVE risk of a range of a range of agencies including the Police, New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC), Border and other supporting agencies. There is also a considerable contribution to CT internationally through MFAT (see Focus Area Three) and our readiness for a CT incident is regularly tested with multi-agency CT exercising and stress-testing.

In October 2014, Cabinet considered the threat posed by FTF's and agreed a targeted review of capacity, capability and legislation be undertaken to ensure they are adequate to respond to the evolving domestic threat [CAB Min (14) 32/2].

The review was focused on interim measures in advance of the 2015 statutory review and considered what additional measures could be implemented to enhance the safety and security of New Zealand in the short term. Cabinet agreed to additional investment in NZSIS capability and concluded that there were targeted legislative amendments that could be made to strengthen NZSIS's powers to monitor and investigate extremist individuals, and to further restrict and disrupt the travel plans of those wishing to fight in the Middle East.

The limitations of these approaches

Current efforts to monitor and investigate individuals of security concern domestically whilst necessary and important are generally reactive in nature, labour intensive and always expensive in terms of opportunity cost. This work remains integral to our CVE risk management .

That being said there are limitations to the criminal justice based approach to security risk management including:

- the difficulty in providing clear and reliable security outcomes, with investigations potentially dragging on for months or years and often remaining unresolved;
- the problem of relying on a criminal justice based management approach with a very limited set of options available to control extremists.
- the inability to address the suspected underlying causal factors directing individuals towards radicalisation and/or violent extremism;
- the inability to address an individual's personal susceptibility to extremist propaganda; often exacerbated by lack of information and diagnosis of the underlying problems;
- The inability to maintain accountable, appropriate and suitably empowered national management processes to control returning FTF's, given the probability that that actual prosecutions will be difficult to support through lack of useable evidence;
- The difficulty in limiting or countering r the pervasive and inflammatory terrorist propaganda online.

Disengaging individuals vulnerable to radicalisation

While New Zealand currently has relatively low known numbers of radicalised individuals (or at risk of radicalisation), these few individuals continue to present an ongoing risk needing intensive management by the authorities. There is also the potential, without significant interventions, for the problem to grow risking overwhelming the resources of the security agencies. Accordingly, New Zealand needs to explore broader approaches to mitigating the risk of radicalisation. Some overseas experience points to the use of a more holistic social agency approach as being the most effective approach to try.

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Engaging social agencies to counter violent extremist risk

Within New Zealand, there are a range of agencies which currently deal with individuals who are in need of various types of social rehabilitation similar to that contemplated here. Some programmes are quite organised and structured, whilst others are more like less formal outreach opportunities. For example, The Department of Corrections currently assist inmates adjust to life outside prison with a range of initiatives including anger management courses, work skill development, budgeting programmes, and general life skills coaching. The Ministry of Social Development works with long term unemployed and unskilled youth in an effort to enhance job opportunities; resolve personal difficulties and help people towards more productive lives. New Zealand Police also has experience in diverting potential young offenders into more creative lifestyles as well as sophisticated methods of engaging at the grass root level. Immigration have well established programmes and highly attuned cultural approaches to help immigrants and refugees assimilate into this country's mainstream.

Using inter disciplinary experts to help in the process

Whilst this is a start the complexity of the terrorist radicalisation problem defies ready-made solution finding. Dealing with this problem will require adaptive approaches based on stroing problem solving and a culture of learning by doing. Whilst the use of a wider group of social agencies will be helpful, we would clearly benefit from ongoing expert advice on the problems and what might work best to manage risks. Agencies are already researching global best practice and creating links with international expertise and this is leading to discussion about what type of approaches might work here. In the Netherlands, for example law enforcement agencies and local authorities have brought together panels of inter disciplinary experts to help both in policy creation and actual risk management examining the literature. Scandinavian countries are also emphasising the equal importance of psycho social and social scientific analysis working with and alongside more traditional security risk management. The United States has emphasised its own aspiration of all of government counter terrorist approach bringing together social agencies and external expertise to greater identify risk and manage problems.

Counter messaging

Countering the extremist messaging espoused by ISIL and other terrorist groups is recognised as a component in defeating them. This applies in domestic and international dimensions, and ranges from broad media interventions through to bespoke convesations with idividuals.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 urges:

> *".. Member States, to act cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources, including audio and video, to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under international law".*

Developing a strategy to counter jihadi radical narratives is a complex challenge that a number of countries are currently grappling with. In 2014/2015, the Australian Attorney General pledged over $A37 million for a new Combating Terrorist Propaganda initiative. The UK and other countries are currently considering laws enabling ISIL linked material online to be lawfully disabled and removed.

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New Zealand needs to consider what approach to counter messaging may fit our own political culture and specific threat profile. We must consider what type of framework should be used to achieve the right outcome.

The importance of the internet as a vehicle to spread ISIL propaganda has been a theme of this strategy. New Zealand policy settings should be aimed at balancing the freedom of expression which lies at the heart of the internet whilst seeking to address and counter the extremely graphic and violent terrorist propaganda being directed towards our country and its citizens.

Curbing unwarranted excess on the internet is nothing new and there are existing, non-terrorist related, areas of internet management which are reasonably non controversial and may provide models to assist. For example we may need to consider how we can exploit existing initiatives around promoting internet safety for young people and children to help in a wider effort to prevent a wider group of vulnerable people from exposure to graphic ISIL propaganda and gratuitous terrorist violence - the work in New Zealand that agencies do around managing 'harmful digital communications' may be a starting point for this.

Other helpful starters may well be found within government itself by ensuring that communication strategies and resultant messaging is carefully crafted and supported by expert advice. Ministers and other spokespeople could be assisted by messaging which is appropriately coordinated and in step with likeminded friends and allies.

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2.4 Community Strengthening

Policy Context

Community strengthening is identified as a key component in countering violent extremism (CVE). Increased government engagement with communities to build leadership, resilience and inclusivity has obvious benefit in and of itself but also, if properly done, will help to counter risks of violent extremism or terrorism. In saying this there should also be real caution. There are examples of constructive community strengthening which have served to reinforce social cohesion. Other examples unfortunately have only served to marginalise particular communities, often Muslim, and have been seriously counterproductive. Our aim in New Zealand is to capitalise on current and successful community strengthening examples to help manage the wider CVE threat.

Countering Violent Extremism

With the rise of ISIL there is heightened interest in countering violent extremism. Violent extremism is defined as violent extremist behaviour by persons who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. CVE is defined as preventing radicalisation, recruitment and mobilisation of vulnerable individuals and groups into violent extremist/terrorist groups and becoming involved in terrorist activities at home or abroad (as foreign terrorist fighters). Extremism can come in many different guises e.g. far right fascism, anti-immigration movements, animal rights and environmental activism, as well as a variety of other political, cultural and religious viewpoints.

New Zealand's risk profile is low, but the threat remains

A rapidly changing demographic profile raises significant implications for government services New Zealand's migration history and immigration settings (focusing on importing skilled migrant workers to fill labour market gaps) have so far set us apart from other countries facing CVE problems. Nevertheless a rapidly changing demographic profile presents government with a challenge to maintain and improve community trust and confidence in civil society. Increasing diversity of language and cultures mean that new approaches are needed. Failure to address socio economic difference can give rise to perceptions that some ethnic communities are being deliberately excluded or isolated from the mainstream which can, over time fuel, perceived and actual social grievance.

CVE Internationally

Internationally a great deal of social policy is being developed to implement CVE best practice. Common components of these strategies include:

- Building awareness and understanding of the drivers of CVCE by promoting local research and information sharing.
- Countering extremist narratives – by directly addressing extremist recruitment propaganda.
- Engaging with communities and supporting community lead interventions – through proactive relationship building and building partnerships in an effort to empower family and local efforts to stem radicalisation before it emerges into criminality.

This is all designed to achieve two distinct objectives:

- Improving social cohesion through community engagement; and
- Reducing the risk associated with identified extreme and /or radicalised individuals and groups.

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Community strengthening and CVE; what we are already doing

A core implementation group has been established (DPMC, NZP, DIA Office of Ethnic Communities, Corrections, NZSIS and MFAT). The Office of Ethnic Communities has been active in community strengthening programmes along with other agencies including New Zealand Police. Recent examples include:

- Ethnic women and youth leadership programmes – training to provide a range of skills to help career development and local community contribution.
- Small grants and capability building projects. Called the Settling In fund these grants help provide enable new migrants and refugees with the skills to build cases for grant proposals.
- Building Bridges initiative focused on Muslim communities and designed to help them build organisational capability, and provides opportunities to connect with other communities, government and the media.
- Interfaith activity – DIA works with MFAT to promote a Regional inter faith dialogue. New Zealand is a co-sponsor of the South East Asian and South Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue.

New Zealand Police has its own Ethnic and Community Engagement Strategy which has engendered a considerable degree of community strengthening activity. Recent examples include:

- New Zealand Police acting as sponsor and participant in the New Zealand Diversity Forum alongside the Human Rights Commission (since 2006).
- Focussed recruitment drives, crime prevention programmes, youth work and sporting activity all seeking to foster positive policed-community relationships.
- The creation of a network of ethnic liaison officers from the Maori and Ethnic Services group within police who work with district police colleagues to build relationships and liaise with a wide range of ethnic community representatives.
- Crime prevention resources translated and published into a range of languages to address specific needs within ethnic communities.

Developing a more coordinated New Zealand approach

Strategic aims

The core group of government agencies is now considering how best to work together to maximise community strengthening activities and establishing the touch-points of government and communities with a view to limiting disenfranchisement and radicalisation potential. They seek to address the potential for current radicalisation and prevent it in the future. Effective prevention requires tailored and localised approaches focussing on two linked objectives, namely *prevention* and *protection*..

Prevention

Activities include:
Relevant NZ Police community oriented policing initiatives.
Ethnic women and leadership programmes
Settling in Grants and capability building projects
Media Training for community groups supported by DIA
Various bridge building initiatives
Interfaith activities including the Asia Pacific Regional Inter Faith dialogue (see MFAT in Pillar one)

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An extension of the Treasury driven programme supporting Maori and Pacific Island youth related employment programmes into Muslim youth communities. (coaching and employment recruiting) Cultural capacity building including interpretation services and cultural education for public servants.

Protection

DPMC, Police, MFAT Corrections to supply
The aim of this pillar is to provide a joined up approach with clear objectives. The approach seeks to capitalise on New Zealand's reasonably successful social cohesion approaches (notable community oriented policing) and avoid labelling approaches, tried elsewhere, which can become counter-productive by ostracising the very people government seeks to reach out to.
This pillar seeks a clear separation between the socially cohesive aims of this approach with the harder edges of law enforcement and national security related CVE.

Potential focus areas proposed:

- Tackling social problems including poverty, drug abuse, alcohol abuse unemployment low educational achievement etc.
- Building on current community engagement activities in an effort to reduce marginalisation.
- The development of support tools and information to counter the threat of radicalisation and the community and family level. (mothers, parents and families being effective first-responders in terms of intervening in the radicalisation risk).
- Related to the above, active strengthening of relationships and intra relationships of religious leaders and schools by supporting inter faith activities

Next steps

There is more work to be done in terms of discussions across government on how coordination, collaboration and information sharing might occur. We also need to canvas other agencies such as Ministry of Youth Development, Ministry of Social Development, Immigration New Zealand, Ministry of Pacific Islands Affairs and others to gain a better understanding of all the touch points government has with communities and the range of activities taking place.

A coordinated approach would ultimately look to develop common messages, a co-ordinated schedule of meetings, regular fora for longer term planning and discussions around best practice, and the brokering of engagement between Ministers, government agencies and different community groups.

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Appendix 1 Terrorism legislation explained

The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002(as amended)

This is a key piece of counter terrorism legislation in New Zealand. The act defines a terrorist act as:

One that has the purpose of advancing an ideological, political or religious cause, and has the intention of inducing terror in a civilian population or of compelling or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act, through causing one or more of the following outcomes:

- *Death or other serious bodily injury.*
- *A serious risk to the health and safety of a population.*
- *Destruction of, or serious damage to property of great value or importance, or major economic loss, or major environmental damage.*
- *Serious interference with, or serious disruption to, an infrastructure facility, if likely to endanger human life.*
- *Devastation of the national economy of a country through the introduction or release of a disease bearing organism.*

Amongst other things the act:

- Implements the United Nations Conventions and resolutions (notably Resolution 1373) - all related to countering terrorism and implementing urgent action to freeze the sources of terrorist related funding.
- Clarifies extraterritorial jurisdiction for terrorists acting within or without our national boundaries.
- Establishes universal jurisdiction against foreign terrorist found in New Zealand and not for any reason extradited.
- Sets in place a designation process to identify and criminalise terrorist entities.
- Criminalises the dealing in assets of entities designated as terrorist.

International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 this legislation authorises the use of emergency powers where terrorist acts are committed for the purpose of furthering a political aim outside of New Zealand. If the terrorist activity has no international political dimension, the NZ Police must rely on other statutory powers. The Act sets up a process whereby the Commissioner of Police must report to the Prime Minister where an international terrorist emergency is taking place. The Prime Minister may act with at least three Cabinet ministers to authorise emergency powers.

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The use of these powers is then to be reported to the House of Representatives and publically published as soon as practicable.

The emergency powers include:

- Public evacuation
- Forcible entry of premises
- Closure of roads and public places
- Destruction of or requisition of dangerous property
- Interception of telephone communications (Police only)
- The PM in extraordinary circumstances may prohibit the publication of a person's name or identity
- Military acting in good faith in support of police may be protected from civil or criminal proceedings

The Crimes Act 1961 Most crimes that arise in the context of terrorism are covered in the Crimes Act. These include offences against persons, public order, and crimes against the rights of property. Crimes against the person include assault, homicide abduction and kidnapping. Relevant offences against the rights of property include theft or robbery, computer crimes and arson related crimes. Also contained are offences relating to infecting animals and contamination of food, crops or water supplies.

The Crimes Act (new Search and Seizure Act?)also contains general powers to stop and search vehicles, enter and search private property without warrant in special circumstances and to intercept private communications, also in special circumstances.

The Defence Act 1990 provides for Armed Forces assistance to the civil power in emergencies which may only be authorised by the Prime Minister or his or her proxy. Most of these support provisions can only be activated if the Commissioner of Police certifies that the emergency problem is imminent and cannot be dealt with adequately by the police alone.

The New Zealand Intelligence Service Act 1969 describes the functions of the NZSIS which in short are to obtain, correlate and evaluate intelligence relevant to security, and to communicate such intelligence as the Director of Security considers to be relevant in the interests of security.

The Act authorises the Director of Security to make recommendations with regard to citizenship and immigration and to cooperate with other public service agencies at home and abroad in the interests of the Service performing its functions.

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