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## A Strategic look at MFAT's priorities for future CT engagement

May 2012

### Part One – Introduction

- A. Context
- B. MFAT's evolving CT response post 9/11

### Part Two – Evolution of the Threat Picture

- C. Risk to New Zealand
- D. Risk to New Zealanders overseas
- E. The Global Threat picture

### Part Three – Evolution of the CT approach

- F. Enablers of Terrorism
- G. Guiding principles
- H. Indicators of Success

### Part Four – How does New Zealand inc s CT approach compare?

- I. The NCTP
- J. New Zealand's efforts to date
- K. Suggested future priorities for NZ INC
- L. Suggested future priorities for MFAT

## PART ONE – Introduction

### A) Context

1. This is a non-paper that considers MFAT's future Counter Terrorism priorities. Domestic and Overseas CT aspects have been included because of their interlinked relationship.
2. New Zealand recognises that an effective response to terrorism can only come from an approach that is comprehensive, multi-layered and long-term. It also recognises that terrorism, including in parts of the world far away from New Zealand, threatens our interests directly and indirectly, and to tackle it effectively requires a co-ordinated international response. So in addition its domestic CT requirements, New Zealand is committed to regional and international counter-terrorism cooperation. Overseas co-operation includes:
  - s6(a)
    - Improving the counter-terrorism (CT) capabilities of other governments, that is consistent with the rule of law and fundamental human rights.
    - Reducing the support for terrorists by challenging their ideology and tackling the grievances that drive radicalisation.
    - Preventing terrorists from misusing technology
    - Preventing terrorists from exploiting fragile/failing political environments
3. Since 9/11 CT has become an ingrained feature of the international security agenda. Although the likelihood of a direct attack against New Zealand interests is low, the impact of an attack on New Zealand interests, on or offshore, could be considerable. New Zealand should therefore continue to engage in CT to protect its national security and to make a wider contribution to international security.

### B) MFAT's CT response post 9/11

4. MFAT has a central role in counter-terrorism diplomacy and maintains an overview of NZ Inc's CT activities offshore, but many aspects of international CT co-operation and commitments are the responsibility of other government agencies (see Annex I for core MFAT roles with respect to terrorism and counter-terrorism). The domestic and the overseas CT efforts are also often interlinked – for example the Terrorism Suppression Act fulfils international CT obligations, but provides the basis for many of New Zealand's domestic CT responses. In response to the international security agenda, New Zealand has over the last 10 years, developed significant CT contributions. Examples include a national terrorism sanctions regime pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions; contributions to multilateral CT forums (including the GCTF), support for the UN CT Strategy and regional initiatives; and a beefed up programme of bilateral (foreign ministry) CT policy consultations..

5. s6(a)

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Banyan has also helped to reduce Taliban influence and threat of terrorist activity in that province. With New Zealand's diplomatic, military, intelligence, and development components, our efforts in Afghanistan have contributed to an international, comprehensive, multi-faceted and long-term approach to countering terrorism.

6. **South East Asia:** MFAT has focused on SE Asia due to the risk of NZ interests being caught up in a terrorist attack there. The Bali bombings in 2002 and subsequent acts of terrorism in Indonesia and the Philippines have sharpened New Zealand's focus on the threat of terrorism in South East Asia. New Zealand has responded with the deployment of Police Liaison Officers in Jakarta in addition to the longstanding position in Bangkok. These positions are cross-accredited to other ASEAN countries. MFAT also increased CT engagement with ASEAN countries, especially with Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, and in 2005 MFAT established the Asia Security Fund (ASF) – a NZ\$ 1 million per annum programme to support CT capacity building and CVE in South East Asia. New Zealand Police, Customs and Aviation Security have played a leading role in delivering ASF-funded training in the region.
7. As well as law enforcement cooperation with various partners, New Zealand has helped improve legislative, policy and operational frameworks in SE Asia, in areas such as aviation security, radioactive source security, and counter-terrorist financing. Much of the cooperation has been bilateral, but increasingly South East Asian nations are asking New Zealand to engage with them on a regional basis, and we have pursued this through projects with all three of the region's counter-terrorism training centres. NZ also works through the UN (specifically UNODC and CTED) to carry out CT relevant programmes and other projects that have a wider security/development focus. Australia, a major donor across the spectrum, is equally committed, and New Zealand's CT activities are complementary to Australian ones.
8. Indonesia is a key country<sup>s6(a)</sup>. Whilst violent extremism is supported by a small percentage (1% of the population according to some polls) radicalisation of specific vulnerable groups and self-radicalised individuals continues to persist. This emerging trend is a concern to New Zealand given its interests in the country. New Zealand has 300 registered citizens in Indonesia and in 2011 17,000 New Zealanders visited the country (not including New Zealanders resident in Australia), largely travelling to Jakarta and Bali. These numbers will increase with the resumption of direct Garuda and Air New Zealand flights to Indonesia in 2012. Close co-operation with SE Asian governments, particularly Indonesia, in the area of countering violent extremism remains relevant.
9. Since 2002, Indonesian authorities have, with some successes, increased their disruptive capabilities alongside international human rights obligations. s6(a)

s6(a)

International partners are increasingly placing importance on advising GoI to develop its own strategy to tackle radicalisation. NZ funding has helped to build some CVE capability but lack of resources within the Indonesia CT framework has hindered an effective approach.

**10. The Pacific.** s6(a)

Post 9/11, the UN highlighted the Pacific as one of the poorest performing regions for implementing international CT instruments and meeting reporting obligations. MFAT has focused on the following areas, to secure an environment that denies terrorists space to operate:

- To improve governance, MFAT has encouraged programmes such as community policing and promoting the rule of law.
- To reduce the vulnerabilities of physical infrastructure that a terrorist might exploit, the NZ Ministry of Transport has played a significant role in hardening the region's national infrastructure including implementing wider border security measures to counter drugs, weapons and people smuggling.
- To create a stable environment MFAT and IDG have implemented wider security and development programmes in the region.
- In partnership with the Pacific Islands Forum and UNODC, New Zealand has since 2006 delivered CT technical assistance to the Pacific that has increased regional compliance with international CT instruments, improved levels of reporting as required under UNSCR 1267 and 1373, and helped introduce domestic CT legislation in a number of countries. Over 2011/2012, Australia has joined the Pacific CT project as a co-sponsor, and UNODC has employed a National Officer, based within the Forum Secretariat, to advance the project work plan.
- New Zealand is also the co-Chair (with the Forum Secretariat) and organiser of the annual Forum Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (WGCT), the only CT meeting in the Pacific that brings together senior law enforcement and legal officials to discuss CT priorities and review progress. In conjunction with the WGCT meeting in Auckland in May 2011, New Zealand hosted a well-received regional CT table-top exercise, Exercise *Ready Pasifika II*, which tested PIC response capability against a series of CT and terrorist financing scenarios.

- 11. Africa and South Asia.** MFAT is considering working alongside international partners in Africa and South Asia to bolster international CT efforts. MFAT's focus will remain concentrated on SE Asia and the Pacific, but a co-ordinated approach with international partners across the CT spectrum not only unifies global political will against terrorism, but also allows NZ to build stronger relations with its African and South Asian partners. This work is also complimentary to that of UN agencies which NZ supports such as UNODC.

## PART TWO – Evolution of the Threat Picture

### C) Risk to New Zealand

12. While Islamist terrorism remains the greatest threat to Western interests worldwide, a direct terrorist attack from AQ against New Zealand assets domestically or overseas, is very unlikely; this includes from AQ affiliates, associated groups, non-associated groups and individuals acting on their own.
13. However recent reporting has highlighted that the perceived "soft" environment in New Zealand could be attractive as a location for terrorism-related activity or as a staging ground for terrorist attacks in a third country. This is a concern. Should an attack or activity be traced back to NZ, NZ's reputation as a safe environment would be tested.
14. The greatest risk to New Zealand domestically may come from non-Islamist extremists or self-radicalised individuals. Agencies are also mindful of individuals travelling overseas to engage in Jihad and returning to NZ with fighting skills and know how. With limited resources at their disposal, agencies note that vigilance is required to provide assurance that undetected threats do not transpire into events that leave little time for an effective response.

### D) Risk to New Zealanders overseas

15. Recent history illustrates the risk to New Zealand citizens from terrorism overseas. They have been killed in terrorist attacks in the US 9/11 attacks, Bali in Oct 2002, London in July 2005 and Jakarta in July 2009.
16. New Zealanders overseas are more vulnerable to becoming inadvertent victims of terrorism, rather than being specifically targeted. Attacks are most likely in S Asia, East, North and West Africa and the Middle East (Yemen) where NZ assets are few. A terrorist attack in SE Asia including Indonesia and the Philippines is currently assessed as possible but not expected. But with a history of attacks in the last 10 years, and the presence of terrorist activity there, coupled with the region's variable CT capacity, its vulnerable infrastructure and its large numbers of westerners; SE Asia remains a potential location for terrorist attacks in which New Zealanders might be caught up. A major terrorist attack in SE Asia would have negative consequences for New Zealand's direct and indirect interests at home as well as across the region.

### E) The Global Threat picture.

17. **Sunni Islamist extremist** activity, 10 years after 9/11, still dominates the global terrorist threat against the West, although other terrorist groups predominate in certain countries and regions. With the disruption of key figures, Al Qaida's leadership is weaker now more than ever. AQ's inability to take advantage over the Arab Spring highlights that government

reform is achievable without AQ's narrative. The Arab Spring made AQ ideology look impotent. But whilst AQ's senior leadership (AQSL) is in decline, there is a risk AQSL will put pressure on its affiliates and those associated with it to carry out attacks on western targets. AQ in the Arab Peninsula (AQ-AP) remain a potent threat to the West. AQ in the Maghreb (AQ-M) continues to grow; s6(a) ; and in part due the unstable environment in the countries it operates.

18. **Other terrorist groups** associated with AQ have also evolved; they include: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and JI in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. LeT, a Pakistan-based terrorism organisation that primarily seeks to drive out Indian Security forces from Kashmir, has, like other terrorist groups, embraced an increasingly global agenda against the West, leading to the 2008 attacks in Mumbai which killed 170, including 6 US citizens. American citizen, David Headley, became radicalised during his visits to Pakistan, pleaded guilty to helping plan the Mumbai Attacks.
19. **Self-radicalised individuals and non Islamist extremists** pose a significant concern to security services. Individuals often remain undetectable until attack planning is near completion or an attack has happened. Their motivations to attack can vary broadly so identifying and disrupting 'lone terrorists' is a significant challenge.

### PART THREE – Evolution of the CT approach

20. Unlike NZ, the US, UK, Australian and Canadian national counter terrorism strategies have been revised frequently to keep pace with the different kinds of terrorist and the threats they pose. For example, most recently "non Islamists", such as right wing activists have been included in CT strategies. And as terrorists motivations and capabilities have evolved, so too has the toolbox governments use to respond to them. As a result, a more comprehensive CT approach has evolved with a greater preventative focus. This section will take a look at the strategic factors key partners now focus on, when addressing global terrorism and New Zealand's positioning in this.

#### F) Enablers of terrorism

21. There are four key strategic factors that enable terrorism to grow in today's climate:
  - Technology
  - Conflict and instability
  - Ideology
  - Drivers of Radicalisation
22. **Technology:** Terrorists use the internet as a means to plan attacks, facilitate finance and radicalise others. They also use technology to advance weapons manufacture (such as IEDs). Whilst the likelihood of using the internet to carry out Cyber attacks or build CBRNE weapons is low, the impact of such an attack is high. Therefore it is important to have i) an

understanding of how terrorists use this technology; ii) a capability to disrupt its use; and iii) strong contingency plans to respond to such attacks.

23. **Conflict and Instability:** Terrorists thrive in an unstable political and economic environment. Southern Philippines for example, is a politically unstable and s6(a) region, where internal conflict provides a haven for Al Qaeda-affiliated groups such as Abu Sayaf and JI. To deny terrorists space to operate, wider security and development programmes are needed to help support a stable and governed environment.
24. **Ideology:** Terrorists communicate their ideology well in an environment where they are not challenged by others. Work streams should centre on challenging the ideology of terrorism by using NGOs' and other government education programmes, community outreach (working through imams to reach young Muslims) and the criminal justice system, including prison reform. Better monitoring of the internet is also needed to disrupt communications between terrorists and their audience.
25. **Drivers of radicalisation** include political, social, economic or environmental grievances. It is important that the driver be understood before the application to de-radicalise or counter radicalise is applied. Using a variety of policing mechanisms and the NGO sector are good ways of identifying CVE risks in communities. Successful programmes will increase the resilience of communities, strengthen the rule of law and address drivers of radicalisation.
26. Whilst New Zealand uses its CT investment to meet international obligations, contribute to core security relationships and reduce the risk of an attack against its National assets; a comprehensive CT strategy enables governments to proactively address terrorism at source instead of just responding to it. The following guiding principles may be used to form a comprehensive strategy.

#### G) Guiding principles

We need to recognise:

The importance of being ready

The need to proactively reduce the risks

By being ahead of the curve

27. **The importance of being ready:** Whilst there is a low likelihood of attack planning and attacks in New Zealand and against New Zealand's assets; we cannot discount a future threat, including from self-radicalised individuals. Effective preparedness to respond to a terrorist threat will include sound interoperability across government and with partners, with

the appropriate resources in place to ensure an effective response at both a national and international level.

28. **The need to proactively reduce the risks:** In response to the current global threat picture and in alignment with the CT approach of some international partners, a risk based approach is common place; and a 'proactive approach' will allow early identification of the risk and the opportunity to reduce it in its earliest stages. New Zealand can reduce this risk directly by targeted work streams; or indirectly through broader security and development measures. New Zealand's unique geographical location, along with Australia, provides an advantage in working with Pacific and Southeast Asian partners.
29. **By being ahead of the curve:** As the methods and mediums terrorists use continues to evolve; so does the approach. As well as taking into account the strategic factors that enable terrorism; NZ has the opportunity to work with multilateral organisations and key bilateral partners to co-ordinate our efforts, promote best practice and fulfil international obligations. Fighting terrorism cannot be done in silos; it requires a multi-layered approach; for example we are increasingly seeing links between terrorists and organised criminals (e.g. weapons and explosives proliferation).
30. Tailoring this to a New Zealand CT approach, a NZ comprehensive approach might include the following:
- **A revised CT National Strategy to replace the NCTP:** that reflects joined up structures between government departments in New Zealand, making greater use of non-CT enabling departments. There should be strong working level relations between NZ government CT departments and with their opposite departments overseas both in strategic partner countries and in countries of concern i.e. SE Asia. The plan should link and balance domestic objectives with overseas CT objectives, and preventative measures with responsive ones. New Zealand's CT legislative, executive and judicial powers need to be effective, in line with international obligations and be human rights compliant.
  - **A strong Overseas 'RISK led' CT strategy/Action Plan:** , where spend is proportionate to the risk and work streams are balanced to reduce the intent and capability of the terrorist and the vulnerability of the targets they seek to attack. Working with multilateral organisations, international partners and host governments in mainly SE Asia and the Pacific; wider work streams must also tackle the strategic factors that enable terrorists to grow.
  - **A strong contribution to Multilateral CT forums** that aim to make a more coherent global approach to countering terrorism. NZ should aim to play a full role in international security issues by contributing to building up global CT capacity on priority thematic areas Cyber, CVE, CBRN, TF and WMD and building up the capacity of host governments in countries of concern.



#### H) Indicators of success:

31. There is increased scrutiny of CT programmes and activities to ensure that they represent 'value for money' spent. Work streams that reduce the threat against NZ at home and overseas could be measured by:

- **Reduced vulnerability of targets:** Work streams include hardening of physical infrastructure, increased surveillance, reducing the vulnerability of crowded places and providing up-to-date public information on travel advice.
- **Reduction in numbers of people drawn into terrorism:** A successful strategy will seek to establish common values; empower communities and isolate extremists. It can do this indirectly through social inclusion programmes or directly by challenging the terrorists' narrative or by countering the grievances that act as drivers of radicalisation. Non-traditional CT partners should be utilised to deliver CT objectives through a range of development programmes that can act to reduce grievances and local community support for terrorist groups. The strategy should also aim to prevent terrorists operating on the internet. The internet allows terrorists to radicalise, plan and carry out attacks. Work streams should include monitoring the internet with the aim of disrupting terrorist use of it, countering ideology online and reducing its vulnerability to e.g. a cyber-attack.
- **Reduction in terrorist attack planning/attacks:** Early visibility of planning or attacks enables early disruption thus mitigating the impact. Successful disruption is dependent on effective investigations, arrests, prosecutions, deportations or detentions of terrorists in a HR compliant manner. Close co-operation between Police, Intelligence agencies and security agencies and sound legislation are key. New Zealand agencies could expand cooperation with non-CT enabling partners such as the Charities Commission in countering the financing of terrorism. .
- **Reduced impact of a terrorist attack.** Success will depend on NZ's ability to 'respond' at national and international level to a variety of attack scenarios; from conventional attacks involving IED's, to higher impact attacks involving unconventional weapons including CBRNE and Cyber-attacks. To lessen the impact New Zealand should aim to reduce its vulnerability to, and detect and defend itself from these attacks. Again non-CT enabling partners like the Red Cross could be used in improving Crisis Management response.

#### Part Four: How does NZInc CT approach compare as a comprehensive approach?

##### I) The NCTP.

32. New Zealand's National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP) since 2006, has been set around the 4 R's approach.

- Reduction of the threat, through deterrence, prevention and disruption.
- Readiness to deal with an attack to minimise consequences.
- Response post attack.
- Recovery to restore normal conditions quickly.

33. The NCTP's main aim was to put in to place the necessary CT infrastructure in which government departments and agencies could prepare plans to prevent, prepare, respond and recover from a terrorist attack. New Zealand's CT infrastructure and response procedures are now largely in place, but in practice its government departments have long outperformed the guidelines set out by the NCTP; agencies' efforts have responded to the global threat picture and international CT obligations. The newly published National Security System will help guide the long overdue revision of the NCTP later in 2012 and perhaps signal that the NCTP should be replaced by a national CT strategy. Agencies may choose to update their CT strategies in response to these new national security settings.

J) A snapshot of New Zealand's efforts to date.

34. The CT strategy: The NCTP is 6 years old. **Revising the NCTP** would allow NZ's ministries to align their strategies and work-streams for a joined up approach. Some agencies feel that **New Zealand's CT legislation may also need revising** to ensure terrorists can be successfully arrested, prosecuted and detained, in line with international obligations.
35. New Zealand agencies, notably NZDF and the intelligence community, have built up considerable CT expertise, <sup>s6(a)</sup> there is now a potential risk that these skills may fade. Consideration should be given to how best to sustain these capabilities.
36. **The NCTP** concentrates on responding to a terrorist attack, less on preventing it. In practise **ministries have a more balanced approach**, often using preventative activities and working through wider development and security programmes to deliver CT objectives.
37. Domestic focus: **New Zealand, partly due to resource limitations, tends to take a reactive CT approach domestically.**<sup>s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

Early visibility of the threat would enable the security forces early intervention, thus minimising the impact of an adverse outcome. Extra resource would be used to increase engagement with vulnerable groups <sup>s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>

38. New Zealand has good conventional attack response plans and protective security, tested by the Christchurch earthquake and Rugby World Cup. DPMC is confident that New Zealand's crisis responses are adequate but NZ is less well prepared for non-conventional attacks such

as Cyber and CRBN. **A co-ordinated approach with international partners will improve best practise but New Zealand must also have domestic capacity to identify and respond to CBRNE and cyber-attacks at home.** Better monitoring of the internet and stocks and movement of CBRNE material will help improve New Zealand's preparedness.

39. **Overseas focus:** In the Pacific and SE Asia, NZ has provided law enforcement and border control training both through ASEAN and the UN and bilaterally in Indonesia and the Philippines to harden protective security. Indonesia has also made sound progress on improving arrests and prosecutions and is now focusing on improving its capacity to prevent attacks by looking to counter ideologies and reducing the attempts of terrorist to radicalise and recruit others. MFAT is involved in some CVE work in SE Asia. In particular, **a greater New Zealand contribution to CVE and CT in Indonesia would target the evolving risk; enable New Zealand to contribute more to GCTF's CVE working group, and make a significant contribution to key security relationships (with Indonesia and core security partners).**

40. **More could be done in terms of regional programmes with strategic partners.**<sup>s6(b)(i)</sup>

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deeper involvement in CVE activity in SE Asia might be another option to explore.

41. New Zealand's role in Afghanistan will likely remain one of NZ's most significant CT contributions to the global CT effort. Post 2014, NZ intends to remain in Afghanistan through the placement of trainers at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy, potentially through the Asia Security Fund, and IDG programming.

42. New Zealand has also responded well to international obligations. It has designated 17 terrorist groups since 2010 and works well across international CT forums. New Zealand is also engaged within the AU, UNSC, EUPOL, GCTF and Cyber security networks. **There is opportunity for New Zealand in this context to carve out something more than just a supportive reactive role and increase its stakeholder profile in multilateral institutions.**

43. NZ has a key role to play in **political lobbying on key security agenda items with influential actors**<sup>s6(a)</sup> and ensuring their stake in the region is a positive contribution and does not negatively impact on the security of others.

#### K) Suggested future priorities for NZ Inc

44. The key practical 10 elements derived from above that NZ needs to focus on to ensure a comprehensive CT approach are therefore:

- 1) Aligned departmental CT strategies and work streams with a comprehensive national strategy that merges domestic and overseas CT requirements.
- 2) Interoperability between CT departments with whole of government oversight and coordination.
- 3) Emphasis on 'a risk based approach' for sound return on investment.
- 4) Preventative /Responsive balanced approach at home and overseas, e.g. on CVE increased monitoring of the internet, monitoring travel of persons of interest and CVE/counter grievance work.
- 5) Increased readiness for a CBRNE/CYBER attack.
- 6) Maintain niche capabilities e.g. In SF and intelligence post-Afghanistan.
- 7) Regional programmes with international partners.
- 8) Increased enabling of non-CT enabling partners to help achieve CT aims (e.g. Red Cross, IGD etc.)
- 9) Increased stakeholder profile in multilateral institutions.
- 10) Political lobbying on key security items with influential actors.

#### L) Suggested future priorities for MFAT

46. Having explored the evolution of MFAT's CT programming over the last 10 years, the current global threat picture and the necessary elements for an effective national response; MFAT CT engagement, in particular over the next 18 months, could realistically achieve (this is in addition to MFAT's other core responsibilities with respect to terrorism – see Annex I):

- A written MFAT CT action plan, including work-streams, by mid-2013 aligns with the National Security System and revised NCTP or new National CT Strategy.
- Increased joint working, bilaterally with Indonesia, focusing on CVE programmes and CT, and regionally with Australia on SE Asia and in the Pacific.
- Support for modest projects that add political value to the efforts of close security partners in Africa and South Asia.
- Consolidated MFAT engagement in diplomatic (foreign ministry) Five Eyes dialogue on CT and bilaterally with close security partners.
- An increased international profile in multilateral forums and discussion groups.

47. Whilst international work has made considerable progress in reducing the global threat, unfolding events in the Middle East or elsewhere could change the threat picture. MFAT's future CT approach must therefore be one that is flexible and responsive to the socio-economic and political change.

## Annex I

Core MFAT responsibilities under the NCTP:

- Provides the primary interface between the New Zealand Government, foreign governments and international agencies during a terrorist emergency. (ISED)
- Reports on political, security and counter-terrorism developments in other countries, including following an overseas terrorist attack, and how such developments affect New Zealand, New Zealand nationals, or New Zealand interests. (Post)
- Provides travel safety advice for New Zealanders travelling and/or residing overseas, including on risks arising from terrorism. (CONS)
- Has responsibility for the consular response to any major incident involving New Zealanders overseas. (CONS / Posts)
- Mobilises and deploys emergency response teams in the event they are required to travel to the site of a terrorist act, or other major overseas event affecting New Zealand nationals. (CONS)
- Facilitates New Zealand involvement in bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism. (ISED)
- Maintains security arrangements for New Zealand diplomatic missions overseas and advises on security arrangements for other government offices abroad. (SEC)
- Provides secure communication between New Zealand Diplomatic Posts and the New Zealand Government in the event of an overseas attack. (COMS)
- Ensures the legal obligations for the protection of diplomatic or consular offices and diplomatic and consular missions within New Zealand are met. (PRD)

In addition to these roles defined by the NCTP, MFAT has over-arching responsibility to:

- Ensure that New Zealand adheres to international law with respect to CT and fully implements all of the CT instruments and treaties to which New Zealand is a signatory, including relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. (ISED / LGL)

Annex IIThe Terrorism Threat PictureGCTF Plenary, June 2012, Istanbul.*Context*

1. In response to international counter-terrorism co-operation, new technology and global events, the terrorist threat is changing. The overall picture is one of a diminished but persistent threat – in part due to limiting Al Qaeda's space to operate in Pakistan and elsewhere, and in part because of the 2011 deaths of AQ's key figures; in particular Osama Bin Laden (AQ's senior leader) and Anwar Al Awlaki (Head of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQ-AP). With the removal of key figures, Al Qaida's leadership is now weaker than ever, and their inability to take advantage over the Arab Spring shows that their regimes can be overthrown without them. However the potential remains for Al Qaeda to take advantage of unfolding events in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. In 2010, over 10,000 people were killed by terrorists world-wide.
2. Whilst Al Qaida and its formal affiliates continue to dominate the global terrorist threat picture; other terrorist groups broadly supportive of it, predominate in certain countries and regions; for example Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines.
3. Radicalised individuals, some home grown, and domestic extremist groups add to the complexity of the threat picture. The most notable examples are right wing extremist, Norwegian citizen, Anders Breivik, who killed 87 people in Norway in July 2011, and American citizen, David Headley, who became radicalised in Pakistan and helped plan the Mumbai attacks in 2008, which killed 168 people.

*The threat picture*Pakistan and South Asia

4. s6(b)(i) remains the greatest strategic CT threat to western targets and AQ Core continues to plan international attacks. However recent disruptions of key senior leaders have left fewer attack planners with an external western focus but this is unlikely to last for long. In addition s6(b)(i)

Although the current threat from international terrorism in Afghanistan is relatively low, the increased vulnerability from the withdrawal of ISAF forces in 2014 make this a significant risk in the medium term.

5. The possible relocation of some elements of AQ Core to East Afghanistan and the presence of groups with international intentions such as LeT and the Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan, supported by the Haqqani network, means that the terrorist threat to the West may

increase. A strong insurgency in 2015 will mean the Afghan government and military will not be able to protect western interests, concentrating instead on their national security. A viable Afghan state sufficiently stabilised to challenge international terrorism and extremism within its borders is vital if we are to avoid an unstable Afghanistan posing a wider threat to regional and international security.

#### Middle East

6. Despite the deaths of Anwar Awlaki, AQ-AP retains its IED capabilities and intent to attack Western interests. The United States have disrupted several AQ-AP plots to bomb airliners in recent years. Strikes against AQ-AP though, have reduced its opportunities to attack outside the Arabian Peninsula but instead we have seen AQ-AP increasing its engagement with other groups such as Al Shabaab in Somalia. The threat from AQ-AP remains a concern.
7. The Middle East has changed dramatically over the last 18 months and will continue to shift over the next year. Whilst remaining conscious of the threat from AQ-AP, it is also the consequences of the Arab Spring; continued instability across the region; and deaths of senior AQ operators which increase the potential for the threat to diversify across the region. If AQ-AP is able to increase its network links with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I), AQ Kurdish Battalions (AQ KB) and Syrian jihadist cells; AQ may be able to reach into new and fertile spaces, increasing the opportunity for jihadi movement and direct state-led threats; for example, by gaining Iranian support to AQ proxies and AQ facilitation routes. AQ-I is active in Syria and may be responsible for some of the recent mass-casualty bombings there.

#### Somalia/East Africa

8. The terrorist threat in East Africa stems largely from Al-Shabaab in Somalia and associated violent extremists. Whilst Al Shabaab's agenda remains internally focused, some elements within it seek greater alignment with AQ, AQ-AP and to a lesser extent AQ-M. Somalia, as a theatre for Jihad, attracts a large number of foreign fighters,<sup>s6(a)</sup>

#### North and West Africa and the Sahel

9. Since 2010,<sup>s6(a)</sup> which have allowed them to conduct a higher number of kidnaps over a wider geographical area. <sup>s6(b)(1)</sup>

Elements within Boko Haram and its emerging splinter groups have embraced AQ's narrative and over the last 18 months have successfully attacked a number of government and Western targets. Targets included the UN building in Abuja – bombed in August 2011 with 35 fatalities. AQ-M has also exploited the security vacuum created by the Arab Spring and procured weapons and foreign fighters from Libya.

10. Political upheaval in Libya and Tunisia and the reduced capacity of their security forces suggest that AQ-M may extend its reach there, as well as further into West Africa. AQ-M will remain on this trajectory as long as ransoms are paid, the region is unable to co-ordinate its CT efforts, and as long as AQ-M's safe haven exists in Mali. With the March 2012 coup in Mali ousting President Toure, AQ-M may be able to take further advantage of instability there. Nigeria is cooperating well with international partners to tackle Boko Haram and its splinter groups but wider political/social grievances require a comprehensive CT approach, if this group is to be successfully disrupted and local support for it reduced. On the positive side, s6(b)(i)

#### South East Asia

11. Although terrorist groups in South East Asia present a significantly lower threat to western interests than in other regions, groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf remain a significant concern for New Zealand. New Zealanders were killed in the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings.

12. Since 2002, Indonesia has dramatically increased its CT capability and has dealt a series of blows to JI. Most senior JI leaders and those responsible for high profile attacks are either dead or in prison. Indonesia's success can partly be attributed to support provided by foreign partners.

13. s6(b)(i)

. Although Indonesian terrorist groups have shifted their main focus towards Indonesian government targets, extremist leaders continue to preach the desirability of violent jihad against the west and that western civilians remain legitimate targets. If radicalisation of vulnerable groups – a growing problem – continues to persist, likelihood of attacks being carried out in Indonesia may increase.

#### New Zealand

14. While Islamist terrorism remains the greatest threat to Western interests worldwide, New Zealand's interests are affected directly and indirectly by terrorism in all parts of the world. However a direct terrorist attack from AQ against New Zealand assets domestically or overseas is very unlikely; this includes from AQ affiliates, associated groups, non-associated groups and individuals acting on their own. The perceived "soft" environment in New Zealand could be attractive as a location for terrorism-related activity or as a staging ground for terrorist attacks in a third country. This is a concern. Should an attack or activity be traced back to New Zealand, New Zealand's reputation as a safe environment would be tested.

15. The greatest risk to New Zealand domestically may come from non-Islamist extremists or self-radicalised individuals. Agencies are also mindful of individuals seeking and receiving training from Islamist terrorist groups whilst overseas, and returning to New Zealand. With



limited resources at their disposal, agencies note that vigilance is required to provide assurance that undetected threats do not transpire into events that leave little time for an effective response.

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# New Zealand engagement strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism in South East Asia 2018-2022

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| <p><b>Success statement</b></p>  | <p>New Zealand's contributions reduce the risk of South East Asia being a target or source of terrorism</p>  |
| <p>Judgements and risks</p>  | <p>Countries in South East Asia have experienced major terrorist incidents, and the risk of further attacks remains – including those inspired by Da'esh</p> <p>New Zealand's equities in South East Asia are increasing, and accordingly so is our exposure to this risk</p> <p>Terrorist activity is a destabilising influence the region, which is a threat to the communities of some of our closest partners</p> <p>The return or relocation of even a small number of experienced and committed fighters from Iraq and Syria may increase the capabilities and prestige of local groups</p> <p>The most acute terrorist risk for New Zealand in South East Asia is New Zealanders being caught up in a specific terrorist incident</p> <p>s6(a)</p> <p>s6(a)</p> <p>s9(2)(g)(i)</p> <p>New Zealand has the ability to make a meaningful impact in countering terrorism in the region, and there are expectations we will play a lead role</p>  |
| <p>Objectives</p>  | <p>The risk terrorist acts pose to <b>New Zealanders and NZ critical interests</b> in the region is mitigated</p> <p>NZ is <b>adept at responding</b> to terrorism risks in the region</p> <p>Countries of the region become <b>less susceptible to terrorism and violent extremism</b>, through holistic and well-coordinated approaches</p> <p>Outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New Zealanders living and travelling in the region are not the victim of terrorism</li> <li>Trade and business interests are not impacted by terrorist acts in the region</li> <li>Events in the region do not have a direct negative impact on NZ's domestic terrorism threat rating</li> <li>NZ understands the drivers of terrorism in the region, trends, and policy and operational responses</li> <li>NZ is a trusted and valued partner; effective government relationships support a collective CT response</li> <li>NZ's CT capability is expanded alongside that of our South East Asian partners, through capacity building and joint operations</li> <li>Regional partners take an increasingly strategic, all-of-government and transnational approach to counter-terrorism</li> <li>NZ engagement supports the building of well-integrated, resilient communities</li> <li>Regional frameworks are made more robust and effective through NZ engagement and contributions</li> <li>International rule of law is enhanced, and emphasis placed on adherence to human rights standards</li> </ul> |
| <p>Activity streams ('4Rs')</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Priority regional partners</li> <li>Cooperation with external partners</li> <li>Multilateral/regional/track II</li> </ul> <p>s6(a)</p> <p>Modes of engagement</p> | <p>To enhance our impact we will ensure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New Zealand's footprint in the region facilitates optimum levels of interaction, information-sharing and action (reduction; readiness)</li> <li>Credible and valuable participation in relevant regional/multilateral fora to ensure New Zealand is engaged, aware and adds value (reduction; readiness)</li> <li>Target engagement in regional bodies to 'showcase' niche New Zealand expertise and values-based approaches (readiness)</li> </ul> <p>Working closely with international partners we will strengthen our efforts to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Build capacity of partner governments to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks (readiness; response; recovery)</li> <li>Support awareness and capability of partner governments and civil society to build resilient communities and counter the root causes of violent extremism (reduction; recovery)</li> <li>Help invigorate mechanisms that promote coherence and coordination of CT policy and practice across the region (reduction; readiness)</li> </ul>  |

# New Zealand engagement strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism in South East Asia 2018-2022

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## Executive summary

New Zealand is more integrated with and reliant on the countries of South East Asia than ever before. The region s6(a) is one in which New Zealanders have come to harm through terrorist activity in recent decades.

This strategy seeks to provide a blueprint to ensure New Zealand's engagement in the region is appropriately calibrated to the risk posed by terrorism and violent extremism, to ensure we are supporting the countries of the region to counter the threats they face, and to maximise the effectiveness with which we work with close partners, inter-governmental and non-governmental mechanisms to do so.

The strategy highlights that in order to have a meaningful impact on reducing the risk of South East Asia being a target or source of terrorism, New Zealand engagement in the region should be more co-ordinated and systematised, better resourced and more carefully targeted.

Priority areas of focus include:

- actions to strengthen security relationships with key partners s6(a) s6(a) to help prevent and respond to terrorist attacks;
- support for addressing the root causes of violent extremism, including through integrated law enforcement, non-government and community-level engagement; and
- strengthening the effectiveness of sub-regional, regional and multilateral initiatives to promote coordination and coherence.

Enhancing New Zealand's engagement to counter terrorism and violent extremism in the region provides a tangible opportunity for ex-ante investment by the New Zealand Government in the mitigation of security threats which, if not addressed, have the potential to pose considerable costs down the track.

## Context and problem definition

1 Terrorism is a tactic employed by individuals or groups, involving the unlawful use of violence and intimidation by those seeking to impose their ideology or advance political aims. Terrorism challenges government authority, and, by jeopardising peace and security, economic activity. Countering terrorism is complicated, and therefore demands a multifaceted global effort, in which New Zealand must continue to play a part.

2 Violent extremism can be described as the use of violent, coercive means in opposition to a society's fundamental values, which could include democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, as well as the tolerance of different faiths, lifestyle choices and beliefs.

3 New Zealand is a strong proponent of a holistic approach to countering these phenomena. This starts with building resilient and cohesive communities, to address the root causes of violent extremism, such as a sense of grievance brought about by an interaction of factors such as social marginalisation, historical grievance and economic

deprivation. It stretches to the use of law enforcement or defence resources to deter and disrupt terrorist acts.

4 New Zealand's 'all hazards – all risks' approach to national security encompasses social, law enforcement and military elements. The framework for considering policy options is known as the '4Rs', encompassing:

REDUCTION: identifying and analysing long-term risks and taking steps to eliminate these risks if practicable, or if not, to reduce their likelihood and the magnitude of their impact;

READINESS: developing systems and capabilities before an emergency happens;

RESPONSE: taking action immediately before, during or directly after a significant event; and

RECOVERY: using coordinated efforts and processes to bring about immediate, medium-term, and long-term regeneration.

5 South East Asia is the most proximate region to New Zealand posing a persistent terrorist threat. The emergence of Da'esh in 2014 served to invigorate a number of South East Asian threat groups (some of which switched allegiance from al-Qaeda). The five-month occupation in 2017 of Marawi city in the Philippines by Da'esh-affiliated insurgents heightened focus on the threat of violent extremism s6(a)

s6(a) in the regions. The May 2018 terrorist attacks in Indonesia were a further stark reminder of the capability and intent of some local extremist groups with global Islamist links.

6 s6(a)

### Judgements and risks

7 New Zealand seeks to maintain a dynamic understanding of regional terrorism trends and responses. The strategy does not contain a detailed assessment of this changing picture, but should be considered in the context of the latest relevant assessment products s6(a)

8 A number of key observations nonetheless underpin the strategy.

- Countries in South East Asia have experienced major terrorist incidents, and the risk of further attacks remains – including those inspired by Da'esh.

Attacks in the countries of South East Asia have caused direct harm to New Zealanders in recent decades. While counter-terrorism efforts have reduced the probability of a significant terrorist event, most threat groups maintain the intent to do harm. Alignment with Da'esh is the greatest risk currently, but the presence of groups associated with al-Qaeda represents a considerable latent risk, and the possibility of lone-actor attackers operating independently cannot be overlooked.

- New Zealand's equities in South East Asia are increasing, and accordingly so is our exposure to this risk.

We are becoming more integrated with the countries of the region in terms of trade and economic activity, people, transport and communications linkages, engagement in regional architecture and the sense of shared endeavour – and this trend is set to continue. More than ever before what happens in South East Asia is of consequence to New Zealand. Terrorist attacks, and the responses they produce, have the potential to destabilise links with the region (which represent key national security interests), and the possible disruption to economic activity in a region containing some of our most important trading partners represents a real risk. As a member of the international community, New Zealand also carries moral and legal obligations to support collective efforts to address this risk.

- Terrorist activity is a destabilising influence in the region, which is a threat to the communities of some of our closest partners.

The detrimental impact terrorism can have on the communities of some of our South East Asian partners is of genuine concern to New Zealand. Terrorism challenges government authority, and, by jeopardising peace and security, economic activity and the prospects of individuals in a society to thrive. Additionally, terrorist groups utilise and expand regional networks used for transnational organised crime. s6(a)

s6(a)

- The return or relocation of even a small number of experienced and committed fighters from Iraq and Syria may increase the capabilities and prestige of local groups.

This includes those who may have become disillusioned with the philosophy or practices of Da'esh in its self-proclaimed caliphate, and who may be attracted to other groups' causes (e.g. al-Qa'eda). In addition to those relocating or returning, South East Asian extremists may look to join conflicts nearer to home, as participating in the conflict in Syria and Iraq no longer remains an option. Some may also become disillusioned with violent extremism in general, and could be valuable for domestic counter-radicalisation narratives.

- The most acute terrorist threat for New Zealand in South East Asia is New Zealanders being caught up in a specific terrorist event.

Over 200,000 New Zealand residents travel to countries in South-east Asia annually, while many more undertake extended stays. Groups may seek to attack both host-nation government and Western targets. The taking of Western hostages remains a risk, s6(a)

s6(a)

- The presence of radicalised groups in South East Asia has the potential to create opportunities for radicalisation of New Zealanders.

s6(a)

- s6(a)

A number of South East Asian governments have stepped up counter-terrorism activities and networks, including the development of specialised counter-terrorism policy and agencies. s6(a)

s6(a)

- New Zealand has the ability to make a meaningful impact in countering terrorism in the region, s6(a)

Given the confluence of interests outlined above, it is fitting that New Zealand should seek to make a substantive, influential contribution to addressing the terrorist threat in South East Asia. s6(a)

But having a meaningful impact will require New Zealand to allocate greater effort and resource to this end.

### Drivers

9 When engaging internationally, New Zealand's counter-terrorism/CVE effort is driven by a desire to:

- contribute to the **national security** of New Zealand, including through the protection of New Zealanders and New Zealand interests at home and abroad;
- contribute to **international stability** and uphold moral and legal obligations, including support for the international rules-based system and rule of law;
- enhance New Zealand's **understanding, capability and expertise** in responding to terrorism;
- ensure New Zealand's **policy interests** are appropriately aligned with international policy and practice; and
- support **foreign relationships**, including advancing and strengthening bilateral links and underscoring New Zealand's reputation as a trusted and valued contributor to international efforts.

10 The success of New Zealand's counter-terrorism engagement in the region will be judged on whether our contributions have a meaningful impact on **reducing the risk of South East Asia being a target or source of terrorism.**

11 Accordingly, this strategy is organised around three main objectives, each seeking a number of specific outcomes, as follows:

*The risk terrorist acts pose to New Zealanders and New Zealand critical interests in the region is mitigated*

12 The desire to protect New Zealand citizens and critical national interests is a central national security driver. ASEAN countries are important trading partners for New Zealand, representing our fourth-largest trading bloc on two-way trade, with a high potential for growth. While it is necessary to recognise that, for the most part, events in the region are largely out of New Zealand's control, it is critical that our targeted interventions are aimed at limiting the potential for direct harm New Zealanders and our linkages with the region.

13 Outcomes sought:

- New Zealanders living and travelling in the region are not the victim of terrorism.

- Trade and business interests are not impacted by terrorist acts in the region.
- Events in the region do not have a direct negative impact on New Zealand's domestic terrorism threat rating.

*New Zealand is adept at responding to terrorism risks in the region*

14 Through engaging internationally, we support our partners and assist with the development of their capacity to counter terrorism more effectively, while also enhancing New Zealand's own ability to deal with terrorist threats. This includes increasing our understanding and ability to track the complex factors behind violent extremist incidents, by deepening our networks, relationships and involvement in cooperative mechanisms in the region. By engaging in capacity-building activities with partners, New Zealand agencies are also able to test and develop their operational expertise.

15 Outcomes sought:

- New Zealand understands the drivers of terrorism in the region, trends and policy responses.
- New Zealand is a trusted and valued partner; effective government relationships support a collective counter-terrorism response.
- New Zealand's counter-terrorism capability is expanded alongside that of our South East Asian partners, through capacity building s6(a)

*Countries of the region become less susceptible to terrorism and violent extremism, through implementation of holistic and well-coordinated approaches*

16 We would like to see the communities of our close partners enjoy the same potential to thrive that is commonplace in New Zealand. In line with New Zealand's holistic view on countering terrorism, there is scope for targeted interventions to help regional governments address the drivers of violent extremism, reduce the ability of groups to recruit to their cause and thereby mitigate the potentially devastating impact of terrorism on society.

17 Doing so requires an integrated, cohesive approach that sees cooperation between law enforcement, intelligence, border security agencies and military, both within and between countries of the region. It is important that our engagement models this type of approach, drawing on the 'NZ Inc' paradigm.

18 New Zealand enjoys the privilege of membership across the spectrum of ASEAN-centric architecture, and we must take the opportunity of this engagement to support the development of effective cross- and sub-regional coordinating mechanisms that enable a collective response to the terrorist threat. Regional fora also offer platforms for New Zealand to emphasise values that are important to us, which includes the strengthening of frameworks to support international legal obligations and human rights norms.

19 Supporting a holistic approach also means recognising the role non-governmental actors have to play in building social cohesion, educating communities in the values of tolerance and inclusiveness and promoting related issues such as those with a particular impact on women and youth.

## 20 Outcomes sought:

- s6(a)
- New Zealand engagement supports the building of well-integrated, resilient communities.
- Regional frameworks are made more robust and effective through NZ engagement and contributions.
- International rule of law is enhanced, and emphasis placed on adherence to human rights standards in the region.

**Activity streams**

21 New Zealand's influence is impacted by our small size, modest resources and low domestic terrorist threat level. Our counter-terrorism engagement is therefore deliberately targeted to achieve maximum impact, with a focus on identifying areas where we can contribute 'multipliers' that enhance partner capability. In practical terms this also means operating through existing frameworks and cooperative mechanisms where possible, avoiding duplication, and working with partners to (re-)energise coherent, collective approaches where structures are currently lacking.

*Modes of engagement*

22 The following channels provide an organising basis for considering New Zealand's enhanced counter-terrorism engagement in South East Asia.

- Bilateral engagement with key South East Asian counter-terrorism partners.
  - **Indonesia** is a key partner for New Zealand in addressing the regional terrorism threat, and the country where most New Zealanders have been affected by terrorist attacks. s6(a)
  - **Malaysia** is a long-standing and reliable partner in the region, with an established counter-terrorism capability and commitment to engaging with partners such as New Zealand. It is a priority country for deepening our security relationship (including through the Five Power Defence arrangements), and is invested in region-wide counter-terrorism coherence. s6(a)  
s6(a)
  - **Singapore** is a key partner on all security issues, including through the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It is an established regional player with an insightful understanding of regional dynamics, has a high capability and resource, and is a valuable conduit into other parts of the region. s6(a)



s6(a)

- We have significant interests in minimising the impact of the 2017 Marawi conflict in the southern **Philippines** on regional stability. New Zealand needs to contribute to regional efforts to manage the aftermath of this conflict, recognising the complex coalescence of ethno-nationalist and Da'esh-linked drivers which led to the siege. s6(a)  
s6(a)

There is potential for capacity building under the Defence Force-led Philippines/New Zealand Mutual Assistance Programme, which is under consideration. New Zealand's aid programme in the Philippines has a growing focus on Mindanao. Its development goals complement New Zealand's broader counter-terrorism objectives and support for the Bangsamoro peace process.

- Recognising differing national contexts, in particular the current absence of international violent jihadist ideology as a driving factor, New Zealand has an interest in ensuring **Thailand and Myanmar** do not present additional threats to regional stability. Southern Thailand's ethno-nationalist insurgency remains a security risk, and Thailand sits at the nexus between transnational organised crime, irregular migration and terrorism. s6(a)

Conditions in Myanmar's Rakhine state (and neighbouring Bangladesh) s6(a) and a careful watching brief is warranted (in addition to humanitarian support in line with international best practice). s6(a)

- Working with traditional security partners in the region.

s6(a) Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States all have interests and play a substantive role in South East Asia. Others, such as Japan and the EU may seek to work with New Zealand to deepen their engagement in future – but possible opportunities for interaction are yet to be tested in detail. It is important for us to understand our partners' capabilities and current contributions so we can leverage our respective efforts, and, ideally, serve as a multiplier to one another's contributions.

- Enhancing regional counter-terrorism frameworks.

Within the regional architecture, a number of groupings and initiatives engage on counter-terrorism issues and activities. New Zealand can work closely with partners s6(a) s6(a) to encourage greater coordination and focus. New Zealand can also work with those non-governmental and track II organisations with a proven record of consistent and fair messaging that is received by wide and varied audiences, and which, therefore, have the potential to support effective community-building and education, as well as promote coherent policy and practice by governments in the region.

- Focusing multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives in the region.

New Zealand is actively engaged in a range of multilateral counter-terrorism fora. These offer considerable resources to support global counter-terrorism activities. It is in New Zealand's interests that these efforts are appropriately oriented towards the terrorist

threat in South East Asia, and that New Zealand's involvement is directed in part to achieving this.

23 With reference to the '4Rs' approach to counter-terrorism policy, there is merit in New Zealand considering future interventions across the spectrum from preparedness, to operational responses, to recovery. This will enable us to support partners taking a comprehensive, holistic approach to countering the terrorist risk in the region, including by targeting its root causes.

*Priority interventions*

24 To achieve the objectives in this strategy the following priority interventions are proposed, each focused on one of more elements of the '4Rs'.

25 New Zealand can undertake the following independently, in order to enhance our impact:

- ***Ensure New Zealand's footprint in the region facilitates optimum levels of interaction, information-sharing and action (reduction; readiness).***

As direct contact is fundamental to building effective government-government collaboration, the NZ Inc footprint in South East Asia is a critical enabler for delivering on our counter-terrorism objectives in the region. The main regional hub for agencies other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is Jakarta, though active cross-accreditations are utilised. s9(2)(g)(i)

- ***Credible and valuable participation in relevant regional/multilateral fora to ensure New Zealand is engaged, aware and adds value (reduction; readiness).***

In order for our interventions to have impact, New Zealand must be recognised as a relevant player and useful partner in the region. At its most simple, this means ensuring a credible level of contribution within all regional groupings addressing the issues in question in order to build trust with partners in the region, s9(2)(g)(i)

In addition, a sound level of attendance at expert-level meetings in South East Asia will help ensure New Zealand retains a high level of understanding of the trends, drivers, opportunities and challenges countries face, and will support development of effective working relationships. s6(a)

- ***Target engagement in regional bodies to 'showcase' niche New Zealand expertise and values-based approaches (readiness).***

By taking a proactive approach to our engagement in regional fora, on a targeted basis, New Zealand has the chance to encourage the sharing of expertise more broadly than is possible through bilateral initiatives alone. We can also take these opportunities to emphasise adherence to accepted human rights norms. Platforms could include cross-, sub-regional and multilateral initiatives focused on South East Asia.

26 Working closely with international partners we will strengthen our efforts to:

- ***Build capacity of partner governments to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks (readiness; response).***

We will continue to identify targeted initiatives to use New Zealand expertise to help build the capacity of South East Asian partner governments, enabling them ensure effective law-enforcement led approaches to countering terrorism (while recognising the limits of New Zealand's ability to influence outcomes). Capacity-building activity will also serve to deepen our key agency relationships with countries in the region, in order both to enhance our understanding of threats and ensure that we are able to cooperate most effectively at the policy and operational levels. Adequate funding is critical to enable agencies to engage in capacity-building activities.

- ***Support awareness and capability of partner governments and civil society to build resilient communities and counter the root causes of violent extremism (readiness; reduction; recovery).***

New Zealand would like to see the countries of South East Asia able to respond to and counter the terrorist threat in a comprehensive way. As such, New Zealand embraces efforts both to prevent and counter the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, including addressing drivers such as political, economic or social grievance, fostering positive alternatives for those who are most at risk of radicalisation and countering destructive narratives that can incite violence. We also recognise the importance of including a focus on issues of particular relevance to women, families and youth. New Zealand is able to draw on its well-respected 'prevention first' policing model and high levels of social cohesion, and further thought should also be given to the involvement of non-government actors that can play a valuable role in building tolerant communities. Adequate funding is critical to enable agencies and organisations to engage in CVE-related activities. In this context it is worth noting that, while financing for CVE activities is generally excluded from official development assistance, recently updated OECD DAC guidance outlines a range of CVE activities which are reportable as ODA, as long as they are led by partner countries and their primary purpose is developmental (e.g. education, working with civil society and support for rule of law). This may provide greater scope to consider support for eligible CVE projects from ODA allocations in the future.

- ***Help invigorate mechanisms that promote coherence and coordination of CT policy and practice across the region (reduction; readiness).***

Recognising the trans-regional nature of the terrorist threat, we will seek to promote greater cooperation, consistency and coherence of responses across the region. In our engagement New Zealand will seek to model and encourage cross-government coordination and a holistic approach. We will coordinate with other partner governments, multilateral bodies and funds to ensure our respective interventions are streamlined and complementary, and consider the potential for further track II/1.5 initiatives to support and extend more formal work streams.

27 In line with this strategy's objectives, agencies will review the **funding** available to support targeted CT/CVE projects in the region <sup>s9(2)(g)(i)</sup>  
s9(2)(g)(i)

A number of agencies have requested greater scope to consider 'programme style' funding options, including multi-year funding for tried and tested initiatives where these

are currently considered on an annual basis. New or enhanced engagement in the region may require additional funding or the reprioritisation of resources.

### **Implementation and review**

28 The term of this strategy is intended to run through fiscal years 2018-2022. As an all-of-government strategy, ownership is joint, and responsibility for delivery lies with agencies that comprise the New Zealand security sector, working as appropriate in conjunction with relevant social agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade will oversee implementation and review of the strategy's effectiveness against the objectives and outcomes set.

29 Appendix I details an initial plan of action for implementing the strategy in 2018-2019, through the framework of priority interventions outlined in the preceding section. Lead agencies are assigned to key interventions, and the action plan highlights resourcing implications which will be considered in the context of budget estimates for this financial year.

30 An interim stocktake of the action plan will be undertaken by relevant agencies in June 2019, to refresh the plan based on an updated assessment of regional dynamics and testing of progress with implementation, as well as the feasibility, opportunity and risk associated with potential future actions.

31 A mid-term review of the strategy will be undertaken by June 2020, to assess progress and provide data and inputs to the action plan for the following two fiscal years, in order to ensure delivery of the strategy to best effect. This review should involve reflection on what has been achieved against the original objectives and the lessons that have been learnt for the future.

32 A formal evaluation of the strategy's effectiveness should be undertaken in 2022. The exact type and methodology of the evaluation will be determined following the mid-term review.

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ANNEX I – ACTION PLAN

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ANNEX III – ASSESSMENT

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