



23 May 2022

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

3 June 2022

Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2022

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To brief you on the Ministry's approach to development of its Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2022 and to share the summary of a draft set of global megatrends.

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Raylene Liufalani	Divisional Manager	Strategy and Performance Division	s9(2)(a)
Peter Zwart	Unit Manager Strategic Policy	Strategy and Performance Division	s9(2)(a)
Vickie Saunders	Lead Adviser	Strategy and Performance Division	s9(2)(a)

Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2022

Pito matua – Key points

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has commenced work on its 2022 Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment (the Assessment), a three-yearly analysis of shifts in Aotearoa New Zealand's strategic environment and their implications for our foreign policy.
- The Assessment will look out to 2035. It will inform a planned review of the Ministry's Strategic Framework in 2023, provide a reference for other Government agencies and support engagement with key international partners.
- As a first step officials have identified a set of global megatrends shaping the international context (refer Annex I for a summary). These foreshadow a world where our long-held assumptions about global and regional affairs will be further disrupted, where strategic uncertainty will be heightened, where progress will be more difficult, and risks increased. A copy of the full document is available if of interest.
- On completion of the megatrends, focus will shift to the Strategic Assessment itself, which will articulate our strategic context to 2035 and its implications for Aotearoa New Zealand, our foreign policy, and the Ministry.
- Officials plan tailored consultation with other agencies, Māori, academia, civil society, business, and other interested New Zealanders to ensure the Assessment is robust and incorporates tirohanga Māori.
- While the Assessment will be an internal document and classified at Restricted level, officials propose to publish an unclassified summary.
- Officials will continue to keep you updated as the Assessment is developed. We are available to provide an in-person briefing if of interest.

Ben King
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2022

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|--|-----------------|
| 1 | Note the Ministry has commenced work on a Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment (the Assessment) which will be delivered in late 2022 and will encapsulate the Ministry's view of Aotearoa New Zealand's strategic context and the implications for our foreign policy to 2035. | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note the Ministry will be consulting widely with other government agencies, Māori, academia and the public as we develop the Assessment; | Yes / No |
| 3 | Note that the Ministry will keep you informed of progress and as we consider foreign policy implications. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

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Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2022

Pūrongo – Report

Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2035

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has commenced work on Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2035 (the Assessment), a three-yearly analysis of shifts in Aotearoa New Zealand's strategic environment and their implications for our foreign policy. The last such assessment was produced in December 2019.¹ The Ministry also produced two smaller interim assessments, including last year's *Toward Greater Resilience*, which factored in COVID-19 disruptions and identified a foreign policy considerations over a shorter, 12-24 month, horizon.
2. The Assessment is due to be completed in late 2022. It will inform a review of the Ministry's Strategic Framework in 2023, provide a useful reference for the internationally-facing work of Government agencies and support ongoing engagement with key international partners.
3. While the Assessment will be classified at "Restricted" level, officials propose to publish an unclassified summary to support public engagement and discussion on Aotearoa New Zealand's approach to international affairs.
4. The time horizon for the Assessment will be out to 2035.

Progress to date

5. Officials are nearing completion of the first stage of the Assessment during which we have identified key global megatrends that we expect will shape the international context in the period ahead. These megatrends will inform an articulation of Aotearoa New Zealand's strategic context to 2035 and its implications for Aotearoa New Zealand, our foreign policy, and the Ministry.
6. The draft global megatrends are summarised in Annex I and available in full if of interest. They foreshadow a world where our long-held assumptions about global and regional affairs will be further disrupted, where strategic uncertainty will be heightened, where progress will be more difficult, and risks increased.

Consultation

7. The Assessment is one of the more important documents the Ministry produces, in that it is a touchstone and central reference point for so much of the Ministry's work. Consultation with other agencies, Māori, academia, civil society, business and other interested New Zealanders will be important to ensure that it is sufficiently comprehensive, robust, accessible and accepted.
8. A tailored consultation processes for the following groups is planned:

¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2019), *Building Our Future in a Disordered World: New Zealand Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2020-2030*.

Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2022

- 8.1. Government agencies – direct consultation on our analysis and draft documents at working level and via a Tier 2 Consultation Group;
 - 8.2. The general public – a web-based invitation for submissions promoted through MFAT networks which provides an avenue for input by interested parties and the public on a set of broad questions relevant to the Assessment analysis;
 - 8.3. Academia/civil society/business – targeted fora and discussions with key interested parties in which we would share some of our assessment.
9. In order to ensure a tangible tirohanga Māori, officials propose a specific consultation with Māori aiming to ensure that the Assessment articulates and responds to Māori perspectives, values and interests. Officials intend to engage with a group of individuals – identified for their deep understanding of both te ao Māori and the international arena – at three points:
- 9.1. Initially, to share the purpose and approach to the Assessment and to pose and discuss a set of broad questions relevant to Aotearoa New Zealand's strategic context and a tirohanga Māori;
 - 9.2. During analysis – to share and discuss broad assessment themes and proposed directions;
 - 9.3. On completion – to discuss the final Assessment including how it reflects a tirohanga Māori and share the draft Summary.
10. This approach will also establish a good foundation for more substantive engagement with Māori when the Ministry comes to review its Strategic Framework (due for completion in early 2023).

Next steps

11. Following this submission, officials will be proceeding with the following steps:
- 11.1. Sharing a full draft of the megatrends analysis within the Ministry and with working level contacts in relevant Government agencies for feedback (May);
 - 11.2. Initiating the consultation processes outlined above (May/June);
 - 11.3. Preparing an initial draft of Aotearoa New Zealand's strategic context (July);
 - 11.4. Identifying key implications of the megatrends and strategic context for Aotearoa New Zealand's foreign policy (September).
12. Officials will keep you updated as the Assessment develops and are available to provide an in-person briefing on this work should that be of interest.

Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2022

Annex 1: Draft Global Megatrends - Summary

Ecological changes are forming a less hospitable world

In the Anthropocene, human-mediated environmental changes will continue to create a world that is progressively less hospitable for people, plants and animals. Industrialisation, urbanisation and natural resource exploitation in particular, have created an environment that brings near-term unprecedented risks related to climate change; deteriorating ocean health; habitat loss; species loss; human health threats; and water, food and energy insecurity – all with geopolitical and foreign policy corollaries.

Disunited nations will see increased resort to power in shaping international affairs

The fractures in ^{s9(2)(g)(i)} the rules-based international order will probably continue to deepen due to a lack of collective vision and ambition; reduced political will to drive outcomes, ^{s6(a)}; a more transactional approach to multilateral issues from a greater range of players; and a more narrowly focused national interest agenda, resulting in reduced willingness to cooperate, compromise ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}. Even a global pandemic was barely able to shift the dial. Russia's invasion of Ukraine may, however, prove a watershed moment, as ^{s6(a)} states rally to isolate ^{s9(2)(g)(i)} Russia.

^{s9(2)(g)(i), s6(a)}

Shifting priorities and paradigms are reshaping trade, aid and economic power

Amidst sustained populist nationalism and anti-globalisation sentiment, the strength of the multilateral trading system and liberal economic norms that have provided the backbone of international trade and global economic growth for over 30 years are waning. When these drivers are considered in combination with drivers to re-shore or "friend-shore" strategic industries, the trends of further multilateral trade liberalisation and more globalisation may stall ^{s9(2)(g)(i)} unless trade can address a wider social and environmental agenda. At the same time, multinational corporations and Big Tech will be increasingly influential and seek to flex more of the economic muscles they are developing. Overall, weakening multilateral norms will impact how countries trade, how they provide and receive development assistance, and even what economic power looks like.

Development outcomes are spurring economic growth and expectations

Development has reduced global poverty and created more educated and healthier populaces than ever before. Nevertheless, aid targets are consistently missed, and a confluence of fragility, conflict and climate change effects mean that progress from here will be harder – and COVID has both set back and exacerbated all development challenges. Youth bulges and technological displacement will intensify under-employment and associated social issues in low and middle income countries and, with human labour diminishing as a driver of economic

Foreign Policy Strategic Assessment 2022

growth, challenges may be amplified. Growth in the global middle class will heighten expectations of governments and, in some ^{s6(a)} states, people and power friction may be a force for change.

Internally-divided countries and a post-truth world are generating dangerous dynamics with international consequences

Social and political institutions in many ^{s6(a)} democracies have been battered in the wake of concerted efforts by politicians and non-state actors to drive and leverage polarisation in societies for political and economic purposes. International cooperation becomes more difficult as domestic politics consume leaders, and ennui, discontent and protest is exploited by ^{s6(a), s9(2)(g)} for geopolitical purposes. Truth is harder to find as disinformation and misinformation abound to blur any kind of common reference point for 'truth.' But there are some bright spots as citizens demand their governments do better on climate change.

Militarisation, technological advances and weaponisation of frontier spaces are redefining the battlespace² and changing the character of conflict

Geopolitical challenges are fuelling activity at odds with international disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; stimulating widespread militarisation and a global arms race, which is extending to space, cyberspace and polar regions. At the same time, military technological advances are changing what militaries will look like in the future and how they will deliver their effects. The Russia-Ukraine crisis will probably impact progress on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control regimes.

The rise and rise of "black box"³ technology is generating both opportunity and poorly understood risk

Technological advances will grow in their ability to save lives, improve the quality of life and allow more sustainable lives. But there is a set of transformative technologies that pose risk and opportunity to the international community. These technologies have characteristics in common: developments are outpacing the ability of governments to understand and regulate them; significant ethical questions remain; it is difficult to fully predict the second and third order effects; they hold potential for powerful constructive or malign use; there is no coherent international framework to govern their development and application; benefits may generate greater inequality; and, in many cases, it is non-state actors rather than states that seem to hold the power.

² The area of air, sea, and land that is directly involved in war, often taken to include any technological, environmental, infrastructural, or temporal factors which may be relevant to the success of a mission.

³ That is, new technologies that are poorly regulated, especially at the international level, and which have unclear but likely significant second and third order effects.



23 May 2022

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

30 May 2022

Australian Federal Election 2022 – strategic priorities for engagement with the Albanese Government

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To report on the anticipated impacts of the newly elected Australian Labor Party Government for Aotearoa New Zealand, and to set out proposed strategic priorities to guide bilateral engagement with the incoming government.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of State for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Climate Change	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control	For information by	30 May 2022
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs	For information by	30 May 2022
Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Minister for Trade and Export Growth	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for National Security and Intelligence	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Finance	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Corrections	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Research, Science and Innovation	For information by	30 May 2022

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakāi – Minister's Office to complete

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Noted | <input type="checkbox"/> Referred |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment | <input type="checkbox"/> Declined | <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events | <input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes | |

Comments

Australian Federal Election 2022

Minister for COVID-19 Response	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Health	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister Responsible for the GCSB	For information by	30 May 2022
Attorney-General	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for the Environment	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for Oceans and Fisheries	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Police	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Agriculture	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for Biosecurity	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for Economic and Regional Development	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Immigration	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Tourism	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Justice	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Defence	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for Women	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister of Commerce and Consumer Affairs	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for Digital Economy and Communications	For information by	30 May 2022
Minister for Pacific Peoples	For information by	30 May 2022

Taihiopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Dawn Bennet	Divisional Manager	Australia Division	s9(2)(a)
Ken Ryan	Unit Manager	Australia Division	

Australian Federal Election 2022

Pito matua – Key points

- The Australian Labor Party led by Anthony Albanese has won the Australian Federal election 2022. While the exact pathway to government formation is not yet certain, s6(a)

while sending climate change up the order of priority for Australian political discourse.

s6(a)

- s6(a), there may be meaningful opportunities for the bilateral relationship s6(a), coming at a time when the reopening of trans-Tasman travel allows us to refresh our engagement with our closest international partner. As detailed in separate advice, due to a confluence of events including the 40th anniversary of CER next year, we have an opportunity in 2023 to bring to the attention of both the Australian and New Zealand public and government systems the immense value of the relationship to both sides and to **set new ambition** for how we move forward as partners on the international stage.

- s6(a)

- These opportunities provide all the more reason to reinvest in the bilateral relationship architecture that has served us well, and to reaffirm or re-establish strong, productive relationships across the Tasman at all levels s6(a)

. Across our bilateral, regional and global agendas, we want to highlight that there is strength when we come together as partners while embracing our diversity (kotahitanga).

Australian Federal Election 2022

- Other strategic policy priorities to pursue in our engagement with the new Government include:
s6(a)

Rob Taylor
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

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Australian Federal Election 2022

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|---|-----------------|
| 1 | Note that the Labor election victory in Australia ^{s6(a)} | Yes / No |
| 2 | Note that these changes, as we emerge from the pandemic into a less stable geostrategic environment, may present opportunities to refresh engagement with our closest international partner and set new ambition for the relationship; | Yes / No |
| 3 | Agree that to capture this opportunity Aotearoa New Zealand should reinvest in strong, productive relationships across the Tasman at all levels, led by recommitment to the high-level architecture and engagement between key ministerial counterparts as a matter of priority; | Yes / No |
| 4 | Note that further strategic policy priorities for engagement with the incoming Australian Government include ^{s6(a)} | |
| 5 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister and relevant Ministers. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

Australian Federal Election 2022

Pūrongo – Report

1. The purpose of this submission is:
 - 1.1. To report on the anticipated implications for Aotearoa New Zealand of the incoming Albanese-led Labor government, ^{s6(a)}
 - 1.2. To identify strategic policy priorities to guide early ministerial engagement with the new Government.

Australian election 2022: Labor victorious

2. Anthony Albanese has been sworn in as the 31st Prime Minister of Australia, and will lead the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to form the next government. At the time of writing it is not yet clear whether Labor will make the 76 Lower House seats necessary for a majority government, or whether it will need to secure support from independents or the Green Party to ensure confidence and supply.

3. Despite a degree of uncertainty around the exact shape of the new government formation, it is clear that ^{s6(a)}

4. Albanese and incoming Foreign Minister Penny Wong both struck a conciliatory tone in their election night comments, recommitting to the Uluru Statement from the Heart and signalling a government that will seek to overcome divisions and growing polarisation across regional, suburban and urban Australia. Senator Wong summed up the result as follows:

“Australians have chosen and they have chosen change. Australians have chosen and they have chosen hope. Australians have chosen and they have looked to the future. A better future for all. A government that will act on climate change. A government for women. A government that will look to unify. To bring people together. Not to divide. A Labor government. An Albanese Labor government. Australians chose hope.”

5. ^{s6(a)}
Albanese and Wong are travelling to the meeting of the Quad in Japan this week.
- ^{s6(a)}

Australian Federal Election 2022

The Albanese Administration in the world – s6(a)

6. While foreign policy was elevated s9(2)(g)(i) during the election campaign, s6(a)

8. The ALP have set out three overarching principles for the Australian foreign policy agenda: first, projecting modern Australia to the region and the world, including through development of a First Nations foreign policy; second, fostering genuine partnerships by demonstrating authenticity and trustworthiness; third, enhancing its capability in navigating international relationships.

s6(a)

11. To support these objectives, Labor is focused on rebuilding Australia's diplomatic and development capacity, including through beefing up the resourcing and capability of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Anthony Albanese has outlined a vision for

Australian Federal Election 2022

international engagement that “rebuilds our diplomatic service [and] revitalises our international aid program”. Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong has called for “a rebuilding of our development assistance program” and diplomatic capacity, particularly in the region.

12. s6(a)

The trans-Tasman relationship – s6(a)

Ma te kotahitanga e whai kaha ai tātou - in togetherness we have strength

13. The change in Australian leadership for the first time since 2013 comes at the same time as the world emerges from a global pandemic into a less stable geostrategic environment.
s6(a)

15. s6(a)

. In a speech by PM Albanese prior to the election, he said he saw New Zealand as a central partner in the regional effort to support Australia’s security and economic strength, and to shape the world for the better. He bemoaned, that “for too long Canberra has preferred to talk at Wellington rather than realising the potential of our shared experiences.”

Strategic policy priorities to pursue with the Albanese Administration

Waiho i te toipoto, kaua i te toiroa – let us keep close together not far apart

16. s6(a)

Australian Federal Election 2022

s6(a)

17. Explanatory commentary and further context is provided in the annex to this submission, s6(a)

18. There is a well-established trans-Tasman 'architecture' of ministerial-level meetings which will roll out over the coming weeks once the new government is in place. These meetings will provide important opportunities to draw on the above strategic priorities to set the tone for the bilateral relationship and for how we will work together in the region and globally. This includes the following meetings.

Foreign Ministers' Consultations (New Zealand, mid-June)

Australia-New Zealand Leaders' Meeting (Sydney, 7/8 July)

Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum (Sydney, 7/8 July), along with potentially a Single Economic Market ministerial meeting

Closer Economic Relations Ministerial Meeting (New Zealand, TBC)

19. A number of other important ministerial-level engagements are also already on the annual calendar, for example the Closer Defence Relations ministerial meeting, s6(a)

Australian Federal Election 2022

s6(a)

MFAT officials and our network of NZ Inc representatives in Australia stand ready to work with ministerial offices and lead agencies to support engagement with the Australian system at all levels. Updated guidance on MFAT support to ministerial visits to Australia is also being issued to help streamline this engagement over coming months.

Released under the Official Information Act

Australian Federal Election 2022

Annex: key policy issues, opportunities and risks

New Zealanders in Australia

1. Australia's turn to more hard-line immigration policies over the past 20 years has significantly affected some New Zealand citizens living in Australia, and been an ongoing irritant in the bilateral relationship. A large proportion of New Zealanders in Australia have little or no access to the entitlements and opportunities of Australian permanent residency and citizenship. Australia's deportation policy in particular remains corrosive to the bilateral relationship and vexing to the New Zealand public.

2. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

s6(a)

Indigenous foreign policy

Australian Federal Election 2022

6. Penny Wong has announced the ALP's intention to deliver a First Nation's Foreign Policy "that weaves the voices and practices of the world's oldest continuing culture into the way we talk to the world". This builds on earlier commitments to put First Nations Peoples at the heart of Australian diplomacy, and will include appointment of an Australian First Nation's Ambassador. This development opens up a unique opportunity for Aotearoa New Zealand to enhance our engagement with Australia on developing indigeneity into a meaningful element of our respective foreign policy kete.

7. In the first instance this could include sharing your experiences of implementing an approach to an indigenous foreign policy for Aotearoa New Zealand, ^{s6(a)}

8. ^{s6(a), s6(b)(i)}

^{s9(2)(f)(iv)}

while activities under the Single Economic Market agenda and Aotearoa New Zealand Australia Indigenous Collaboration Arrangement will enable policy dialogue on areas of interest to both countries.

Pacific

9. Pacific policy leapt to the forefront of the election campaign following announcement of the Solomon Islands-China security deal, with Labor contending that the pact represented a broader failure of the Coalition's Pacific Step Up programme and that this failure had severely undermined Australia's and the region's security.

10. Harnessing the momentum, Shadow Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong unveiled Labor's Pacific plan on 26 April. The key proposals include:

- Establishing a new Australia-Pacific Defence School to train Pacific defence and security forces (AUD 6.5 million over four years from existing defence budgets);
- Doubling funding for the Pacific Maritime Security Program (AUD 12 million per year from 2024-25);
- Delivering an Indo-Pacific Broadcasting Strategy to boost Australian media content to regional audiences as well as deliver journalist training (AUD 8 million to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) to expand its transmission);
- Lifting ODA to the Pacific and Timor-Leste by AUD 525 million over the next four years;
- Establishing a Pacific Climate Infrastructure Financing Partnership to support climate and clean energy infrastructure projects in the Pacific;
- Reinstating regular bipartisan Parliamentary Pacific visits;

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- Reforming the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) Scheme's Seasonal Worker Program (SWP); and
- Encouraging more Pacific permanent migration to Australia through a new Pacific Engagement visa (modelled on New Zealand's Pacific Access Category resident visa).

11. s6(a)

13. s6(a), s6(b)(i)

14. s6(a)

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Australian Federal Election 2022

16. s6(a)

Climate Change

17. While climate change remains a politically sensitive issue for Australia, s6(a)

The ALP has publically pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 43 per cent by 2030. That's slightly less than the 45 per cent target the party took to the last election, but it's higher than the Coalition's long-standing target of 26 to 28 per cent.

18. s6(a)

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s6(a)

21. s6(a)

Defence and national security

25. s6(a)

Released under the Official Information Act

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27. s6(a)

China

29. s6(a)

Released under the Official Information Act

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Economic relationship

33. We largely expect policy continuity on trade and economic matters under a Labor administration, which will remain committed to protecting the international rules-based trading system and to pursuing new opportunities for exporters, e.g. through concluding FTA negotiations with the EU. ^{s6(a)}

35. Our economic relationship is underpinned by the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER), our oldest and most comprehensive FTA. CER enables our world-leading economic integration and benefits businesses and people on both sides of the Tasman enormously. ^{s6(a)}

As the 40th anniversary of CER approaches in 2023, we have an opportunity to set some genuine ambition for the future of our joint economic interests with the ALP, looking a decade ahead to CER's 50th anniversary to develop long term economic policy that will continue to benefit both countries and is inclusive and sustainable.

36. ^{s6(a)}

-

Released under the Official Information Act

Briefing for meeting: Jeremiah Manele, Solomon Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, Wednesday 25 May, 11-11:30am

Haurongo – Biography



Jeremiah Manele [*“ma-ne/ee”*] was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade in 2019. A career diplomat, Manele was previously Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs and External Trade.

s6(a)

You also spoke with Manele by phone on 30 November 2021, to relay our solidarity with Solomon Islands during recent unrest and our intention to deploy security personnel to help restore peace and stability.

Ngā whakaritenga - Call logistics

- He-Mihi – Greeting: Gudfala moning lo iu (Good morning to you).
- It is likely this call will have a s6(a)
- This will be a Zoom call. Aotearoa New Zealand will initiate.
- Whakapāho – Social media: We recommend a tweet following the call, and a short read out for the MFAT website. A draft is attached. We will also note the call in the press release on the extension of the New Zealand Defence Force deployment to Solomon Islands.

Ngā Whāinga – Objectives

- Highlight the depth and breadth of our partnership with Solomon Islands including the extension of our deployment to the Solomon Islands International Assistance Force (SIAF); and s6(a)
- Engage with Solomon Islands on the importance of working within existing regional architecture to discuss geostrategic challenges we face as a region.
- Make direct representations on the Solomon Islands – China Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation, s6(a)
- s6(a)
- s9(2)(f)(iv)

Ngā Take - Issues

Aotearoa New Zealand's partnership with Solomon Islands

- **We are committed to our deep and long-standing partnership with Solomon Islands, aligned with the Pacific resilience approach and underpinned by mutual recognition of our mana and sovereignty.**

- We recognise the **severe impacts of COVID-19 and November's unrest** and are committed to supporting Solomon Islands in weathering these challenges.
- **Our partnership promotes peace** through our security cooperation, **as well as by addressing economic instability and climate change**, in supporting health, education, other basic services, sustainable livelihoods, infrastructure, and good governance.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

Extension to the New Zealand Defence Force deployment

- Aotearoa New Zealand is **proud of the success of the Pacific-led Solomon Islands International Assistance Force (SIAF)**.
- Ministers have recently **approved an extension of Aotearoa New Zealand's mandate for deployment** to Solomon Islands as part of the SIAF. The mandate has been extended by **twelve months** and will be **reviewed again by 31 May 2023**.

Engaging on geostrategic challenges as a region

- In navigating a **challenging geostrategic environment**, our firm view is that we are stronger when we **work together as a region**.
- s6(a) Our strong messaging to all partners is to engage in the Pacific in a manner that is **consistent with regional norms and practices**, and **supportive of regional institutions**.
- Aotearoa New Zealand supports **regional dialogue through the Pacific Islands Forum**. Our key priority for this year's Leaders' Meeting is the adoption of the *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent*, providing the basis for engaging with Forum Dialogue Partners.
- We are also firmly committed to **working together as a Pacific family to meet our region's security needs**, as set out in the *Biketawa* and *Boe* Declarations.

Solomon Islands – China security agreement

- Ministers Manele and Veke's **recent address to Forum Members** on the security agreement with China was a **useful initial conversation**. We look forward to continuing this discussion at the upcoming Forum Foreign Ministers' and Leaders' meetings in July.

s6(a)

s6(a)

If raised

s6(a)

- *Labour mobility/RSE:* We were pleased to welcome 148 Solomon Islands workers in November last year. We are preparing for more regularised labour mobility processes as our border opens, and look forward to working with Solomon Islands on this.

Pacific Melanesia and Micronesia Division
May 2022

ERS Aide Memoire: Operation WHIO

- You and the Minister of Defence seek Cabinet’s agreement to extend New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) commitments to Operation WHIO. The deployment supports United Nations Security Council (UNSC) **sanctions enforcement against North Korea**.
- The paper recommends a ^{s6(a)} extension ^{s6(a)} ^{s6(a)} Alternative options are: maintaining our current personnel commitment ^{s6(a)} , or withdrawal. ^{s9(2)(g)(i)}
- Specifically, the recommended option (Option One) asks Cabinet to:
 - Approve the extension of the mandate for the ^{s6(a)} at the ^{s6(a)} Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) ^{s6(a)} and increase the contribution ^{s6(a)}
 - Agree in-principle to ^{s6(a)} and
 - Authorise Ministers to ^{s6(a)}
- Aotearoa New Zealand has contributed personnel and P-3K2 maritime surveillance aircraft to efforts to enforce UN sanctions against North Korea on five occasions since 2018. These efforts are carried out with eight other partners through the Pacific Security Monitoring Exchange (PSMX)¹.
- ^{s6(a)}
- New Zealand’s contribution to PSMX activities is **a tangible demonstration of our support for international law, the international rules-based system and nuclear non-proliferation efforts**. PSMX deployments support the implementation of UNSC sanctions by detecting and deterring North Korea’s sanctions evasion activities at sea, thereby increasing the political and economic costs of nuclear activities and decreasing the flow of revenue to North Korea.
- **PSMX participation also brings significant relationship benefits**, given the value of our contribution alongside partners. Further, ^{s6(a)}

¹ Japan, the United States, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, France and New Zealand.

RESTRICTED

- **North Korea has increased inter-continental ballistic missile tests in recent months.** Future tests, and development of capability, could threaten the security of the Pacific. Further support by Aotearoa New Zealand to the PSMX would continue a tangible contribution to one of the most pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

s6(a)

International Security and Disarmament Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
May 2022

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RESTRICTED



22 June 2022

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For approval by

30 June 2022

Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

BRIEFING Decision Submission

PURPOSE To seek approval for up to NZ\$8.5 million to extend the Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme (SIPSP) for 24 months to provide continuity of policing support while SIPSP is reviewed and a future phase is designed.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister	For information by	8 July 2022
Minister of Police	For information by	8 July 2022
Minister of Defence	For information by	8 July 2022
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs	For information by	8 July 2022

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Mark Ramsden	Divisional Manager	Pacific Melanesia and Micronesia Division	s9(2)(a)
Richard Griffith	Unit Manager	Pacific Melanesia and Micronesia Division	s9(2)(a)

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Noted	<input type="checkbox"/> Referred
<input type="checkbox"/> Needs amendment	<input type="checkbox"/> Declined	<input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn
<input type="checkbox"/> Overtaken by events	<input type="checkbox"/> See Minister's notes	

Comments

Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

Pito matua – Key points

- Your approval is sought to: extend the Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme (SIPSP) by 24 months until 30 June 2024; and raise the SIPSP budget by NZ\$ 8.5 million. This would utilise the Solomon Islands bilateral International Development Cooperation core allocation, bringing total activity value to NZ\$21 million over seven years (2017-2024), within your delegation.
- An extension would allow time for an independent review of SIPSP, which would provide the basis for the design of a future phase of policing support. A review had been envisaged since 2021 but had been delayed due to COVID-19 ^{s6(a)}
- Support for Solomon Islands' security and stability through SIPSP advances ^{s6(a)} Solomon Islands' resilience, in keeping with the Tātou Tātou principle. It reaffirms Pacific regional capacity to meet Solomon Islands' security needs, ^{s6(a)} It is responsive to Solomon Islands Government's request for support to build Royal Solomon Islands Police Force capability.
- ^{s6(a)}



Jackie Frizelle
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

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Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|--|-----------------|
| 1 | Note the NZ\$12.5 million Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme (SIPSP) is due to conclude on 30 June 2022. | Yes / No |
| 2 | Approve NZ\$8.5 million in additional International Development Cooperation programme funding for a 24 month extension of SIPSP. | Yes / No |
| 3 | Note an extension aligns with New Zealand and Solomon Islands' agreed priorities. Our ongoing support is requested by Solomon Islands. | Yes / No |
| 4 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister, Minister of Police, Minister of Defence, and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

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Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

Pūrongo – Report

1. Enabling peace and stability requires engagement and investment in sustainable livelihoods, education, health and other basic services, infrastructure and good governance. These are the long-standing cornerstones of Aotearoa New Zealand's development partnership with Solomon Islands, alongside our security partnership, including support for community policing.
2. Since July 2017, MFAT has funded, under Official Development Assistance (ODA)¹, the NZ\$12.5m Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme (SIPSP), implemented by New Zealand Police (NZP). SIPSP followed Aotearoa New Zealand's policing contribution to the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) over 2003-2017.
3. The overarching goal of the SIPSP is a "Reduction in crime, victimisation and social harm" within Solomon Islands. SIPSP established funding for eight NZP advisors to work in partnership with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) on crime prevention and community policing, focused on developing and implementing Solomon Islands' Crime Prevention Strategy (CPS). Initially due to conclude on 30 June 2021, SIPSP was extended from within baseline funding until 30 June 2022 due to underspend in the programme associated with COVID-19.
4. The programme has successfully delivered capability building across RSIPF, setting RSIPF on a strong course to implement the CPS. NZP are considered regional leaders in community policing and the programme is highly valued by the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) and RSIPF. ^{s6(a)}

. Annex One provides further details on SIPSP.

The Solomon Islands security context and strategic rationale

5. Our support to RSIPF through SIPSP aligns with the Pacific Resilience approach principle of Tātou Tātou – All of us together. ^{s6(a)}

Security is also a Priority Area for Cooperation in the 2019-2023 New Zealand – Solomon Islands Statement of Partnership.

6. ^{s6(a)}

7. Both SIG and RSIPF have indicated their interest in continuing to receive policing advisory support from Aotearoa New Zealand. Ongoing work is required to further embed the CPS and a community-oriented policing approach within the RSIPF. ^{s6(a)}

¹ ODA rules set out strict parameters for police and security activities that are eligible; at a very broad level, advisory and capability building support is eligible while operational activities are not.

Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

s6(a)

Proposed extension to SIPSP

9. MFAT seeks your approval to extend SIPSP by 24 months until 30 June 2024, enabling ongoing progress building RSIPF's crime prevention and community policing capabilities and supporting Solomon Islands' long-term stability. ^{s6(a)}

10. During the extension period, an independent review of SIPSP would be completed. SIG requested a review in 2021; this is under way following delays due to COVID-19 ^{s6(a)}. On completion of the review, NZP would lead the design of a next phase of support in coordination with MFAT and RSIPF. The review and the design process would be expected to be completed by Q4 2023.

11. ^{s6(a)}

Funding implications

12. MFAT seeks approval to raise the SIPSP activity budget by NZ\$ 8.5 million for a 24-month extension of SIPSP, using Solomon Islands bilateral core allocation of International Development Cooperation funds. In addition to the NZ\$ 12.5 million already approved for this activity in 2017, the whole-of-activity funding amount would grow to NZ\$ 21 million over seven years (2017 – 2024).

Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

13. The NZ\$ 8.5 million would cover:

s9(2)(j)

Complementary security initiatives

14. The ongoing New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) deployment to the regional Solomon Islands International Assistance Force (SIAF), approved by Ministers with Powers to Act in response to the November unrest in Honiara, is distinct from but complementary to the SIPSP. It is not eligible for ODA funding, as deployed NZDF personnel are able to undertake operational roles (s6(a), s9(2)(f)(iv))

. NZDF and NZP coordinate closely to ensure that their activities with RSIPF are not duplicative or counterproductive. Both SIPSP and the NZDF deployment are consistent with regional frameworks including the commitment to support each other to meet our broader ambitions for Pacific security.

s6(a)


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Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

Annex One: Further details on SIPSP

SIPSP objectives

- The overarching goal of the SIPSP is a “Reduction in crime, victimisation and social harm” within Solomon Islands. The key objectives of the programme are:
 - Supporting the development and operationalisation of RSIPF’s Crime Prevention Strategy (CPS);
 - Assisting the development of RSIPF operational leadership and organisational capability so that the CPS becomes embedded within the RSIPF and supported across Solomon Islands institutions;
 - Developing systems and policies for the delivery of provincial policing and RSIPF messaging, and establishing consistent nationwide training to assist with the implementation of the CPS.



The New Zealand Police approach

- NZP takes a collaborative and inclusive approach to working with Pacific partners, with a focus on understanding each Commissioner’s priorities and how NZP can support their achievement. NZP closely collaborates with the Australian Federal Police to de-conflict and coordinate on respective activities in the Pacific.

Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

- NZP is uniquely positioned to support RSIPF with community-orientated policing approaches. The CPS is modelled on NZP's Prevention First policing model, and there are similarities in our and Solomon Islands' operating and legislative frameworks. ^{s6(a)}
- s6(a)


Recent adaptations and current focus

- The recent unrest, and Solomon Islands' transition out of the acute phase of the pandemic, has seen the number of SIPSP advisors scale up to six (having been at four, or less than four, since March 2020), and lengthen deployments to 12 months. ^{s6(a)}
- SIPSP advisors are now shifting focus back to mentoring and advisory work, primarily supporting RSIPF to embed a crime prevention approach and deliver community engagement activities. This is particularly important to help re-build trust and confidence with communities.

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Solomon Islands Policing Support Programme: two-year extension

Annex Two: Other Key Information



Resilience: This activity supports governance and social resilience in Solomon Islands

Impact: This activity will make Solomon Islands communities safer and more resilient by addressing the drivers of insecurity and crime

Measuring impact: The activity's impact will be measured by regular partner reviews to assess progress against agreed outputs and objectives

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): This activity will contribute to the Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions SDG



9 September 2022

Minister of Foreign Affairs

For action by

19 September 2022

Nuclear Shipment Through the Tasman Sea

BRIEFING Overview Submission

PURPOSE To provide information about a regular shipment of nuclear fuel that will pass through the Tasman Sea in October en route from France to Japan.

Tukunga tūtohua – Recommended referrals

Prime Minister

For information by

23 September 2022

Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control

For information by

23 September 2022

Taipitopito whakapā – Contact details

NAME	ROLE	DIVISION	WORK PHONE
Cecile Hillyer	Divisional Manager	International Security and Disarmament Division	s9(2)(a)
Katy Donnelly	Unit Manager	International Security and Disarmament Division	s9(2)(a)

Mā te Tari Minita e whakakī – Minister's Office to complete

 Approved Noted Referred Needs amendment Declined Withdrawn Overtaken by events See Minister's notes**Comments**

Nuclear Shipment Through the Tasman Sea

Pito matua – Key points

- s6(b)(i)
a regular shipment of mixed oxide nuclear fuel that will depart France on or around 6 September 2022, bound for Japan. The two specially-designed vessels carrying that material will travel via the Cape of Good Hope and are expected to transit through the Tasman Sea in October en route through the western Pacific.
- Japan transports used nuclear fuel by ships from its civilian nuclear power reactors to France and the United Kingdom (UK) for reprocessing. It is then returned to Japan as either a new type of nuclear fuel or as nuclear waste which is stabilised for long-term storage. The shipments use a variety of routes, only one of which comes through the Tasman Sea. The most recent shipment using this route took place in October 2021.
- Aotearoa New Zealand has previously called for the highest security and safety standards for these shipments, and for shipping states to provide adequate information about them. s9(2)(g)(i)

It is our understanding that the arrangements made by the UK-based shipping company (Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited) meet or exceed international standards. s6(a)

s6(b)(i)

- s6(a)

- s9(2)(f)(iv)

Ben King
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Nuclear Shipment Through the Tasman Sea

Tūtohu – Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

- | | | |
|---|--|-----------------|
| 1 | Note the planned shipment of nuclear fuel from France to Japan, departing on or around 6 September 2022, that will pass through the Tasman Sea en route to the western Pacific; | Yes / No |
| 2 | s6(a) | Yes / No |
| 3 | | Yes / No |
| 4 | s9(2)(f)(iv) | Yes / No |
| 5 | Refer a copy of this submission to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control for their information. | Yes / No |

Hon Nanaia Mahuta
Minister of Foreign Affairs / Minita Take Aorere

Date: / /

Nuclear Shipment Through the Tasman Sea

Pūrongo – Report

Background

1. The reprocessing and transport of Japanese nuclear materials is conducted with the support of the UK, French and Japanese governments. The nuclear fuel contained in this shipment consists of a mixture of uranium 235 and small amounts of plutonium (making it known as mixed oxide or “MOX” fuel). The presence of plutonium makes the material particularly sensitive, as plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons.
2. There are three possible shipping routes between Europe and Japan, all of which are used from time to time: (i) through the Panama Canal, (ii) via the southern tip of South America, or (iii) via the Cape of Good Hope and then through the Tasman Sea and western Pacific. This will be the eighth shipment of mixed oxide fuel through the Tasman Sea.

Safety considerations

3. The UK-flagged shipping company (Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited) uses two purpose-built vessels for transporting nuclear materials (Pacific Heron and Pacific Egret). They have dual hulls and propulsion systems, and extended range to avoid entering ports en route. Packaging of the fuel meets or exceeds relevant international standards.
s6(b)(i)

s6(a)

s6(b)(i)

5. Aotearoa New Zealand has been active in international discussions on communications protocols for the transport of nuclear materials, including through an agreement on best practices in the International Atomic Energy Agency. We also take part in international discussions around liability for nuclear transport accidents, where the scope for compensation for reputational damage is still not well defined. s6(a)

Nuclear Shipment Through the Tasman Sea

s9(2)(g)(i)

s6(a)

s9(2)(g)(i)

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